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CHAPTER 1: GENERAL INTRODUCTION 
“Errare humanum est, perseverare diabolicum” 
“To err is human, to persist is of the devil” 
(Seneca the younger)
This famous quote emphasizes the importance of action-monitoring and 
error-detection brain processes for adaptive behavior. To not persist in making 
errors necessarily implies that these errors are swiftly detected as distinctive 
motivational events, and they eventually guide or promote learning, thanks to 
dedicated action-monitoring systems in the human brain (Holroyd & Coles, 
2002). Usually, error monitoring does not operate in isolation, but is part of a 
larger executive control system that enables to exert control over behavior, and 
is composed of several key cognitive components: inhibition, updating and 
shifting (Miyake et al., 2000). While inhibition refers to the ability to suppress 
dominant pre-potent responses, irrelevant information in the external 
environment or distracting thoughts, updating is defined as the active 
manipulation of relevant information in working memory. Shifting can be seen as 
the capacity to quickly alternate between different tasks or mental states. This 
prefrontal-based executive control system has generally been conceived in the 
past as an efficient cognitive monitoring system operating on specific mental 
processes, independently of changes in affect or emotion (Bush, Luu, & Posner, 
2000; Duncan & Owen, 2000). However, more recently, this classical view has 
somewhat been challenged and systematic influences of affective dimensions on 
this prefrontal executive control system have been taken into account, and 
eventually modeled to explain how control over behavior may be exerted to 
cope with fast changing contingencies in the environment (Rushworth, Mars, & 
Summerfield, 2009). In this perspective, executive control systems and affective 
control systems are no longer seen as fully separate or non-overlapping, but 
instead reciprocal and dynamic interactions between these systems are thought 
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to govern the implementation of adaptive behavior (Etkin, Egner, & Kalisch, 
2011; Mansouri, Tanaka, & Buckley, 2009). According to Pessoa (2009) and 
Bishop (2007), executive control may be influenced by emotion, either in a 
‘stimulus-driven’ or in a ‘state dependent’ manner. In the former case, emotional 
stimuli (e.g. emotional faces or affective scenes), disrupt goal-directed 
processing and attention allocation (Corbetta & Shulman, 2002; Vuilleumier, 
2005). By contrast, state-dependent effects can be induced by reward-related 
manipulations for example (Hickey, Chelazzi, & Theeuwes, 2010; Kennerley & 
Wallis, 2009) or may be related to specific pre-existing traits or affective 
dimensions that shape online executive control as well. In particular, negative 
affect like anxiety and depression has often been linked to alterations in 
executive control processes (Bishop, 2007; Elliott, 1998; Eysenck, Derakshan, 
Santos, & Calvo, 2007; Visu-Petra, Miclea, & Visu-Petra, 2012). In this work, I 
focus on these latter effects and how they influence error monitoring brain 
processes. 
In this context, error monitoring is no exception to the rule, and a growing 
number of studies and models have confirmed how deeply intricate error-related 
affective and cognitive control processes are (Frank, Woroch, & Curran, 2005; 
Ullsperger, Harsay, Wessel, & Ridderinkhof, 2010). Errors (committed with 
neutral stimuli using well-controlled laboratory tasks, such as the Stroop or 
Flanker task) are not simply noisy events inadvertently promoting learning 
(Holroyd & Coles, 2002), they are also able to trigger a cascade of affective or 
defensive reactions (Hajcak & Foti, 2008; Pourtois et al., 2010), as well as specific 
attentional orienting effects (Notebaert et al., 2009; Ridderinkhof, Ramautar, & 
Wijnen, 2009), suggesting that they are swiftly processed as distinctive 
motivational events, and hence they are not devoid of emotion (Luu, Collins, & 
Tucker, 2000). For example, a recurrent and robust finding in the affective 
neuroscience literature is the overactive or hyper sensitive error-monitoring 
system found in individuals with enhanced negative affect, including trait anxiety 
or depression (Endrass et al., 2010; Olvet & Hajcak, 2008; Vaidyanathan, Nelson, 
& Patrick, 2012). However, the exact functional meaning of these overactive 
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error-monitoring effects remains unclear. Do they reflect a general break-down 
in executive control in these participants, or rather a differential motivational or 
affective reaction during the processing of these adverse events? The goal of my 
PhD dissertation was to address these questions using standard experimental 
methods, and more specifically to better characterize possible changes in error-
monitoring brain processes [when they are explored primarily using advanced 
Electroencephalogram (EEG)/Event-related potentials (ERP) methods] induced by 
anxiety or depression, and eventually clarify their functional meaning. To explore 
error monitoring in (sub clinical) high anxious or clinically depressed patients, I 
used a common Go/noGo task and methodology. In this task, the differential 
processing of a specific type of error is investigated, namely the failure to inhibit 
a pre-potent response tendency (Miyake et al., 2000). In these conditions, 
participants have to rely primarily on an internal (pre-existing or stored) 
representation of their action to infer whether a response error has been made 
or not. These conditions are therefore optimal to explore changes in early error-
monitoring processes as a function of anxiety or depression, given that these two 
traits have usually been seen as resulting from “internalizing” troubles (Krueger, 
1999). By contrast, in some other daily-life situations, performance monitoring 
cannot be achieved solely based on an internal (motor) representation of the 
action, but the additional processing of external cues in the environment (i.e. 
feedback) is needed to gauge whether the action is correct or not (Holroyd, 
Hajcak, & Larsen, 2006). This aspect was also addressed in my dissertation in 
such a way to assess whether negative affect (trait anxiety) influences internal 
and external action-monitoring processes equally. Finally, I also devised a new 
method enabling to decipher “online” the actual affective value of actions 
generated by participants during the Go/noGo task in order to gain insight into 
the extent and nature of the substantial changes induced by anxiety or 
depression during early error (and action) monitoring in this task. 
This introductory section is organized as follows. First, I review 
neuroscientific evidence from ERP and activation studies in the literature, that 
have focused on delineating the electrophysiological properties and time-course 
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of error detection, and action-monitoring brain mechanisms more generally. 
Next, I focus on the phenomenology of “negative affect” in psychology and 
experimental psychopathology, and more specifically trait anxiety and 
depression, before clarifying the nature and extent of changes in performance-
monitoring and error-detection brain processes accounted for by each of these 
two psychopathological conditions. Finally, I outline the content of the five 
empirical chapters and three main research questions included in this 
dissertation. 
ERROR MONITORING 
In 1966, Rabbitt reported that individuals systematically slowed down for 
trials immediately following an error in a continuous performance choice-
response task, while no similar slowing effect was found for trials following 
correct responses. This post-error slowing effect (Laming, 1979) provides 
evidence for the existence of remedial or adaptive (perhaps attentional 
orienting) processes following error detection (Danielmeier & Ullsperger, 2011; 
Notebaert et al., 2009), and hence, it lends support to the idea of core automatic 
error-detection systems triggering this (secondary) regulative effect. Based on 
these behavioral results, one may thus assume that cognitive control likely 
operates thanks to an early error-detection mechanism that in turn leads to a 
second regulation or adaptive effect, preventing errors to repeat because more 
control or attention is suddenly exerted once these adverse events have properly 
been detected (Botvinick, Braver, Barch, Carter, & Cohen, 2001). Significant 
insights into error-monitoring processes (and more specifically the existence of 
early, automatic and generic error-detection processes in the human brain) have 
more recently been obtained using ERPs. A large number of ERP studies have 
confirmed that error detection is associated with specific error-related ERP 
components, early on following the onset of the incorrect key press (or motor 
command), and presumably based on an internal representation of (motor) 
actions (e.g. corollary discharge originating from the motor cortex; see Sommer 
& Wurtz, 2008), given this ultra-fast time-course (Mathalon, Whitfield, & Ford, 
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2003). These deflections include the error-related negativity (ERN/Ne; 
Falkenstein, Hoormann, Christ, & Hohnsbein, 2000; Gehring, Goss, Coles, Meyer, 
& Donchin, 1993) and the error positivity (Pe; Falkenstein et al., 2000; 
Nieuwenhuis, Ridderinkhof, Blow, Band, & Kok, 2001). Moreover, an ERN/Ne-like 
component has also been reported and coined the feedback-related negativity 
(FRN; Luu, Tucker, Derryberry, Reed, & Poulsen, 2003; Miltner, Braun, & Coles, 
1997) in situations where action monitoring is necessarily based on the 
processing of external (evaluative) feedback, as opposed to internal motor 
representations in the case of the ERN/Ne and Pe components. 
Before I review the exact neurophysiological properties and likely 
functional meaning of these error-related ERP components, I first introduce the 
ERP technique in general, as well as the set of brain regions involved in error 
detection, or more broadly action monitoring. 
Event-related potentials (ERPs) 
The ERP technique 
ERPs provide a non-invasive and direct measure of brain activity related to 
the processing of specific events in the external environment (e.g. a visual 
stimulus), or in the participant (e.g. a response) (see Figure 1AB). ERPs are time-
resolved, because they provide a temporal resolution at a millisecond time scale, 
even though these recordings take place at distance (i.e. at the scalp level using 
specific electrodes or sensors) from the putative (cortical) dipolar brain 
generators. ERPs are not visible directly, but they are embedded in the 
electroencephalogram (EEG), which is the raw electrical signal of the brain being 
10 to 50 times larger in amplitude than the ERPs. Therefore, a standard 
averaging procedure is needed to extract ERPs from the continuous EEG (Rugg & 
Coles, 1995). This requirement has important implications regarding the 
interpretation of ERPs, which always represent a compound brain activity across 
many trials (Makeig, Debener, Onton, & Delorme, 2004). This is especially true in 
the case of response errors, which are usually rare and deviant events (Olvet & 
Hajcak, 2009b). The underlying assumption is that the neuronal activity 
generated for all individual events is stable and reproducible, such that the use 
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of an averaging procedure allows to remove the noise (which is by definition 
random across events) and to reliably identify the signal (which is systematic 
across the different individual events or presentations). This neuronal activity in 
response to an event and giving rise (after averaging) to a given ERP component 
(or multiple) actually corresponds to the synchronous activation of the post-
synaptic dendritic potentials of a large population of neurons. These (pyramidal) 
neurons are arranged in a geometrical configuration such as to yield a dipolar 
field. EEG is sensitive to both tangential and radial components of a current 
source. ERPs provide a direct estimate of these dipolar fields. Because the 
recording of the EEG usually occurs using scalp electrodes, the spatial resolution 
of the resulting ERPs is by definition limited, compared to other neuroimaging 
techniques, like functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging (fMRI) or Positron 
Emission Tomography (PET). However, a way to partly overcome this limitation is 
to use a large array of electrodes (up to 128, such as used in this dissertation) 
covering evenly and densely all scalp locations, and apply additional data 
analyses (including topographical mapping analyses; see Murray, Brunet, & 
Michel, 2008; Pourtois, Delplanque, Michel, & Vuilleumier, 2008) and 
mathematical transformations to gain insight into the underlying configuration of 
brain generators giving rise to the ERPs. For example, standardized low 
resolution brain electromagnetic tomography (sLORETA) (Pascual-Marqui, 2002) 
can be used as a powerful tool to source-localize the recorded ERP components 
and hence obtain additional critical information about the cortical regions 
involved in the generation of a specific ERP component (besides its actual 
amplitude and latency at the scalp level). I adopted this logic in my dissertation 
when using this specific technique and explored the malleability of error-related 
brain processes in anxiety or depression. Hence, ERPs provide a 
neurophysiological signal to timely study brain functions (Michel & Murray, 
2011), including performance monitoring and error detection. Each ERP 
component is usually characterized by specific and precise neurophysiological 
properties, including the latency (following the onset of the event), the 
amplitude, the polarity, the topography (i.e. distribution of the electric field over 
the scalp surface), as well as the underlying brain generators (Luck, 2005). In the 
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case of error detection and performance monitoring, many studies have already 
identified in the past several robust error-related or performance-monitoring-
related ERP components, and have clarified their specific neurophysiological 
properties, as reviewed in the next section. 
 
Figure 1. (A) Raw EEG. The rectangles show a 600 ms interval locked to the stimulus (B) EEG 
segments are averaged. 
The error-related negativity (ERN/Ne) 
The ERN/Ne is a negative component in the ERP (see Figure 2A), time-
locked and phase-locked to the onset of a response error, and is thought to 
reflect the neural activity of a larger dopaminergic-dependent system that is 
involved in the rapid monitoring of actions, and the detection of response errors 
(Falkenstein, Hohnsbein, Hoormann, & Blanke, 1991; Falkenstein et al., 2000; 
Frank et al., 2005; Gehring, Coles, Meyer, & Donchin, 1990; Gehring et al., 1993; 
Gehring & Willougby, 2002; Holroyd & Coles, 2002). The ERN/Ne is usually 
elicited between 0 and 100 ms post-error onset, is maximal at frontocentral 
electrodes, consistent with underlying brain sources located in the dorsal 
anterior cingulate cortex (dACC; Bediou, Koban, Rossett, Pourtois, & Sander, 
2012; Carter et al., 1998; Debener, Ullsperger, Fiehler, von Cramon, & Engel, 
2005; Dehaene, Posner, & Tucker, 1994; Herrmann, Rommler, Ehlis, Heidrich, & 
Fallgater, 2004; Kiehl, Liddle, & Hopfinger, 2000; O’Connell et al., 2007; Vocat, 
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Pourtois, & Vuilleumier, 2008). Given this ultra-fast unfolding in dACC following 
error detection, it has been advocated that the ERN/Ne reflects an early, generic 
and automatic reaction to errors, based on the rapid detection of a mismatch 
between the actual and intended, or desired, motor action, before any sensori-
motor or proprioceptive feedback comes into play (Bush et al., 2000). This early 
error-related component is generated regardless of the response modality or 
effector with which response errors are made (e.g. hand, finger and foot; 
Falkenstein et al., 2000; Holroyd, Dien, & Coles, 1998). Strikingly, error 
awareness is not necessary for the generation of the ERN/Ne (Nieuwenhuis et 
al., 2001; O’Connell et al., 2007; Shalgi, Barkan, & Deouell, 2009; but see Wessel, 
Danielmeier, & Ullsperger, 2011). The ERN/Ne is however larger when accuracy, 
as opposed to speed, is stressed in task instructions (Falkenstein et al. 2000; 
Gehring et al., 1993), as well as when errors become motivationally significant 
events (Bernstein, Scheffers, & Coles, 1995; Falkenstein et al., 2000; Hajcak & 
Foti, 2008; Hajcak, Moser, Yeung, & Simons, 2005). These two findings 
unambiguously link this early medial frontal ERP component to action-
monitoring and error-detection processes. 
Several theories have been put forward to account for these remarkable 
electrophysiological properties. Initially, this component was interpreted as 
reflecting a rough “cognitive” mismatch signal between the intended and actual 
motor action (Bernstein et al., 1995; Coles, Scheffers, & Holroyd, 2001; 
Falkenstein et al., 1991; Falkenstein et al., 2000; Gehring et al., 1993; Mathalon 
et al., 2003). Alternatively, Holroyd and Coles (2002) posited in their influential 
model that the ERN/Ne is a reward-prediction error signal. Using the 
reinforcement learning framework (Sutton & Barto, 1998), these authors stated 
that the ERN/Ne is generated when the current action is worse than the 
expected or desired one (see also Frank et al., 2005). This negative prediction 
error is reflected by a phasic decrease of dopamine in deep midbrain regions 
(Fiorillo, Tobler, & Schultz, 2003), which releases the dACC via specific fronto-
striatal loops (Seifert, von Cramon, Imperati, Tittgemeyer, & Ullsperger, 2011), 
and in turn yields the ERN/Ne component. Yet, another account for the ERN/Ne 
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was proposed by Botvinick et al. (2001). These authors underscored that the 
ERN/Ne is not specifically elicited following response errors, but rather signals a 
conflict among competing responses, like a tendency to respond vs. to withhold 
a response (see also Yeung, Botvinick, & Cohen, 2004). In this framework, 
response errors and conflicts are somehow lumped together, and therefore the 
ERN/Ne is not seen as an error-selective signal, but instead as a conflict-related 
component. Some authors have also found a link between the magnitude of the 
ERN/Ne and post-error adjustments in behavior, including the post-error slowing 
effect (Debener et al., 2005; Gehring et al., 1993). Finally, some authors have 
also advocated that the ERN/Ne corresponds to an affective evaluative signal 
related to the emotional or motivational significance of errors (Hajcak & Foti, 
2008; Luu et al., 2000; Luu et al., 2003; Tucker, Luu, Frishkoff, Quiring, & Poulsen, 
2003). Consistent with this view, these authors have reported changes in the 
amplitude of the ERN/Ne as a function of the negative affective state or trait of 
the participants. I present and discuss these findings more thoroughly later. 
 
Figure 2. (A) Illustration of the ERN/Ne and Pe components elicited following errors during a 
standard behavioral task (data from Amodio, Kubota, Harmon-Jones and Devine, 2006). (B) 
Illustration of the FRN component elicited following negative feedback during a gambling task 
(data from Hajcak, Moser, Holroyd, & Simons, 2006) 
The correct-related negativity (CRN) 
A negative component similar to the ERN/Ne but associated to correct 
responses, is the correct-related negativity (CRN). The CRN is typically smaller in 
amplitude than the ERN/Ne (see Figure 2A), but these two components share the 
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same early time-course following action execution, as well as the same medial 
frontal scalp distribution, and likely similar neural sources within the dACC (Vidal, 
Hasbroucq, Grapperon, & Bonnet, 2000). The observation of an ERN/Ne-like 
response in the absence of an error led some authors to argue that the ERN/Ne 
and CRN are actually not distinct, but they reflect the same generic early 
cognitive control process (Falkenstein et al., 2000; Roger, Bénar, Vidal, 
Hasbroucq, & Burle, 2010; Vidal, Burle, Bonnet, Grapperon, & Hasbroucq, 2003; 
Vidal et al., 2000). An increased CRN has also been related to enhanced response 
uncertainty (Coles et al., 2001; Pailing & Segalowitz, 2004a). At any rate, it 
remains important to establish whether motivational components or negative 
affect influences both the ERN/Ne and CRN components (Hajcak, McDonald, & 
Simons, 2004), or the ERN/Ne component alone, and therefore the early error-
monitoring processes selectively. This question too, was addressed in my PhD 
dissertation. 
The error-positivity (Pe) 
This ERN/Ne component is usually followed by a large positive component, 
the Pe (see Figure 2A). The Pe is a broad deflection resembling the P3 
component, peaking over the vertex (or more posterior parietal scalp positions 
along the midline, such as PZ) roughly 150-300 ms after response error onset, 
with neural generators involving possibly more rostral ACC as well as posterior 
cingulate and insular cortex regions, compared to the earlier ERN/Ne component 
(Dhar, Wiersema, & Pourtois, 2011; Falkenstein et al., 1991; Falkenstein et al., 
2000; Herrmann et al., 2004; Nieuwenhuis et al., 2001; O’Connell et al., 2007; 
Overbeek, Nieuwenhuis, & Ridderinkhof, 2005). This error-related component 
can be dissociated at the functional level from the preceding ERN/Ne component 
(Nieuwenhuis et al., 2001; Overbeek et al., 2005). Although the Pe is typically less 
investigated and hence less well understood than the ERN/Ne component in the 
literature, some authors have nevertheless linked this component to the 
conscious registration of response errors (Dhar et al., 2011; Endrass, Franke, & 
Kathmann, 2005; Leuthold & Sommer, 1999; Nieuwenhuis et al., 2001). 
Alternatively, it could also reflect an affective appraisal of errors (Falkenstein et 
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al., 2000; van Veen & Carter, 2002), a P300-like attention orienting response 
(Davies, Segalowitz, Dywan, & Pailing, 2001; Hajcak, McDonald, & Simons, 
2003b; Ridderinkhof et al., 2009), or an accumulation of evidence process that 
timely informs about error commission (Steinhauser & Yeung, 2010). 
The feedback-related negativity (FRN) 
Whereas the ERN/Ne or CRN, and Pe components reflect error detection 
based on internal monitoring processes, the feedback-related negativity (FRN, 
see Figure 2B) likely reflects the same process than the ERN/Ne, when it is 
achieved based on external stimuli (feedback; see Figure 2B). The FRN shares 
many electrophysiological properties with the response related ERN/Ne 
component: It is a negative component peaking at fronto-central electrodes 
roughly 250-300 ms post-negative (visual) feedback onset and that is likely 
generated within the dACC as the ERN/Ne (Gehring & Willoughby, 2002; Miltner 
et al., 1997). According to Holroyd and Coles (2002), the same dopaminergic-
dependent reinforcement learning brain system is at stake for the FRN and 
ERN/Ne, based on internal and external monitoring cues, respectively (see also 
Frank et al., 2005; Chase, Swainson, Durham, & Benham, 2011). Usually, the FRN 
is larger for negative compared to positive feedback and for unexpected 
compared to predictable outcomes (Holroyd, Nieuwenhuis, Yeung, & Cohen, 
2003). These findings point to the involvement of the FRN in the processing of 
the valence or reward value of the feedback. Hence, the FRN, when contrasted 
to the ERN/Ne, provides a powerful means to assess the efficiency of 
performance-monitoring brain processes when based on external, as opposed to 
internal, evaluative cues. Accordingly, possible differential effects of trait anxiety 
on internal (ERN/Ne) vs. external (FRN) monitoring processes were also 
investigated in this work by means of these two performance-monitoring ERP 
components. 
Brain areas associated with performance monitoring 
In addition to source localization analyses of ERP data that have shown the 
ubiquitous involvement of the dACC in the generation of the ERN/Ne, CRN, Pe 
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and FRN, fMRI studies have largely corroborated the importance of this region 
for performance monitoring and error detection (Bush et al., 2000). These brain 
mapping studies based on fMRI (or PET) have also clearly shown that this dACC 
region (sometimes called rostral cingulate zone, RCZ; see Klein et al., 2007) is not 
operating in isolation, but is actually part of a larger brain circuit (see Figure 3), 
encompassing fronto-striato-thalamo-cortical loops involved in performance 
monitoring (Danielmeier, Eichele, Forstmann, Tittgemeyer, & Ullsperger, 2011; 
Seifert et al., 2011; Ullsperger & von Cramon, 2006). 
Anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) 
Several ERP studies have identified the dACC as the main neural source of 
the ERN/Ne (Carter et al., 1998; Debener et al., 2005; Dehaene et al., 1994; 
Herrmann et al., 2004; Kiehl et al., 2000; O’Connell et al., 2007; Vocat et al., 
2008), Pe (Falkenstein et al., 1991; Falkenstein et al., 2000; Herrmann et al., 
2004; Nieuwenhuis et al., 2001; O’Connell et al., 2007; Overbeek et al., 2005), 
CRN (Vidal et al., 2000) or FRN component (Gehring & Willoughby, 2002; Holroyd 
& Coles, 2002). Although these neurophysiological studies have clearly confirmed 
the involvement of the dACC (or RCZ) in error monitoring (Bush et al., 2000; 
Devinsky, Morrell, & Vogt, 1995; Ridderinkhof, Ullsperger, Crone, & 
Nieuwenhuis, 2004), lesions of the RCZ (mainly resulting from corpus 
callosotomy or tumors) were nonetheless not always associated with clear cut 
error-monitoring or -detection impairments in humans, suggesting that this 
medial frontal cortex region is probably sufficient, but not necessary for normal 
error monitoring (Fellows & Farah, 2005). Neuro-anatomically, the ACC is part of 
the limbic system and more specifically forms the frontal/anterior part of the 
cingulate cortex (Brodmann Areas – BAs, 24, 32 and 33). The ACC classically 
consists of two major subdivisions that subserve distinct functions, an emotional 
rostral part (rACC; including BAs 24, 25, 32 and 33), and a cognitive dorsal part 
(dACC that includes BA 24 and 32) (Bush et al., 2000; Devinsky et al., 1995). The 
dACC has been shown to be activated during cognitively demanding tasks and is 
part of a larger attention network (Corbetta & Shulman, 2002) that includes the 
lateral prefrontal cortex (lPFC; BA 46/9), parietal cortex (BA7), premotor and 
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supplementary motor areas (BA6). By contrast, the affective rostral subdivision 
of the ACC is activated during affect-related tasks and is connected to the 
amygdala, periaqueductal gray, nucleus accumbens, hypothalamus, insula, 
hippocampus and orbitofrontal cortex (see Figure 3). Whereas the affective vs. 
cognitive subdivision of the ACC has proven to be particularly useful to account 
for a variety of activation patterns (Bush et al., 2000) or behavioral impairments 
following brain damage (Devinsky et al., 1995), more recently, alternative neuro-
anatomical models of the ACC have been put forward that somehow provide a 
more integrated (and less segregated) view of ACC functioning (Etkin et al., 
2011). 
FMRI or PET studies have found an increased ACC activity during error 
detection (Carter et al., 1998; Kiehl et al., 2000; Menon, Adleman, White, Glover, 
& Reiss, 2001; van Veen & Carter, 2002) and negative feedback processing 
(Holroyd & Coles, 2002). However, as was the case for the ERN/Ne, it is unclear 
from these activation studies whether this increased ACC activity reflects error 
detection per se, or more generally conflict detection (see Carter et al., 1998; 
Kerns et al., 2004). According to these theories, the dACC activation during error 
detection might actually reflect conflict monitoring, and in turn an enhanced 
engagement of cognitive control. Alternatively, an enhanced ACC activation to 
errors or even conflicts might reflect an appraisal of the distinctive affective or 
motivational value of these events, not because they are errors or conflicts by 
themselves, but because these specific events are negatively marked (Dreisbach 
& Fischer, 2012) and therefore, they usually readily signal a need to exert 
enhanced control on behavior (Hajcak & Foti, 2008; Hajcak et al., 2005; Luu et al., 
2003; Pizzagalli, Peccoralo, Davidson, & Cohen, 2006; Polli et al., 2009). 
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Figure 3. Key brain regions typically associated with performance monitoring. Image taken from 
http://brain.mcmaster.ca/cp720/ 
Lateral Prefrontal Cortex (lPFC) 
The lPFC is a key structure involved in executive functions and cognitive 
control (Botvinick et al., 2001; Duncan & Owen, 2000; Rushworth, Buckley, 
Behrens, Walton, & Bannerman, 2007). The lPFC has been related to the 
maintenance and updating of task sets (Barber & Carter, 2005; Brass & von 
Cramon, 2004; Bunge, Klingberg, Jacobsen, & Gabrieli, 2000; Derfuss, Brass, & 
Von Cramon, 2004; MacDonald, Cohen, Stenger, & Carter, 2000). With respect to 
error monitoring, activity in the lPFC has been linked not so much to the quick 
evaluative component, but more to the subsequent regulation component 
following “automatic” error detection. More specifically, when an error is 
committed and an ERN/Ne is rapidly generated in the dACC, an increase in 
attentional control is subsequently needed and this remedial process would be 
reflected in an increased activity in the dorso lPFC following errors (Carter et al., 
1998; Debener et al., 2005; Garavan, Ross, Murphy, Roche, & Stein, 2002; 
Ridderinkhof et al., 2004; Swick & Turken, 2002). Lesion studies also showed that 
unilateral damage to the lPFC resulted in an impaired generation of the 
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electrophysiological markers of error processing (Ullsperger, von Cramon, & 
Muller, 2002; Gehring & Knight, 2000). Both studies showed a blunted difference 
between correct and incorrect trials at the level of the ERN/Ne-CRN following 
lPFC damage. Moreover, Ullsperger and von Cramon (2006) additionally showed 
that patients with lesions circumscribed to the lPFC had a smaller ERN/Ne, and 
no Pe or CRN component. Based on these results, one can conclude that lPFC 
seems to play an important role in the early evaluation of actions and errors, as 
early as when the ERN/Ne reaches its maximum amplitude. 
Basal Ganglia 
The basal ganglia consisting of a group of nuclei at the base of the 
forebrain play an important role in error monitoring as well, especially its 
constitutive mesencephalic dopamine system. Phasic changes in spiking activity 
of dopaminergic neurons within this system are thought to signal errors in 
reward prediction to the striatum, as well as to the cortex (Fiorillo et al., 2003; 
Jocham, Klein, & Ullsperger, 2011). This phasic change in levels of dopamine in 
the forebrain remotely influences the ACC region, given the fronto-striatal loops 
connecting these non-overlapping brain regions, especially during performance 
monitoring (Seifert et al., 2011). The reinforcement learning theory of the 
ERN/Ne component is actually based on this specific brain circuitry, and hence 
indirectly to dopaminergic changes in the forebrain and basal ganglia during 
early error detection (Frank et al., 2005; Holroyd & Coles, 2002). More 
specifically, phasic decreases in dopamine activity, indicating a negative reward 
prediction error (i.e. when the action is worse than expected), are associated 
with a larger ERN/Ne component and phasic increases, indicating a positive 
reward prediction error (i.e. when the action is better than expected), with a 
smaller ERN/Ne component. Accordingly, lesions of the basal ganglia have been 
related to an impaired ERN/Ne component, as well as to the absence of a Pe and 
CRN components during error monitoring (Ullsperger & von Cramon, 2006). 
Moreover, after the administration of a dopaminergic agonist, the early ERN/Ne 
was found to be larger (De Bruijn, Hulstijn, Verkes, Ruigt, & Sabbe, 2004), while it 
was smaller after the administration of a dopaminergic antagonist (Zirnheld et 
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al., 2004), linking this specific neurotransmitter to early error-detection brain 
processes reflected by the ERN/Ne ERP component. Also patients with selective 
dopaminergic deficits in the basal ganglia, like Parkinson patients, show reduced 
ERN/Ne amplitudes during error commission (Falkenstein et al., 2001; Holroyd & 
Coles, 2002). Lesions in the striatum have also been shown to affect the 
amplitude of the ERN/Ne component (Ullsperger & von Cramon, 2006). 
Other brain regions 
As clearly outlined here above, error detection is not circumscribed to the 
ACC, but accumulating data from imaging, neuropsychology and EEG point to the 
involvement of a large brain network in this process (see Figure 3). Hence, 
whereas the involvement of the ACC in error detection is ubiquitous, this 
function is likely to be sub served by multiple brain regions, besides this medial 
frontal cortex area. 
Several source localization studies found that the ERN/Ne is not only 
generated in the ACC but that the surrounding medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC) 
and more specifically the pre Supplementary Motor Area (SMA;BA6) is also 
involved early on following response onset in error monitoring (Kiehl et al., 2000; 
Menon et al., 2001). This region is known to play an important role in motor 
preparation (Picard & Strick, 1996; Rizzolatti, Luppino, & Matelli, 1996; Tanji, 
1994), as well as in higher level motor control (Picard & Strick, 1996; Schubotz & 
von Cramon, 2001; Tanji, 1994). According to Rizzolatti et al. (1996) and 
Vorobiev, Govoni, Rizzolatti, Matelli and Luppino (1998), the pre-SMA is involved 
in complex cognitive and motivational aspects related to motor control. 
Moreover, an association between the rACC and the amygdala during 
action monitoring has been evidenced by Polli et al. (2009). These authors 
showed that the activation in the right amygdala and right rostral ACC predicted 
greater accuracy, while the left amygdala activation predicted a higher error 
rate. An early role of the amygdala during error monitoring has been confirmed 
by Pourtois et al. (2010). These authors found, using direct intracranial 
recordings in two pharmaco-resistant epileptic patients, that response errors 
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(during a Go/noGo task) led to a delayed neural response in the amygdala, 
compared to correct responses. Moreover, these authors found that this effect 
was distinct from the typical early error detection effect taking place in a non-
overlapping dACC region, while the two regions showed an enhanced 
connectivity (in the theta band) early on following response onset. These results 
have been interpreted in terms of a rapid encoding of the behavioral relevance 
of (self-generated) motor actions in the amygdala (see also Sander, Grafman, & 
Zalla, 2003). 
Another structure that plays a role in error monitoring, and more 
specifically in error awareness (and hence the generation of the Pe ERP 
component), is the anterior insula (Dhar et al., 2011; Hester, Nestor, & Garavan, 
2009; Klein et al., 2007; Ullsperger et al., 2010; Wessel et al., 2011). Although 
speculative at this stage, the anterior insula, which has important reciprocal 
anatomical connections with the mPFC and the ACC, would participate to error 
awareness since this same region is involved in interoceptive awareness and the 
regulation of the body’s homeostasis (Craig, 2002; Critchley, Wiens, Rotshtein, 
Ohman, & Dolan, 2004; Singer, Critchley, & Preuschoff, 2009). These 
“internalizing” processes would therefore play a role in the conscious detection 
of self-generated response errors (and by extension the Pe component; see 
Nieuwenhuis et al., 2001; Ridderinkhof et al., 2009), especially in situations when 
this process is mostly based on the rapid monitoring of internal motor 
representations (see Dhar et al., 2011; Wessel et al., 2011). Along the same lines, 
another important region that has been overlooked regarding error-detection 
brain processes but seems however to participate to them is the orbitofrontal 
cortex (OFC). Lesions of the OFC lead to a blunted ERN/Ne (Swick & Turken, 
2002), and more recently the OFC was linked to the evaluative encoding of self-
generated actions, as being either correct or incorrect (see Dhar et al., 2011). 
Finally, the thalamus also seems to modulate ACC activity during 
performance monitoring and error detection. The thalamus is closely connected 
to the ACC and integrates inputs from the striatum, the lPFC and the cerebellum 
(Seifert et al., 2011). Recently, Seifert et al. (2011) showed that patients with 
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focal thalamic lesions had a smaller ERN/Ne amplitude, a reduced error 
awareness and decreased post-error adjustments. Peterburs et al. (2011) also 
found altered error processing following thalamic lesions. 
Summary 
Error detection and performance monitoring are thus characterized by well-
defined ERP components (ERN/Ne and Pe), and these processes seem to depend 
on the integrity of a large scale brain network, wherein the ACC probably plays a 
central or pivotal role, given its widespread anatomical (reciprocal) connections 
with a large number of key brain regions, both at the cortical and subcortical 
levels. This review of the existing neuroscientific data also highlights that these 
processes are probably more complex than it may appear at first sight. In 
particular, error monitoring appears to involve core cognitive functions or 
mechanisms (e.g. reinforcement learning signals), but this process is not immune 
to changes in motivation or affect, nor is it encapsulated from an anatomical 
point of view. As I review in the following sections, negative affect (anxiety or 
depression) actually exert strong modulatory effects on this efficient error-
detection brain machinery. First, I outline the basic characteristics of trait anxiety 
and depression in experimental psychopathology, before reviewing and clarifying 
what are their respective influences on performance-monitoring and error-
detection brain processes. 
NEGATIVE AFFECT 
Negative affect in internalizing psychopathology 
Phenomenology 
Negative affect is one of the two dimensions that has consistently been 
observed as an important constituting factor of the affective structure (Watson 
& Tellegen, 1985). In contrast to the other affective dimension (i.e. positive 
affect) that reflects the extent to which a person feels enthusiastic, active and 
alert, negative affect has been characterized by subjective distress and includes a 
variety of aversive mood states, including anger, contempt, disgust, guilt, fear 
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and nervousness (Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 1988). These negative affect 
characteristics have been shown to play a key role in the genesis and 
maintenance of internalizing disorders (Brown, 2007; Clark & Watson, 1991; 
Tellegen, 1985), which is a class of disorders that is best characterized by a 
tendency to internalize psychological distress and that has typically been 
opposed to externalizing disorders in which individuals rather tend to externalize 
their distress, as reflected for example in enhanced impulsivity, sensation 
seeking or behaviors that may go against the social norms (Krueger, 1999). 
Negative affect as a separate entity has more specifically been shown to predict 
the development of internalizing disorders. Several studies reported that 
individuals with high levels of negative affect were experiencing more anxiety 
and depressive symptoms (Jylha & Isometsa, 2006), and were also suffering 
more from anxiety disorders (Hettema, Prescott, & Kendler, 2004) and major 
depressive disorders (Brown, Chorpita, & Barlow, 1998; Schmitz, Kugler, & 
Rollnik, 2003). Moreover, negative affect has been closely linked or shares many 
characteristics with personality traits such as harm avoidance (Cloninger, 1986), 
neuroticism (Costa & McCrae, 1988), or behavioral inhibition sensitivity (BIS; 
Carver & White, 1994), which involves a hypersensitivity to threat (or 
punishment) cues and subsequent withdrawal. However, despite the fact that 
anxiety and depression belong to the same class of internalizing disorders that is 
primarily characterized by negative affect, these two psychopathology conditions 
are obviously not fully overlapping in their phenomenology and/or 
neurobiological substrates, and they each have specific attributes (Brown, 2007; 
Clark & Watson, 1991), as reviewed in the next sections. 
Error monitoring 
Both anxiety and depression, or internalizing disorders in general, are 
thought to be characterized by an increased sensitivity towards errors and 
negative feedback, especially when they are perceived as challenging self-
efficacy, or seen as potential social threats (Abela & D’Alessandro, 2002; Beats, 
Sahakian, & Levy, 1996; Conway, Howell, & Giannopoulos, 1991; Elliott, 
Sahakian, Herrod, Robbins, & Paykel, 1997; Elliott et al., 1996; Enns & Cox, 1999; 
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Henriques & Leitenberg, 2002; Holmes & Pizzagalli, 2008; Pizzagalli et al., 2006; 
Shafran & Mansel, 2001). This enhanced sensitivity to errors in individuals with 
internalizing disorders has also been confirmed by previous ERP studies showing 
generally larger ERN/Ne and/or CRN amplitudes in these individuals (Hajcak, 
McDonald, & Simons, 2003a; Simons, 2010; Vaidyanathan et al., 2012; Vocat et 
al., 2008). Based on this evidence, some authors have put forward the notion 
that the ERN/Ne could even be considered as a reliable endophenotype (or 
stable biomarker) for internalizing disorders (Olvet & Hajcak, 2008). Before I 
review in more details the existing neuroscientific evidence linking the ERN/Ne-
CRN ERP component to internalized disorders, I first outline the main 
characteristics of anxiety and depression, separately, both in terms of 
psychological constructs and putative neurobiological substrates. 
Anxiety 
Phenomenology 
Anxiety is an adaptive and normal warning reaction of our biological 
system that prepares the body to react appropriately in front of potentially 
dangerous or harmful situations in the environment (e.g. stressors). When these 
dangerous situations concern the actual or anticipated occurrence of an explicit 
threatening stimulus, the anxious reaction is referred to as “fear”. By contrast, 
“anxiety” is triggered by less explicit or more generalized cues (Lang, Davis, & 
Öhman, 2000). Anxious reactions consist of loose changes concurrently at 
emotional, cognitive, physiologic and behavioral levels. Anxious individuals 
experience for example high levels of negative affect (Brown et al., 1998; Clark & 
Watson, 1991); they are hypervigilant (Eysenck, 1992), showing a specific 
attention bias towards threat (Mathews & Macleod, 1994), and they show a 
tendency to worry or ruminate (Muris, Roelofs, Rassin, Franken, & Mayer, 2005). 
Physiologically, hyper arousal like pounding heartbeat, sweating, dizziness, 
feeling of choking, and shortness of breath is observed (Brown et al., 1998; 
Nitschke, Heller, Palmieri, & Miller, 1999); at the behavioral level, anxious 
individuals are characterized by avoidance (Gray, 1982) and sometimes inhibition 
(Carver & White, 1994; Jorm et al., 1999). These characteristics can fluctuate 
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over time or occur in specific situations in which the level of perceived threat is 
high, and in these situations high levels of state anxiety will be observed and 
measured (Rossi & Pourtois, 2011). Usually, these state-dependent reactions are 
adaptive and they serve the function to protect us from harm and hazard (Lang 
et al., 2000). However, when individuals are characterized by a sustained 
increased sensitivity to stressors (i.e. high trait anxiety) or when anxious 
reactions become stable or chronic, anxiety can become maladaptive, eventually 
result in a disorder and strongly interfere with the daily life activities or 
occupations of a person (Barlow, 1988; Rosen & Schulkin, 1998). 
Anxiety is not a monolithic construct though. Two main classes of anxiety 
have typically been identified in the literature (i.e. anxious apprehension vs. 
anxious arousal; Engels et al., 2007; Watson et al., 1995). Anxious apprehension 
is mainly characterized by worry about the future, by verbal rumination and 
usually encompasses anxiety disorders or trait-related anxiety, generalized 
anxiety disorders and obsessive compulsive disorders (Barlow, 1991; Heller, 
Nitschke, Etienne, & Miller, 1997). By contrast, anxious arousal is characterized 
by somatic tension and physiological hyper arousal, and includes panic disorders, 
phobia or post traumatic stress disorders (Watson et al., 1995). Distinctive and 
common characteristics across these various types of anxiety have also been 
evidenced at the neurobiological level, as discussed here below. 
Neurobiology 
Because a common characteristic among anxiety disorders is excessive 
distress (Brown et al., 1998; Clark & Watson, 1991), either in response to explicit 
stimuli (i.e. fear) or to more general stimuli (i.e. anxiety), neurobiological effects 
of anxiety have mostly been established based on animal models of fear (Davis, 
2006; Indovina, Robbins, Nunez-Elizalde, Dunn, & Bishop, 2011; LeDoux, 1996; 
Maren, 2008; Phelps & LeDoux, 2005). What these different models share in 
common is the predominant role of the amygdala (here reflected by an 
overactive amygdala activation) in the pathogenesis and maintenance of the 
disease, including posttraumatic stress disorders (PTSD), social anxiety disorders 
(SD), specific phobias (SP) and panic disorders (PD), but not in obsessive 
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compulsive disorders (OCD) (Etkin & Wager, 2007; Shin & Liberzon, 2010). Also 
the (anterior) insular cortex, a region involved in the regulation of the autonomic 
nervous system (Oppenheimer, Gelb, Girvin, & Hachinski, 1992), proprioception 
and interoception (Craig, 2002) is typically more active during the processing of a 
variety of negative emotions (Phan, Wager, Taylor, & Liberzon, 2002), and is 
consistently found to be hyperactive in a wide range of anxiety disorders (Etkin & 
Wager, 2007; Shin & Liberzon, 2010). However, in accordance with the variability 
in the phenomenology and symptomatology across anxiety disorders, this 
increased amygdala and insula activity are also variable depending on the type of 
anxiety disorders (Etkin & Wager, 2007). Increased amygdala function appears 
for example to be more diagnostic of phobic disorders. In their meta-analysis, 
Etkin and Wager (2007) also reported altered brain activity in other regions that 
could possibly be specific for certain anxiety disorders. For example, a smaller 
hippocampus volume tends to be systematically associated with PTSD. A blunted 
activation of the hippocampus accompanied by an increased rACC activation is a 
rather consistent observation in panic disorders, whereas OCD would mainly be 
associated with dysfunctions in striatal-orbitofrontal circuits (Graybiel & Rauch, 
2000). 
Interestingly, also the ACC, this large pMFC area that is typically involved in 
the generation of several error-related ERP components and performance 
monitoring more generally, has consistently been found to be dysfunctional 
across several anxiety disorders (Bishop, 2009; Bush et al., 2000; Devinsky et al., 
1995; Etkin & Wager, 2007; Shin & Liberzon, 2010). Abnormal ACC activity was 
more specifically observed in patients with panic disorders (Bystritsky et al., 
2001), in veterans with PTSD (Rauch et al., 1996; Shin et al., 2001), or in simple 
phobia (Rauch et al., 1995). Also anxiety induction in healthy adult participants 
was associated with increased blood flow in the ACC (Bishop, 2007; Kimbrell et 
al., 1999). This strong relationship between the ACC and multiple anxiety 
disorders has led some researchers to argue that ACC hyperactivity may actually 
be related to the experience of symptoms that are common to all anxiety 
disorders, including worry and distress (Kimbrell et al., 1999; Malizia, 1999). In 
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fact, these findings showing that the ACC is probably involved in the 
pathophysiology of many anxiety disorders, combined with the evidence 
showing that the ACC is directly implicated in performance monitoring and in 
error detection, have fostered the idea that anxiety disorders (or trait anxiety 
more generally) may actually be associated with specific performance-
monitoring or error-detection impairments, as outlined in the next section. 
Error monitoring 
At the behavioral level, trait anxiety has often been related to altered 
performance in cognitive or attentional control tasks (Bishop, 2009; Derryberry & 
Reed, 2002; Eysenck et al., 2007). In the attentional control theory (Eysenck et 
al., 2007), it has been proposed that anxiety does not primarily affect the 
effectiveness or the accuracy of attentional control (i.e. the number of errors), 
but more the efficiency (i.e. the speed). Processing efficiency is here defined as 
the latent relationship between performance’s effectiveness and the amount of 
efforts spent in the task to reach a certain level of performance (Berggren, 
Hutton, & Derakshan, 2011). However, no study to date has attempted to use 
this specific framework to account for anxiety-related changes during early error-
monitoring brain processes, as revealed using ERP measurements. Many ERP 
studies have already reported enhanced or overactive ERN/Ne (and often CRN) 
components in patients with anxiety disorders during early error monitoring in 
standard interference tasks, including OCD (Endrass, Klawohn, Schuster, & 
Kathmann, 2008, Endrass et al., 2010; Gehring, Himle, & Nisenson, 2000; Hajcak 
& Simons, 2002; Johannes et al., 2001; Stern et al., 2010) or generalized anxiety 
disorders (Weinberg, Olvet, & Hajcak, 2010). However, a larger ERN/Ne is usually 
not only observed in individuals with clinical levels of anxiety or clear cut anxiety 
disorders, but also in healthy adult participants showing high levels of sub clinical 
trait anxiety (but less systematically for changes in state anxiety), as estimated 
using standard questionnaires or inventories available in the literature (Rossi & 
Pourtois, 2011; Spielberger, 1983). Hence, participants with higher levels of trait 
anxiety were shown to have increased ERN/Ne and CRN components (Hajcak et 
al., 2003a, 2003b) during early action monitoring, as was the case for healthy 
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participants characterized by an enhanced sensitivity to punishment (Boksem, 
Tops, Wester, Meijman, & Lorist, 2006). When considering the existing ERP 
studies, this increased ERN/Ne-CRN during early action monitoring in high 
anxious individuals seems to be related to stable trait characteristics, but to be 
not selective for error processing (i.e. the CRN component is also usually typically 
increased in these participants or patients, compared to low anxious individuals). 
Mixed results were obtained for a similar increased ERN/Ne–CRN component in 
individuals with enhanced levels of state anxiety. While Moser, Hajcak and 
Simons (2005) observed a similar ERN/Ne-CRN in phobic individuals directly 
exposed to their phobia-related objects vs. controls, Hajcak, Franklin, Foa and 
Simons (2008) observed a similar ERN/Ne-CRN before and after treatment of 
OCD symptoms. Moreover, this modulatory (boosting) effect of trait anxiety on 
action-monitoring processes appears to be specific and primarily concerns the 
early “automatic” stages of action monitoring (not restricted to error processing 
thereof), as reflected by the amplitude changes at the level of the ERN/Ne-CRN 
component. However, typically, trait anxiety does not alter the following stage or 
error or action monitoring, as reflected by the error-related Pe component, 
whose amplitude does not vary with trait anxiety or anxiety disorders, unlike the 
preceding ERN/Ne-CRN component (Endrass et al., 2008; Hajcak et al., 2003a; 
Ladouceur, Dahl, Birmaher, Axelson, & Ryan, 2006; McDermott et al., 2009; 
Weinberg et al., 2010). In accordance with these neurophysiological findings, a 
hyperactive ACC has also been found during error monitoring in anxious 
individuals (Fitzgerald et al., 2005; Paulus, Feinstein, Simmons, & Stein, 2004; 
Ursu, Stenger, Shear, Jones, & Carter, 2003). 
As already said above, whether this early increased action monitoring seen 
in anxious individuals is truly error specific or reflects instead a general response 
monitoring or attention deficit (Bishop, 2007), remains an open question. 
Indeed, whereas some earlier ERP studies showed an enhancement of both the 
ERN/Ne and CRN components in individuals with anxiety (Endrass et al., 2008; 
Endrass et al., 2010; Hajcak et al., 2003a, 2003b; Hajcak & Simons, 2002), other 
studies did not report systematic amplitude changes at the level of the CRN in 
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anxiety (Gehring et al., 2000; Hajcak et al., 2008; Stern et al., 2010; Weinberg et 
al., 2010). Moreover, this uncertainty is also probably explained by the fact that 
the CRN is usually much smaller in size than the ERN/Ne component (Luu & 
Tucker, 2001; Luu, Tucker, & Makeig, 2004; Vidal et al., 2003; Vidal et al., 2000) 
hence leading potentially to a floor effect for this ERP component. Moreover, all 
the ERP studies reviewed here, have used amplitude measurements at a few 
electrode positions (Picton et al., 2000), a method that may not be sensitive 
enough to capture more global (sometimes subtle) differences in the expression 
(rather than the strength or amplitude) of the ERN/Ne and CRN components as a 
function of trait anxiety (Pourtois, 2011; Pourtois et al., 2008). I directly 
addressed this specific issue in the present dissertation (see Chapter 2). 
With respect to the neural processing of external evaluation cues (i.e. 
feedback and the FRN component), the existing literature exploring possible 
effects of anxiety on this performance-monitoring process is scant. De Pascalis et 
al. (2010) found that individuals who were more sensitive to punishment (as 
evidenced using the BIS-BAS scale, see Carver & White, 1994) had a larger FRN to 
monetary loss on noGo trials during a Go/noGo task. By contrast, two other ERP 
studies reported a larger FRN amplitude for low, compared to high anxious 
individuals (Gu et al., 2010; Simons, 2010). Accordingly, another goal of the 
present doctoral dissertation was to compare, using advanced ERP methods, 
effects of sub clinical trait anxiety on the processing of internal (ERN/Ne) vs. 
external (FRN) cues during action monitoring (see Chapters 2 and 4). 
Depression 
Phenomenology 
Although anxiety and depression may be seen as belonging to a shared 
continuum (with anxiety disorders sometimes evolving to depression) and 
strongly co-occur and covary with each other (Clark & Watson, 1991; Mineka, 
Watson, & Clark, 1998; Sufka et al., 2006), major depressive disorder (MDD) has 
a different phenomenology than anxiety. MDD is a syndrome that is 
characterized by persistent negative mood states, like fear, sadness and guilt, 
and also by anhedonia or a decrease in the ability to experience positive affect, 
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like feelings of joy, energy, enthusiasm, interest, alertness and self-confidence 
(Brown et al., 1998; Kring & Bachorowski, 1999; Watson et al., 1995). These 
strong emotional disturbances are accompanied by executive function deficits 
like difficulties in short-term and working memory (Rose & Ebmeier, 2006; 
Watts, 1985), attention and concentration (Beblo, Baumann, Wallesch, & 
Hermann, 1999; Fox, Russo, & Dutton, 2002) and cognitive control (Elliott et al., 
1997). Moreover, research has also confirmed that these profound and pervasive 
emotional disturbances in depression are actually backed up by severe deficits 
regarding information processing in general. More specifically, several studies 
showed that depression is associated with cognitive biases towards negative 
information (De Raedt, Koster, & Joormann, 2010), mainly related to memory 
(Bradley, Mogg, & Williams, 1995) but less to attentional processes that are 
more selectively influenced by levels of anxiety (Mineka, Rafaeli, & Jovel, 2003; 
Mineka & Sutton, 1992; Mineka et al., 1998). Some authors have suggested that 
these cognitive impairments are actually related to core executive functioning 
problems, and more specifically to basic inhibitory deficits or a failure to 
disengage from negative stimuli (Fox et al., 2002; Koster, DeRaedt, Goeleven, 
Franck, & Crombez, 2005; Koster, Leyman, DeRaedt, & Crombez, 2006), which 
can therefore form the base of prolonged self-focused rumination (Gotlib & 
Joormann, 2010; Joormann, 2006), which is the tendency or style to think 
repetitively about the causes and consequences of negative or adverse life 
events (Nolen-Hoeksema, 2000; Nolen-Hoeksema, Wisco, & Lyubomirsky, 2008). 
These profound cognitive and emotional disturbances that are usually running 
together with physical or more somatic disturbances, including sleep, appetite 
and libido, are diagnostic of depression (American Psychiatric Association - DSM-
IV, 2000). 
Neurobiology 
Like it is often the case with brain diseases, depression cannot be related to 
a single or circumscribed dysfunctional brain area, but effects of depression on 
brain activity are probably diffuse and widespread, and best explained by a 
system-level or network account (Damasio, 1989; De Raedt & Koster, 2010; 
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Drevets & Raichle, 1998). Regions that are found to be most affected by 
depression are the frontal cortex, the hippocampus, the striatum, the ACC, limbic 
and paralimbic areas like the amygdala, thalamus, hippocampus, basal ganglia 
and anterior temporal lobes. Some of these regions (i.e. frontal cortex, the 
hippocampus, the striatum and limbic areas as the subgenual cingulate cortex) 
were found to be smaller (i.e. reduced volume) in depressed patients compared 
to healthy controls (Anand & Shekhar, 2003). The functional activation in some 
of these regions, together with other regions, was also found to be influenced by 
depression. Depression-related decreased activations were observed in 
“cognitive” control regions, such as the dlPFC and ACC (Anand & Shekhar, 2003; 
Davidson, Pizzagalli, Nitschke, & Putnam, 2002; Mayberg, 1997; Seminowicz et 
al., 2004), while increased activations were evidenced in other limbic and 
paralimbic regions (i.e. hippocampus, amygdala, thalamus, basal ganglia and 
anterior temporal lobes; Anand & Shekhar, 2003). Mayberg (1997) put forward 
the idea that a dysregulation between limbic and cortical areas might play a key 
role in depression (see also Drevets & Raichle, 1998). More specifically, she 
proposed that the “dorsal compartment”, which encompasses in her view brain 
regions that are involved in attentional and cognitive processes affected by this 
illness (i.e. dlPFC, dACC, inferior parietal cortex and basal ganglia), does not 
interact properly anymore with the “ventral compartment”, which includes 
paralimbic cortical, subcortical regions like the insula and subgenual cingulate, 
and brainstem, all of which are hypothesized to mediate somatic symptoms 
related to sleep, appetite or libido. According to Mayberg (1997), the reciprocal 
links between this dorsal and ventral compartment are assumed to be regulated 
or controlled by yet another region, namely the rACC which is found to be 
overactive in depressed individuals. Accordingly, various therapies targeting 
selectively this rACC for the treatment of depression have been proposed in the 
literature (Mayberg, 2009; Mayberg et al., 1997; Pizzagalli, 2011). 
Error monitoring 
At the behavioral level, depressed individuals show exaggerated reactions 
to errors or negative feedback on task performance (Beats et al., 1996; Elliott et 
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al., 1997; Elliott et al., 1996), an excessive concern or worry related to error 
commission (Enns & Cox, 1999; Shafran & Mansell, 2001), an increase in negative 
mood after perceived failures (Abela & D'Alessandro, 2002; Henriques & 
Leitenberg, 2002), difficulties in regulating failure-related thoughts following 
negative feedback (Conway et al., 1991), as well as a decreased accuracy 
following error commission (Holmes & Pizzagalli, 2008; Pizzagali et al., 2006). 
Thus, these behavioral results suggest an over sensitivity in depression (very 
much like in anxiety) to self-generated errors or negative outcome (feedback) 
regarding performance. 
ERP studies corroborated these findings, even though mixed results were 
obtained. Some earlier ERP studies reported larger ERN/Ne amplitudes in MDD 
patients compared to healthy controls (Chiu & Deldin, 2007; Holmes & Pizzagalli, 
2008; 2010), while other studies reported similar (Compton et al., 2008; 
Schrijvers et al., 2008; Schrijvers et al., 2009) or even smaller ERN/Ne amplitudes 
in MDD patients (Ruchsow et al., 2006; Ruchsow et al., 2004). Effects of 
depression on the CRN component are not always consistent either. Olvet et al. 
(2010) and Schrijvers et al. (2009) reported larger CRN amplitudes in depressed 
patients, but Holmes and Pizzagalli (2008; 2010) found comparable CRN 
amplitudes between depressed and control individuals. Likewise, discrepant 
findings have also been reported regarding possible amplitude variations of the 
Pe component as function of depression. While Chiu and Deldin (2007), Compton 
et al. (2008) and Holmes and Pizzagalli (2008) observed similar Pe amplitudes for 
controls and MDD patients, Schrijvers et al. (2008) and Schrijvers et al. (2009) 
reported smaller Pe amplitudes in depressed individuals. 
With respect to the processing of external evaluation cues or feedback and 
its possible impairment in depression, no clear picture currently emerges in light 
of the existing literature. Tucker et al. (2003) reported a small differentiation at 
the level of the FRN component between positive and negative feedback (hence 
suggesting some performance monitoring based on the processing of external 
evaluative cues) in individuals who scored either low or high on a depression 
scale, whereas individuals who scored in the middle were characterized by a 
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larger FRN. Foti and Hajcak (2009) found smaller FRN amplitudes in depressed 
compared to control participants. By contrast, Santesso et al. (2008) investigated 
feedback processing in remitted depressed individuals and showed a larger 
differentiation between positive and negative feedback, compared to controls. 
However, Ruchsow et al. (2004) did not report any difference at the level of the 
FRN between positive and negative feedback processing in depressed patients. 
To sum up, the picture emerges that possible alterations (in terms of 
neurophysiological or ERP effects) induced by depression during early action 
monitoring and error detection appear much less clear or consistent, than what 
has already been found by comparison for trait anxiety. Usually, high anxious 
individuals show increased ERN/Ne (and often CRN as well) components during 
the early monitoring of errors, while the subsequent Pe component is 
unchanged. No such (or any other consistent) pattern is seen in depression 
(Vaidyanathan et al., 2012). Accordingly, another goal of the present doctoral 
dissertation was to address this question, and better characterize and 
systematically compare possible error-monitoring deficits at the level of the 
ERN/Ne, CRN and Pe components between sub clinical high anxious (see 
Chapters 2 and 4) vs. clinically depressed patients (Chapter 3). 
RESEARCH GOALS AND OVERVIEW OF THE FIVE EMPIRICAL CHAPTERS 
The main goal of my dissertation was to gain insight into the possible links 
between negative affect and early error-monitoring brain processes, and more 
specifically, try to better understand the functional meaning of alterations seen 
during early error-monitoring processes in either anxiety or depression. Error 
monitoring is usually not trivial to explore in standard laboratory conditions, 
because response errors are by definition rare and deviant events, but also 
because human beings try hard to avoid making errors during standard 
interference or perceptual-decision making tasks, which somehow challenge 
their self-efficacy. To overcome this major problem, I adopted a common 
methodology and task setting across the different studies performed and 
reported in this dissertation. 
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The asset of this task is that many unwanted response errors (perceived as 
such) could be recorded in each and every participant, within a relatively short 
period of time. The experimental paradigm that I selected for this purpose 
included a speeded Go/noGo task that was previously validated in several groups 
of adult participants (Dhar & Pourtois, 2011; Koban, Pourtois, Vocat, & 
Vuilleumier, 2010; Pourtois, 2011; Vocat et al., 2008). This task requires 
participants to respond to a pre-defined target (i.e. Go stimulus) which is 
presented frequently throughout the experimental session (2/3 of trials) but to 
withhold responding when encountering a non-target (i.e. noGo stimulus), which 
is presented less frequently (1/3 of trials). Hence, using this task, one can 
measure the ability to exert inhibitory control on noGo stimuli. In other words, 
the inhibition of a pre-potent response tendency is investigated in this standard 
task (Miyake et al., 2000). In the speeded Go/noGo task selected in my empirical 
studies, visual stimuli consisted of simple geometric symbols, namely arrows, 
devoid of any affective or motivational value, enabling to explore “pure” effects 
of anxiety or depression on action- or error-monitoring brain processes. Each 
trial had always a similar temporal structure, as follows. First, a black arrow 
pointing either up or down was presented. Then, after a variable delay, this up- 
or down-arrow changed color, and became green most of the time. If the initial 
black arrow became green (i.e. Go stimulus), the participant was instructed to 
respond as fast as possible by pressing a pre-defined response key. However, 
occasionally, the initial arrow could turn blue (instead of green) or the in-plane 
orientation between the initial black arrow and subsequent green arrow was 
swapped. These two cases corresponded to noGo stimuli and participants were 
explicitly asked to not respond when encountering these specific instances. 
Hence, response errors occurred in this task when participants made key presses 
on these noGo stimuli, corresponding to False Alarms (FAs). Task instructions are 
therefore quite simple and swiftly understood by all participants, including 
anxious (see Chapter 2 and 4) and clinically depressed individuals (see Chapter 
3). 
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To promote the occurrence of (many) FAs, I adapted a specific 
experimental procedure, based on the use of a response deadline. On each and 
every trial, the actual speed (Reaction Time – RT) for Go stimuli was calculated 
and compared against an arbitrary limit. This limit was determined individually, 
for each subject separately, and adjusted online throughout the course of the 
experiment to deal with unspecific effects of time or fatigue. Accordingly, 
besides the actual accuracy for each and every trial, the speed was assessed such 
that if the current RT was slower than this arbitrary limit (i.e. Slow Hits), 
participants received negative feedback, whereas if the current RT was faster 
than this limit (i.e. Fast Hits), a positive feedback was given. By emphasizing 
speed like that, participants adopt a specific response mode and respond fast or 
in a rather impulsive way, and therefore they are more likely to make FAs on 
noGo stimuli. However, any violation of task rules (i.e. reacting in front of a noGo 
stimulus), when occurring, is immediately obvious to participants, given the 
simplicity of these rules, enabling to study error-monitoring or -detection 
processes (see Chapter 2). Thus, this procedure allows to collect a high number 
of commission errors (consisting of FAs on noGo trials) in each and every 
participant, despite inter-individual differences in RTs, within a short period of 
time (~ 30 min), without inducing excessive frustration. This was an important 
pre-requisite to compute reliable error-related ERP waveforms, based on a 
substantial number of response errors, and eventually compare these error-
related ERP waveforms to waveforms obtained for correct responses. Another 
added value of this procedure is that on each trial performance is evaluated by 
external evaluative feedback, hence making it possible to study not only internal 
action-monitoring processes (presumably occurring rapidly after the key press; 
see Chapter 2), but also external action-monitoring processes (occurring at the 
time of evaluative feedback delivery; see Chapter 4) using a uniform task. Given 
the updated speed limit used, participants were uncertain about their actual 
speed for a given trial, and hence they had to rely on and attend to these 
feedback stimuli in such a way to infer whether their actions were timely (fast 
hits/positive feedback) or not (slow hits/negative feedback). 
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Possible effects of negative affect (either trait anxiety or depression) on 
error monitoring were explored at the behavioral level (i.e. accuracy and RT data 
collected during the task), but also, and more importantly, using concurrent high-
density EEG measurements. More specifically, in Chapters 2, 3, 4 and 6, 
continuous EEG was acquired at 512 Hz using 128 channels distributed evenly 
over the scalp surface, while participants performed the Go/noGo task outlined 
here above. I performed standard peak analyses following standard practice 
(Picton et al., 2000), looking at amplitude changes of specific action or error-
monitoring ERP components (including the ERN/Ne, CRN, and Pe components for 
internal monitoring effects; but the FRN component for external monitoring 
effects). I also carried out additional topographical analyses to gain insight into 
the configuration of the putative brain generators underlying these specific ERP 
components (Pourtois et al., 2008). 
Levels of (sub clinical) trait anxiety were established in psychology students 
at Ghent University by means of the validated Dutch version of the Spielberger 
State-Trait Anxiety Inventory – Trait Version (STAI-T; Spielberger, 1983 translated 
by Defares, van der Ploeg, & Spielberger, 1979). This questionnaire consists of 20 
items referring to symptoms of anxiety like tension, nervousness, worry and 
apprehension, and participants have to rate the level to which they experience 
these symptoms on a scale from 1 to 4. I also verified, using the same inventory 
(State Version), whether levels of state anxiety accounted for changes observed 
at the level of the error-related ERP components recorded in my studies. 
Ambulatory clinically depressed patients (Chapter 3) were recruited from a local 
psychiatric clinic in Ghent and the severity of their current MDD episode was 
assessed using the Hamilton Rating Scale for Depression (HAM-D; Hamilton, 
1960), which is a multiple choice questionnaire consisting of 17 items in which 
the severity of symptoms observed in depression such as negative mood, 
insomnia, agitation, anxiety and weight loss, is rated. The Mini-International 
Neuropsychiatric Interview (MINI), a structured clinical interview (Sheehan et al., 
1998), was also used to corroborate the inclusion of clinically depressed patients 
in my study (see Chapter 3). 
GENERAL INTRODUCTION  39 
  
In this doctoral dissertation, I mainly addressed three different research 
questions, informing about the existing links between negative affect and error-
monitoring brain processes. First, using the speeded Go/noGo task described 
here above, I compared the behavior and ERP components to error commission 
of a group of low vs. high (sub clinical) anxious psychology students (Chapter 2). I 
focused on early error-related brain activities, namely the ERN/Ne and Pe 
components. The goal of this ERP study was to better characterize possible 
changes induced by trait anxiety on these early error-monitoring brain functions, 
using not only standard peak analyses (Picton et al., 2000), but also 
complementing methods informing about the putative neural sources giving rise 
to these ERP components, and their possible sensitivity to changes in levels of 
trait anxiety (Pourtois et al., 2008). The exact same method and logic was used in 
Chapter 3, where I compared error-monitoring brain processes in non-depressed 
healthy participants vs. clinically depressed patients. Accordingly, these two 
studies (chapters 2 and 3) enabled to investigate whether sub clinical trait 
anxiety and MDD, which share many characteristics but are also dissociable, 
influenced early error-monitoring processes in a similar way or not. This was 
the first main research question investigated in my doctoral research, 
addressed in Chapters 2 and 3. Next, I investigated, still using ERP methods, 
effects of trait anxiety on the processing of external evaluative feedback, 
focusing therefore on the FRN component (Chapter 4). The main aim of this 
study was to examine whether sub clinical trait anxiety would alter 
performance-monitoring processes when these generative processes are no 
longer based on internal cues (see Chapter 2), but rather on external evaluative 
feedback provided to participants. This specific question was the second main 
issue addressed in my doctoral dissertation (Chapters 2 and 4). Whereas studies 
reported in Chapters 2 to 4 informed about the possible locus and the expression 
of anxiety- or depression-dependent alterations during early error monitoring (or 
feedback processing), they do not shed light on the actual functional meaning of 
these changes. What does an enhanced ERN/Ne component in anxiety truly 
reflect? Therefore, I designed and validated a new method (Chapter 5) to infer, 
indirectly at the behavioral level, the actual affective meaning of self-generated 
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actions performed during the Go/noGo task. The rationale (Chapter 5) was to 
test, using a novel action-word evaluative priming sequence, whether unwanted 
response errors were indeed “automatically” marked as negative events, and 
moreover assess whether this automatic appraisal of self-generated actions may 
be impaired in sub clinical trait anxiety. By doing so, I aimed at providing a 
plausible theoretical account for the modulation of early error-monitoring brain 
processes by trait anxiety (and depression to a lesser extent). Finally, I also 
delineated the actual electrophysiological time-course of the evaluative priming 
effects reported in chapter 5, using ERP methods (Chapter 6). Hence, the third 
main research question explored in this work (Chapters 5 and 6) concerned the 
actual affective or motivational value of self-generated actions, including 
response errors, with the aim to eventually better understand possible 
disturbances observed at the neurophysiological level during early error 
monitoring in anxious or depressed individuals (see Chapters 2 to 4). 
  
CHAPTER 2: ANXIETY DOES NOT ONLY INCREASE, BUT ALSO 
ALTERS EARLY ERROR-MONITORING FUNCTIONS
1 
“Anxiety has profound influences on a wide range of cognitive processes, 
including action monitoring. Event-Related brain Potential (ERP) studies have 
shown that anxiety can boost early error-detection mechanisms, as reflected by 
an enhanced Error-Related Negativity (ERN/Ne) following errors in high anxious, 
compared to low anxious participants. This observation is consistent with the 
assumption of a gain control mechanism exerted by anxiety onto error-related 
brain responses within the dorsal Anterior Cingulate Cortex (dACC). However, 
whether anxiety simply enhances or rather alters early error-detection 
mechanisms remain unsolved. In this study, we compared the performance of low 
vs. high trait anxious participants during a Go/noGo task while high-density EEG 
was recorded. The two groups showed comparable behavioral performance, 
although levels of state anxiety increased following the task for high anxious 
participants only. ERP results confirmed that the ERN/Ne to errors was enhanced 
for high, relative to low anxious participants. However, complementary 
topographic analyses revealed that the scalp map of the ERN/Ne was not 
identical between the two groups, suggesting that anxiety did not merely 
increase early error-detection mechanisms, but also led to a qualitative change in 
the early appraisal of errors. Inverse solution results confirmed a shift within the 
ACC for the localization of neural generators underlying the ERN/Ne scalp map in 
high anxious participants, corroborating the assumption of an early effect of 
anxiety on early error-monitoring functions. These results shed new light on the 
dynamic interplay between anxiety and error-monitoring functions in the human 
brain.”
                                                      
1
 Aarts, K., & Pourtois, G. (2010). Anxiety not only increases, but also alters early error-monitoring 
functions. Cognitive, Affective, and Behavioral Neuroscience, 10(4), 479-492. 
 
ERROR-MONITORING AND ANXIETY  43 
 
INTRODUCTION 
The early and efficient detection of a mismatch between the actual and 
expected or desired motor action provides human organisms with adaptive and 
flexible behaviors, since error detection typically leads to learning and the 
implementation of remedial action (Holroyd & Coles, 2002; Rabbitt, 1966). 
Converging neuroscience evidence has revealed that the medial frontal cortex, 
and the dorsal Anterior Cingulate Cortex (dACC) is primarily involved in the early 
detection of errors, or more generally conflicts, whereas lateral frontal or 
prefrontal regions are implicated in behavioral adjustments following errors 
(Carter et al., 1998; MacDonald, Cohen, Stenger, & Carter, 2000; Ridderinkhof, 
Nieuwenhuis, & Braver, 2007; van Veen & Carter, 2006) . In this view, the medial 
frontal cortex (and dACC) provides important cognitive control mechanisms, 
including early error detection. However, errors are also typically rare, deviant 
and negative events. Hence, errors also call for affective control processes 
(Hajcak & Foti, 2008; Ochsner & Gross, 2005), beyond their ubiquitous effects on 
cognitive control processes. Nonetheless, much less is known about the nature 
and extent of affective influences onto early error-detection processes, in 
comparison to a wealth of studies that have primarily focused on cognitive 
control effects (Ridderinkhof et al., 2007). 
Event-Related brain Potential (ERP) studies have largely contributed to gain 
new insight into the time-course and neural bases of cognitive control 
mechanisms, including error detection (Taylor, Stern, & Gehring, 2007). The 
commission of errors is typically associated with the generation of a reliable 
negative ERP component early on following the onset of incorrect motor 
responses, the Error-Related Negativity (ERN/Ne) (Falkenstein, Hohnsbein, 
Hoormann, & Blanke, 1991; Falkenstein, Hoormann, Christ, & Hohnsbein, 2000; 
Gehring, Coles, Meyer, & Donchin, 1990; Gehring, Goss, Coles, Meyer, & 
Donchin, 1993). The ERN/Ne component peaks at fronto-central electrodes along 
the midline (FCz or Fz electrode position), roughly 0 - 100 ms after (incorrect) 
response onset, and is thought to be primarily generated within the dACC 
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(Debener, Ullsperger, Fiehler, von Cramon, & Engel, 2005; Dehaene, Posner, & 
Tucker, 1994; Herrmann, Rommler, Ehlis, Heidrich, & Fallgatter, 2004; O’Connell 
et al., 2007; Vocat, Pourtois, & Vuilleumier, 2008). Hence, the ERN/Ne occurs too 
early to reflect sensorimotor or proprioceptive feedback, but instead, it is 
assumed to reflect the automatic and rapid detection of a mismatch between 
the actual and expected or desired motor action (Falkenstein et al., 2000; 
Nieuwenhuis et al., 2001). Following the ERN/Ne, the Error Positivity (Pe) is 
usually elicited in response to incorrect responses (Falkenstein et al., 2000; 
Nieuwenhuis et al., 2001). The Pe component is a broad positive deflection 
resembling the P3 component, peaking over the vertex (or more posterior 
parietal scalp positions along the midline, such as PZ) roughly 150 - 300 ms after 
(incorrect) response onset, with neural generators involving more posterior 
cingulate regions (Herrmann et al., 2004; O’Connell et al., 2007). 
Although the ERN/Ne is usually described as reflecting cognitive or learning 
processes (Bernstein, Scheffers, & Coles, 1995; Coles, Scheffers, & Holroyd, 2001; 
Falkenstein et al., 1991), several ERP studies showed that the ERN/Ne also 
captures variations in affect or motivation. This observation is consistent with 
the assumption that errors do not only provide important learning or cognitive 
signals, but they also convey an important emotional significance (Bush, Luu, & 
Posner, 2000; Gehring & Willougby, 2002; Pailing & Segalowitz, 2004; Pourtois et 
al., 2010). For example, Hajcak, Moser, Yeung and Simons (2005) suggested that 
an error is primarily a motivationally salient event, as the ERN/Ne was 
significantly larger for errors related to high monetary value. More evidence on 
the relationship between affect and the ERN/Ne comes from studies looking at 
variations in trait affect. Several researchers found that individuals scoring high 
on trait anxiety and negative affect are characterized by an increased ERN/Ne 
(Boksem, Tops, Wester, Meijman, & Lorist, 2006; Hajcak, McDonald, & Simons, 
2003a, 2004; Olvet & Hajcak, 2008). This increased sensitivity for errors in 
individuals with anxiety characteristics suggests that the ERN/Ne also somehow 
reflects an affective evaluation during error detection (Bush et al., 2000; Olvet & 
Hajcak, 2008). 
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Interestingly, research on anxiety-related differences in ERN/Ne has not 
been linked to the broader literature on cognitive control in anxiety. The 
cognitive literature in anxiety allows to deriving relatively specific predictions in 
this context. According to the processing efficiency theory (Eysenck & Calvo, 
1992), trait anxiety influences the efficiency (rather than the amount or 
effectiveness) of cognitive performance. They claim that anxious individuals will 
not show performance decrements on most task as they recruit extra processing 
resources, which eventually hampers the amount of resources available for 
concurrent task processing. In this model, attentional control is the key 
mediating factor between anxiety and cognitive performance (Eysenck, 
Derakshan, Santos, & Calvo, 2007). This theory predicts that attention is more 
readily allocated to internal threatening stimuli (i.e. worrying thoughts) in high 
anxious subjects, reducing therefore the attentional focus on the current task 
demands. However, to maintain a standard level of performance, anxious 
subjects compensate for this reduced efficiency by increasing cognitive effort. 
This mechanism could potentially account for the fact that while an altered 
ERN/Ne is generally observed in high compared to low anxious subjects, no 
direct effect of anxiety on behavior (e.g. the number of errors), is usually 
evidenced (Hajcak et al., 2003a; Vocat et al., 2008). As our discussion of error 
detection suggests that errors are associated with cognitive as well as affective 
correlates, attentional control theory would predict that errors in high anxious 
individuals are not only associated with an increased ERN/Ne related to ACC 
activity but will also be related to a different pattern of neural activity in areas 
involved in emotion processing and cognitive control. 
Brain imaging studies have confirmed that increased effort translates as 
enhanced activation in brain regions associated with cognitive control, including 
the dorsolateral or ventrolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC or VLPFC), and dACC 
(Cazalis et al., 2003; Donohue, Wendelken, & Bunge, 2008; Wagner, Maril, Bjork, 
& Schacter, 2001). Interestingly, anxiety was found to reduce activation in these 
cognitive control areas (Bishop, 2007; Bishop, Duncan, Brett, & Lawrence, 2004). 
Moreover, a reduced efficiency might actually result from a change in the 
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temporal recruitment of these cognitive control areas, as recently shown 
(Braver, Gray, & Burgess, 2007; Fales et al., 2008). These findings therefore 
suggest that anxiety may alter the recruitment of cognitive control areas during 
task performance, and as a result, lead to a reduced processing efficiency. 
However, with respect to error-detection mechanisms (which is a crucial 
component of cognitive control), to our knowledge, no study has examined 
whether low and high anxious participants differ only in their reaction to errors 
(as primarily reflected by the size of the ERN/Ne component), or alternatively, 
also make use of different cognitive control, and more specific, error-detection 
brain networks during the early processing of these negative events. 
The goal of this study was to address this question using a modern ERP 
topographic mapping technique (Murray, Brunet, & Michel, 2008; Pourtois, 
Delplanque, Michel, & Vuilleumier, 2008). More specifically, we aimed to test 
whether trait anxiety merely enhances early error-related brain activities, or 
alternatively, it may also alter the expression (and not only the strength) of these 
brain responses (as revealed by a topographic change of the ERN/Ne scalp map 
with anxiety), in keeping with the main prediction of the attentional control 
theory (Eysenck et al., 2007). We therefore compared, using high-density EEG, 
the electrophysiological responses to commission errors in two groups of healthy 
participants, differing only with respect to their subclinical level of trait anxiety. 
We used a speeded Go/noGo task, previously validated in a group of adult 
participants (Vocat et al., 2008). The added value of this task is that it enables to 
collect a high number of commission errors [consisting of False Alarms (FAs) on 
noGo trials] in each participant, despite inter-individual differences in reaction 
times (RTs), within a short period of time (~30 min), and without inducing 
excessive frustration. This was an important pre-requisite to compute reliable 
ERP waveforms based on a substantial number of trials, including for errors. 
Furthermore, neutral stimuli (i.e. colored arrows) were used during this task, in 
such a way that electrophysiological responses to errors committed with neutral 
stimuli could be compared between the two groups, and a relatively pure 
modulation of trait anxiety on these brain responses could be eventually 
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assessed. Based on the evidence reviewed above, we predicted that behavior 
would not differ between low and high anxious subjects and that high anxious 
participants would show larger ERN/Ne for errors than low anxious participants 
(Olvet & Hajcak, 2008). We also surmise a substantial change in the configuration 
of the electric field of the ERN/Ne for high anxious relative to low anxious 
individuals, suggesting the involvement of partly distinct neural generators, in 
agreement with the processing efficiency theory (see Eysenck et al., 2007; Fales 
et al., 2008). This would indicate that high anxious participants do not only 
respond stronger to their own response errors, but that they likely recruit a 
different network of cognitive control brain regions during this process, relative 
to low anxious individuals. 
METHOD 
Participants 
Four hundred and seventy nine first year University psychology students 
were asked to fill out several questionnaires, including measures of anxiety, in 
exchange of course credits. Within this large sample of psychology students, 
individuals scoring within the lowest quartile (low anxious) or the highest 
quartile (high anxious) of the distribution of trait anxiety scores, were invited to 
participate in the ERP experiment, in such a way to obtain two homogenous 
groups differing with respect to their levels of trait anxiety. A total of 32 
undergraduate psychology students eventually participated in this experiment in 
exchange of 20 Euro payment. Participants had normal or corrected-to-normal 
vision. Trait anxiety levels of participants were primarily screened using a 
validated Dutch version of the Spielberger State-Trait Inventory – Trait Version 
(STAI-T; Spielberger, 1983 translated by Defares, van der Ploeg, & Spielberger, 
1979). Based on these trait anxiety scores, two groups of equal size were formed. 
Sixteen participants (2 male; 3 left-handed) with a mean age of 19.06 years (SEM 
= 0.39) were assigned to the high trait anxious group (M = 51.50, SEM. = 0.99, 
Range: 45 - 58), the 16 remaining participants (2 male; 2 left-handed) with a 
mean age of 18.56 (SEM = 0.26) to the low trait anxious group (M = 29.69, SEM = 
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0.80, Range: 25 - 36). The study was approved by the local university ethical 
committee. 
Speeded Go/noGo task 
We used a modified version of a speeded Go/noGo task previously 
validated in a group of healthy participants (Figure 1; Vocat et al., 2008). Visual 
stimuli were shown on a 17-inch LCD screen. They consisted of an arrow (11.4° x 
0.05° of visual angle at a 60 cm viewing distance) that was presented in the 
center of the screen on a white background. Each trial started with a blank 
screen that lasted for 1000 ms. Then, a black arrow (i.e. cue), either oriented up 
or down, was presented. After a variable interval ranging from 1000 up to 2000 
ms, the black arrow became either green (i.e. target) or turquoise while its 
orientation could either remain identical or shift in the opposite direction. 
Participants were asked to perform a speeded color plus orientation 
discrimination task. When the black arrow turned green and the orientation 
remained unchanged, participants were instructed to press the space bar as fast 
as possible with a pre-defined finger of their dominant hand (Go trials; see Figure 
1A). However, participants had to withhold responding when either the arrow 
became green but changed orientation, or when the arrow became turquoise 
and kept its initial orientation, enabling two types of noGo trials (based either on 
the orientation or color; see Figure 1B). For noGo trials, this color arrow 
remained on the screen for a maximum duration of 1000 ms. Instructions 
emphasized both speed and accuracy. 
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Figure 1. Stimuli and task. Participants had to respond by pressing the spacebar as fast as 
possible only when the arrow became green and kept its initial orientation (A), but not otherwise 
(B). 
We used an online adaptive algorithm to set up a limit for “correct”/fast RT 
(i.e. deadline procedure). The rationale of this procedure was to facilitate the 
occurrence of fast decisions, and hence the occasional making of errors on noGo 
trials. Participants had to respond fast on Go trials, but their performance 
actually depended on this strict time limit, updated on a trial-by-trial basis. At the 
beginning of the experiment, the RT limit was set to 300 ms (this cutoff was 
determined based on previous pilot testing). This limit was adjusted online as a 
function of the immediately preceding trial history, more specifically as the sum 
of current and previous RT divided by two. This procedure was found to be 
particularly efficient to produce a high number of commission errors within a 
short period of time. For any given Go trial, the actual RT was always compared 
with the RT on the previous Go trial. If the current RT was slower than the 
previous RT, the participant received a negative feedback (red dot). If the RT was 
faster than the previous one, a positive feedback (green dot) was presented. This 
procedure ensured obtaining many FAs on noGo trials despite fluctuations in 
speed on a trial-by-trial basis, because this arbitrary cut-off for correct responses 
was updated and adjusted online after each trial, separately for each participant. 
The experiment consisted of 20 practice trials and 360 test trials. The test 
trials were divided into 6 blocks of 60 trials each (40 Go trials and 10 noGo trials 
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of each type). Trial presentation was randomized within blocks. After every 
block, the experimenter emphasized the importance of speed as well as accuracy 
in this task. Stimulus presentation and response recording were controlled using 
E-prime software (V2.0., http://www.pstnet.com/products/e-prime/). 
Questionnaires 
The 32 participants filled out the Dutch version of the STAI-T (Defares et al., 
1979; Spielberger, 1983) and their scores served as a basis to form the low and 
high anxious group. Because trait anxiety is typically related to punishment 
sensitivity, participants also completed the Dutch version of the Behavioral 
Inhibition Sensitivity (BIS)/Behavioral Activation Sensitivity (BAS) scales (Carver & 
White, 1994; Franken, Muris, & Rassin, 2005). Importantly, we also measured 
levels of state anxiety of these 32 participants, both before and after the 
Go/noGo task, using the STAI-S. 
EEG acquisition and analysis 
Continuous EEG was acquired at 512 Hz using a 128-channel (pin-type) 
Biosemi Active Two system (http://www.biosemi.com) referenced to the CMS-
DRL ground. ERPs of interest were computed offline following a standard 
sequence of data transformations (Picton et al., 2000): (1) -500/+1000 
segmentation around the motor response, (2) pre-response interval baseline 
correction (from -500 ms to motor response), (3) vertical ocular correction for 
blinks (Gratton, Coles, & Donchin, 1983) using the difference amplitude of two 
electrodes attached above and below the left eye, (4) artifact rejection (M = -
75/+75, SEM = 2.0 amplitude scale (µV) across participants; no significant 
difference between low anxious (M = 76.56, SEM = 2.84) and high anxious 
participants (M = 72.5, SEM = 2.81) was observed, t(30) = 1.02, p > .10), (5) 
averaging of trials for each of the four experimental conditions (Fast Hits, Slow 
Hits, Color FAs and Orientation FAs), and (6) low pass digital filtering of the 
individual average data (30 Hz). 
We primarily focused on two well-documented error-related ERP 
components following motor execution (Falkenstein et al., 2000), on the ERN/Ne, 
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with a maximum negative amplitude over fronto-central electrodes along the 
midline (electrode FCz) early on following motor execution (0 - 100 ms post-
response onset), immediately followed by the Pe component (150 - 300 ms post-
response onset), with a maximum positive amplitude over more posterior and 
central locations along the midline (electrode Cz). Hence, we performed a 
conventional peak analysis for each of these two error-related ERP deflections 
(Picton et al., 2000). For each ERP component and each condition separately, we 
calculated the area under the curve, during the 30 - 60 ms interval post-response 
onset at electrode FCz for the ERN/Ne amplitude, and during the 180 - 270 ms 
interval post-response onset at electrode Cz for the Pe component. The selection 
of these two specific scalp locations (and time window) was based on the 
topographic properties of the present dataset, as well as based on converging 
results obtained in previous ERP studies for these two electrode positions 
(Dehaene et al., 1994; Gehring et al., 1990; Hajcak et al., 2003a). Statistical 
analyses were performed on the mean amplitude of each area using a 2 
(accuracy) x 2 (anxiety) repeated measures ANOVA, with a significance alpha 
cutoff set to p < .05. 
Topography 
In order to capture more global ERP differences between low and high 
anxious individuals during the detection of errors, a detailed topographic 
mapping analysis of the ERP data was next performed, following a conventional 
data-analysis scheme (Michel, Seeck, & Landis, 1999; Michel et al., 2001; Murray 
et al., 2008; Pourtois, Dan, Grandjean, Sander, & Vuilleumier, 2005; Pourtois et 
al., 2008; Pourtois, Thut, Grave de Peralta, Michel, & Vuilleumier, 2005). 
To precisely characterize topographic modulations over time and 
conditions, we applied a pattern or spatial cluster analysis procedure. The 
pattern analysis efficiently summarizes ERP data by a limited number of field 
configurations, previously referred to as functional microstates (Lehmann & 
Skrandies, 1980; Michel et al., 1999). Here, we performed a topographic pattern 
analysis on group-averaged data from -150 ms until 450 ms after response onset 
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(300 consecutive time frames at 512 Hz sampling rate), using a standard cluster 
(or spatio-temporal segmentation) method (K-means; Pascual-Marqui et al., 
1995) and then fitted the segmentation results back to individual data for 
subsequent statistical testing. The rationale and basic principles of this temporal 
segmentation method have been extensively described elsewhere (Michel et al., 
1999; Murray et al., 2008). The spatio-temporal segmentation algorithm is 
derived from spatial cluster analysis (Pascual-Marqui, Michel, & Lehmann, 1995) 
and allows the identification of the most dominant scalp topographies appearing 
in the group-averaged ERPs of each condition and over time, while minimizing 
the biases for the selection of time-frames or electrodes of interest. Importantly, 
this procedure allows identifying dominant scalp topographies, irrespective of 
(local or global) changes in amplitude (Michel et al., 1999; Murray et al., 2008). 
The optimal number of topographic maps explaining the whole data set is 
determined objectively using both cross validation (Pascual-Marqui et al., 1995) 
and Krzanowski-Lai (Tibshirani, Walther, & Hastie, 2001) criteria. The dominant 
scalp topographies (identified in the group-averaged data) are then fitted to the 
ERPs of each individual subject using spatial fitting procedures to quantitatively 
determine their representation across subjects and conditions. This procedure 
thus provides fine-grained quantitative values, such as the duration of a specific 
topographic map or its Global Explained Variance (GEV, or goodness of fit), which 
are critical indices of the significance of a given topography, not available 
otherwise in a classical component analysis (Picton et al., 2000). GEV represents 
the sum of the explained variance weighted by the Global Field Power (GFP) at 
each moment in time. GEV was entered in repeated-measure analyses of 
variance (ANOVA) with two within-subject factors, accuracy (hits vs. errors) and 
map configuration (i.e. the electric field distributions previously identified by the 
spatial cluster analysis), and anxiety (high vs. low anxious participants) as 
between-subject factor. These analyses were carried out using CARTOOL 
software (Version 3.34; developed by D. Brunet, Functional Brain Mapping 
Laboratory, Geneva, Switzerland). 
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Source localization 
Finally, to estimate the likely neural sources underlying the electrical field 
configurations identified by the previous analyses, we used a specific distributed 
linear inverse solution, namely standardized low-resolution brain 
electromagnetic tomography (sLORETA, Pascual-Marqui, 2002). sLORETA is 
based on the neurophysiological assumption of coherent co activation of 
neighboring cortical areas (known to have highly synchronized activity, see Silva, 
Amitai, & Connors, 1991) and, accordingly, it computes the “smoothest” of all 
possible activity distributions (i.e. no a-priori assumption is made on the number 
and locations of the sources). Mathematical validation of this distributed source 
localization technique has been recently demonstrated (Sekihara, Sahani, & 
Nagarajan, 2005). sLORETA solutions are computed within a three-shell spherical 
head model co-registered to the MNI152 template (Mazziotta et al., 2001). The 
source locations were therefore given as (x, y, z) coordinates (x from left to right; 
y from posterior to anterior; z from inferior to superior). sLORETA estimates the 
3-dimensional intracerebral current density distribution in 6239 voxels (5 mm 
resolution), each voxel containing an equivalent current dipole. This 3-
dimensional solution space, in which the inverse problem is solved, is restricted 
to the cortical gray matter (and hippocampus). The head model for the inverse 
solution uses the electric potential lead field computed with a boundary element 
method applied to the MNI152 template (Fuchs, Kastner, Wagner, Hawes, & 
Ebersole, 2002). Scalp electrode coordinates on the MNI brain are derived from 
the international 5% system (Jurcak, Tsuzuki, & Dan, 2007). The calculation of all 
reconstruction parameters was based on the computed common average 
reference. sLORETA units were scaled to ampere per square meter (A/m2). 
RESULTS 
Behavioral results 
RTs faster than 150 ms (M = 0.83%) and slower than 500 ms (M = 1.18%) 
were removed from the subsequent analyses. The number of excluded trials did 
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not differ between groups, t(30) = 0.52, p > .10. Color and orientation FAs were 
collapsed together (error condition), as there was no significant difference 
between the two error types. Likewise, fast hits and slow hits were collapsed and 
treated as a single condition (hit condition). Accuracy and RT data are presented 
in Table 1. The selected task turned out to be efficient in inducing a high number 
of unavoidable errors, consisting of FAs on noGo trials. Error rates did not differ 
between the low anxious (M = 38.81, SEM = 3.84) and the high anxious group (M 
= 46.56, SEM = 3.98), t(30) = 1.40, p > .10. As expected, participants were quicker 
for FAs than for hits, F(1,30) = 296.58, p < .001. However, the speed did not differ 
between low and high anxious individuals, F < 1, and the interaction between 
accuracy and anxiety did not reach statistical significance, F < 1. Moreover, no 
group difference in efficiency (computed as the ratio between accuracy and 
speed; see Stoeber & Eysenck, 2008 for exact formula), was observed, t(30) = 
0.84, p > .10. These results suggest a comparable behavioral performance in 
these two groups. 
Table 1 
Behavioural results during the Go/noGo task, separately for low and high anxious 
participants 
  RT (ms) Accuracy (number) 
 
Errors Hits Errors Hits 
Anxiety M M M M 
SEM SEM SEM SEM 
Low 264.99 298.67 38.81 237.81 
4.61 4.04 3.84 0.74 
High 261.08 292.44 46.56 238.50 
  4.93 4.68 3.98 0.62 
During the Go/noGo task, a classical post-error slowing effect was 
observed (Laming, 1979; Rabbitt, 1966). Consistent with a systematic adaptation 
following errors, RTs were reliably slower for hits immediately following errors 
(M = 301.31, SEM = 4.18), as compared with hits following another hit (M = 
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292.52, SEM = 3.17), F(1,30) = 7.46, p < .05. The magnitude of the post-error 
slowing effect did not differ between groups, F < 1. 
Questionnaires 
As expected, the level of state anxiety before the task differed significantly 
between the two groups (low trait anxiety: M = 31.62, SEM = 1.11, Range: 25 - 
42; high trait anxiety: M = 38.12, SEM = 1.56, Range: 31 – 51), t(30) = -3.39, p < 
.01. After the Go/noGo task, this level of state anxiety reliably increased, F(1, 30) 
= 5.20, p < .05, although low trait anxious individuals had still a lower level of 
state anxiety (M = 33.50, SEM = 2.17) than high trait anxious individuals (M = 
41.69, SEM = 1.56), t(30) = 3.06, p < .01. Post-hoc comparisons revealed that this 
increase of state anxiety after, relative to before, the Go/noGo task, was only 
significant in high anxious participants, t(15) = 2.11, p = .05, but not in low 
anxious participants, t(15) = 1.11, p > .10 (Table 2). This result suggests a 
differential influence of the speeded Go/noGo task on subjective levels of state 
anxiety in low vs. high anxious participants. 
Table 2 
State anxiety scores (STAI-S) before and after performing the speeded Go/noGo 
task  
State anxiety 
Trait 
anxiety 
Before 
M (SEM) 
After 
M (SEM) 
Low 31.62 (1.11) 33.50 (2.17) 
High 36.56 (1.00) 41.44 (1.48) 
Moreover, the scores on the BIS/BAS further confirmed that the two 
groups differed significantly with respect to the trait related anxiety 
characteristic, punishment sensitivity. BIS scores were significantly higher in high 
trait anxious (M = 22.00, SEM = 0.67, Range: 18 - 26) than in low trait anxious 
subjects (M = 19.13, SEM = 0.49, Range: 16 - 22), t(30) = -3.48 , p < .01. No 
significant difference between the low and high trait anxious group was 
evidenced for the BAS-scores (BAS-drive: low trait anxious: M = 11.69, SEM = 
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0.27, high trait anxious: M = 11.63, SEM = 0.43, t(30) = 0.12, p > .10; BAS-fun: low 
trait anxious: M = 11.63, SEM = 0.24, high trait anxious: M = 11.81, SEM = 0.46, 
t(30) = -0.36, p > .10; BAS-reward: low trait anxious: M = 15.19, SEM = 0.34, high 
trait anxious: M = 15.56, SEM = .44, t(30) = -0.67, p > .10). 
ERP results 
Consistent with many previous ERP studies (Falkenstein et al., 1991; 
Falkenstein et al., 2000; Gehring et al., 1993; Hajcak et al., 2004; Nieuwenhuis et 
al., 2001), we recorded two distinct and conspicuous error-related ERP 
components following motor execution, which have been previously associated 
with error-detection brain mechanisms (i.e. the ERN/Ne and the Pe). During the 
speeded Go/noGo task, the commission of errors was unambiguously associated 
with the generation of these two well-characterized error-related ERP 
components (Figure 2). 
ERN/Ne 
When participants made errors, there was a clear sharp negative deflection 
that peaked roughly 40-50 ms post-response onset, with a maximum amplitude 
at fronto-central electrodes along the midline, including FCz (Figure 2). These 
electrophysiological properties are consistent with the ERN/Ne. Consistent with 
previous ERP studies (Falkenstein et al., 1991; Gehring et al., 1993), the 
amplitude of the ERN/Ne was reliably larger for errors (M = -3.11, SEM = 0.59), 
relative to hits (M = -1.62, SEM = 0.52), F(1,30) = 22.02, p < .001. An ANOVA 
performed on the amplitude values of the ERN/Ne, as measured at the standard 
electrode FCz, disclosed a near-significant interaction between anxiety and 
accuracy, F(1,30) = 3.53, p = .07. Compared to hits, errors elicited a larger 
ERN/Ne component in high anxious participants, t(15) = 4.61, p < .001 (Figure 
2E), than in low anxious participants, t(15) = 2.00, p = .06 (Figure 2B). However, a 
direct comparison of the ERN/Ne between high anxious (M = -3.95, SEM = 0.65) 
and low anxious participants (M = -2.27, SEM = 0.97) did not reach statistical 
significance, t(30) = 1.46, p > .10. Likewise, for hits, the early negativity (i.e. the 
Correct Related Negativity - CRN; Burle, Roger, Allain, Vidal, & Hasbrouckq, 2008; 
Coles et al., 2001; Vidal, Hasbrouckq, Grapperon, & Bonnet, 2000), was 
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comparable across the two anxiety groups (low anxious: M = -1.37, SEM = 0.83; 
high anxious: M = -1.86, SEM = 0.63), t(30) = -0.54, p > .10. Note that because our 
speeded Go/noGo task was quite demanding and uncertainty about accuracy (at 
the time of motor execution) was presumably equally high for errors and hits, it 
was not surprising to find a large CRN component for correct hits in this study 
(see also Pailing & Segalowitz, 2004a). Importantly, the CRN component was still 
significantly smaller in amplitude than the ERN/Ne in both low anxious (p = .06) 
and high anxious (p < .001) participants. Several authors already pointed out the 
electrophysiological similarities between the ERN/Ne and the CRN (Allain, 
Carbonnell, Falkenstein, Burle, & Vidal, 2004; Vidal, Burle, Bonnet, Grapperon, & 
Hasbroucq, 2003; Vidal et al., 2000). These authors argued that the ERN/Ne (and 
CRN) might reflect either a more general comparison process (active after both 
errors and correct responses) or an emotional/arousal reaction (instead of an 
error-detection process per se). 
Pe 
For errors, the ERN/Ne was immediately followed by a large positive 
potential, with maximum amplitude over more posterior scalp positions, 
including Cz. This positive component was strongly attenuated for correct hits 
(Figure 2). These electrophysiological properties are compatible with the error-
related Pe component (Falkenstein et al., 2000; Ridderinkhof, Ramautar, & 
Wijnen, 2009). 
FAs on noGo trials elicited a large Pe, relative to correct hits (Figure 2). 
However, this accuracy effect at the level of the Pe component was similar for 
low and high anxious participants, unlike what was found for the ERN/Ne. 
Statistical analyses confirmed these observations. An ANOVA performed on the 
mean amplitude of the Pe recorded at electrode Cz revealed a main effect of 
accuracy, F(1,30) = 146.29, p < .001, indicating a much larger Pe component for 
errors (M = 13.95, SEM = 1.31) than correct hits (M = 4.90, SEM = 1.24). This 
significant accuracy effect was not influenced by trait anxiety (Figure 2CF), F < 1. 
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Figure 2. ERP results. (A) Grand average ERP waveforms (electrode FCz) for low anxious 
participants. (B) Mean amplitude (µV) ± 1 standard error of the mean of the ERN/Ne for errors 
and hits in low anxious participants. (C) Mean amplitude (µV) ± 1 standard error of the mean of 
the Pe for errors and hits in low anxious participants. (D) Grand average ERP waveforms 
(electrode FCz) for high anxious participants. (E) Mean amplitude (µV) ± 1 standard error of the 
mean of the ERN/Ne component for hits and errors in high anxious participants. (F) Mean 
amplitude (µV) ± 1 standard error of the mean of the Pe component for hits and errors in high 
anxious participants. 
Results of topographic analyses 
Following standard practice (Michel et al., 1999; Murray et al., 2008; 
Pourtois et al., 2008), the topographic segmentation analysis was first performed 
using a broad temporal window, starting 150 ms before response onset and 
ending 450 ms after response onset (i.e. 300 consecutive time frames, 
corresponding to 600 ms), encompassing the two main error-related ERP 
components (ERN/Ne and Pe). A solution with 10 maps explained 97% of the 
variance. Remarkably, during the time interval corresponding the ERN/Ne and 
CRN component (~20-50 ms post-response onset), we found that the scalp 
distribution for errors had a different configuration for high anxious relative to 
low anxious participants, whereas the scalp distribution for correct hits was 
similar between these two groups (Figure 3). Hence, the scalp map 
corresponding the CRN, was similar between the two groups (Figure 3A; map#1), 
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while a differential distribution of the negative activity over fronto-central 
electrodes was evidenced between low and high anxious participants for errors 
(ERN/Ne). Clearly, the fronto-central negative activity associated with errors 
(ERN/Ne) showed a broader and more extended (pre)frontal distribution for high 
anxious participants (Figure 3C; map#3), relative to low anxious participants 
(Figure 3B; map#2), where this negative activity was clearly circumscribed to a 
few electrode positions, including FCz. This result showed therefore a change in 
the configuration of the electric field (topography), regardless of (local) 
variations in amplitude (ERPs, see Methods). 
These observations were further verified by statistical analyses performed 
on the topographic data (i.e. the Global Explained Variance - GEV), obtained from 
the fitting procedure (Figure 3DEF). These three dominant scalp topographies 
(identified in the group-averaged data) were fitted to the ERPs of each individual 
subject during the time interval corresponding to the ERN/Ne and CRN to 
quantitatively determine their representation across subjects and conditions. 
Finally, we submitted these GEV values to a 3 (map) x 2 (anxiety) x 2 (accuracy) 
repeated measures ANOVA. This analysis revealed a significant three-way 
interaction, F(2,60) = 3.05, p = .05. An additional 2 (anxiety) x 2 (accuracy) 
ANOVA run for each map separately confirmed that map#1 (Figure 3D) was 
specific to correct hits but shared across the two groups (as revealed by a 
significant main effect of accuracy, F(1,30) = 40.85, p < .001, but no interaction 
with anxiety, F < 1), whereas maps#2 and 3 were specific to errors (Figure 3EF), 
though with a clear cut dissociation between the two groups for these two error-
related scalp topographies. This first result is in line with a previous topographic 
mapping study showing that the ERN/Ne and CRN led to different scalp 
distributions (and not only a change in the electric field strength, see Vocat et al., 
2008). More importantly, both for map#2 and map#3, the ANOVA disclosed a 
significant interaction between accuracy and anxiety, F(1,30) = 6.70, p < .05 and 
F(1,30) = 5.18, p < .05, for map #2 and map#3, respectively. For low anxious 
participants (Figure 3E), post-hoc paired t-tests showed that map#2 had a larger 
GEV for errors, relative to hits, t(15) = 2.88, p = .01, whereas such an effect was 
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not observed with map#3 in this group, t(15) = -0.59, p > .10. Symmetrically, for 
high anxious participants (Figure 3F), map#3 had a larger GEV for errors relative 
to hits, t(15) = 2.89, p = .01, whereas such an effect was absent with map#2 in 
this group, t(15) = -0.35, p > .10. These topographic mapping results therefore 
suggested a clear dissociation in the configuration of the electric field associated 
with errors (ERN/Ne scalp map) between low and high anxious participants. Note 
that this difference concerned the topography, but not the amplitude of the ERP 
signal. Because changes in the distribution of the electric field over the scalp 
surface (topography) necessarily denote alterations in the underlying 
configuration of intracranial generators (Lehmann & Skrandies, 1980; Michel et 
al., 2001), these results indicated that high anxious individuals may recruit a 
different network of brain regions early on following the occurrence of errors, 
compared to low anxious participants. This assumption was next verified, using a 
distributed source localization technique (sLORETA). 
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Figure 3. Dominant topographic maps (horizontal and frontal views) during the time interval 
corresponding either to the ERN/Ne or CRN (20 
of the CRN (map#1) was shared between the two groups. (B) The scalp map of the ERN/Ne for 
low anxious participants (map#2), showing a circumscribed negative activity around FCz 
electrode position. (C) The scalp map of the ERN/Ne for high anxious participants (map#3), 
showing a broader negative activity over frontal and prefrontal electrodes, compared to low 
anxious participants. (D) The CRN scalp map (map#1) showed a significant main effect of 
condition (explaining more variance for hits than errors, regardless of the e
(E) The ERN/Ne scalp map for low anxious participants (map#2) was found to be specific for 
errors in this group. (F) Likewise, the ERN/Ne scalp map for high anxious participants (map#3) 
was found to be specific for errors in this group 
mean. 
Source localization results
To gain insight into the putative configuration of the intracranial 
generators of these different topographic maps during the time interval 
corresponding to the ERN/Ne and CRN
analysis, using sLORETA 
the CRN scalp map, which was clearly shared across the two groups and specific 
to correct hits), sLORETA disclosed a main generator/cluster within the posterior 
  
- 50 ms post response onset). (A) The scalp map 
xperimental group). 
Error bars represent ± 1 standard error of the 
 
, we performed a source localization 
(Pascual-Marqui, 2002). For map#1 (corresponding to 
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parietal cortex, extending ventrally towards the posterior cingulate gyrus (Figure 
4). A maximum activation was found in the precuneus (Brodmann area 7, with an 
extended activation toward Brodmann area 31) for this CRN scalp map (MNI 
coordinates: -10x, -80y, +50z). More importantly, sLORETA confirmed that the 
configuration of the intracranial generators underlying the ERN/Ne scalp map 
(errors) were roughly similar between low and high anxious participants and 
primarily involved medial frontal/dorsal anterior cingulate cortex (dACC) regions 
(Dehaene et al., 1994; Herrmann et al., 2004; O’Connell et al., 2007; Vocat et al., 
2008), though with some substantial differences in the exact localization of these 
intracerebral generators within the dorsal ACC, as suggested by the topographic 
mapping analyses. While Vidal et al. (2000) found that the CRN and the ERN/Ne 
had the same neural generators (i.e. dACC), here we found in contrast that the 
neural generators of the CRN were different from those of the ERN/Ne, and they 
primarily involved more posterior cingulate regions, whereas the ERN/Ne was 
associated with neural activity originating from the dorsal ACC (Dehaene et al., 
1994; Herrmann et al., 2004; O’Connell et al., 2007; Vocat et al., 2008). 
Therefore, our results support the hypothesis that errors did not simply amplify 
the activity of a generic action-monitoring system that would be equally engaged 
by correct and incorrect actions (Vidal et al., 2000), but rather, they rely on a 
specialized brain system localized within the dorsal ACC, with a significant 
modulation in this latter brain network as a function of levels of trait anxiety. 
For low anxious participants (Figure 4B), the neural generators of the 
ERN/Ne were mainly localized within superior frontal gyrus/dorsal ACC 
(maximum: 5x, 10y, 60z; Brodmann areas 6 and 32), whereas for high anxious 
participants (Figure 4C), they also involved the superior frontal gyrus/dorsal ACC 
(maximum: -5x, 5y, 60z; Brodmann areas 6 and 24), but with a shift towards the 
front, compared to low anxious participants (Figure 4B). Importantly, a direct 
comparison between the two groups confirmed a different configuration of 
intracranial generators for the ERN/Ne (Figure 4D). Whereas the main generators 
of the ERN/Ne primarily involved the dorsal ACC for low anxious participants 
(Brodmann area 24), they were localized in a more anterior region for high 
ERROR-MONITORING AND ANXIETY
 
anxious participants, corresponding to the most anterior part o
medial frontal gyrus (Brodmann areas 32 and 10). In addition, another generator 
was found within the posterior cingulate gyrus/paracentral lobule for high 
anxious participants (Brodmann areas 31 and 5). 
Figure 4. Source localization result
map (map#1) (B) Inverse solution for the ERN/Ne scalp map for low anxious participants (map#2) 
(C) Inverse solution for the ERN/Ne scalp map for high anxious participants (map#3).
The goal of this study was to inve
monitoring functions and individual differences in trait anxiety, primarily using 
ERP measurements. More specifically, we tested the prediction that the ERN/Ne, 
an early electrophysiological mark
was not only relatively enhanced in high compared to low anxious individuals 
(Olvet & Hajcak, 2008) 
alter the expression of this ERP component (qualitative account), consistent with 
the assumption of abnormal or altered early error
anxious individuals. A number of important new results emerge from this study.
First, we found a c
the two groups during the speeded and demanding Go/noGo task. High anxious 
participants did not commit more errors (nor were they slower or faster with 
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errors) than low anxious participants. This rules out the possibility that ERP 
differences observed between these two groups actually resulted from different 
behavioral effects during this Go/noGo task. In addition, the two groups showed 
a comparable classical post-error slowing effect (Laming, 1979; Rabbitt, 1966), 
suggesting preserved error monitoring and adaptation effects in these two 
groups. These results corroborate previous findings showing that behavioral 
measures of cognitive control abilities do not differ between low and high 
anxious subjects (Gehring et al., 2000; Hajcak et al., 2003a; Hajcak & Simons, 
2002; Luu, Collins, & Tucker, 2000). However, we found that the speeded 
Go/noGo task had a differential influence on subjective levels of state anxiety in 
low and high anxious subjects. Only high anxious participants showed increased 
levels of state anxiety following the task (relative to a baseline state anxiety 
measure obtained before the task), compared to low anxious participants. This 
result suggests that the speeded Go/noGo task had a differential influence on 
the experience of negative affect in high vs. low anxious participants. 
Importantly, ERP results confirmed a dissociation between the two groups. 
High anxious participants showed a larger difference between the ERN/Ne and 
the CRN, compared to low anxious participants, suggesting an increased 
sensitivity to errors in the former group. Noteworthy, complementary 
topographic analyses actually indicated that the ERN/Ne scalp map underwent a 
reliable configuration change for high anxious, relative to low anxious 
participants, although the CRN scalp map was shared across these two groups, 
suggesting that errors, but not correct hits, were differentially processed in these 
two groups. Clearly, the ERN/Ne scalp map had a different configuration for high 
anxious, relative to low anxious individuals, and concerned more anterior and 
(pre)frontal electrodes. This result suggests that these two groups used partly 
non-overlapping brain networks, early on following the onset of an incorrect 
response during performance monitoring. This conjecture was formally verified 
by the subsequent source localization analysis, which disclosed a shift of neural 
generators within the ACC for high, relative to low, anxious participants during 
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the time interval corresponding to the ERN/Ne. We discuss the implications of 
these new results in greater detail below. 
Augmented ERN/Ne to errors in high anxious participants 
The results of the conventional peak analysis were in line with previous ERP 
findings, that showed links between trait anxiety and the magnitude of the 
ERN/Ne. Earlier ERP studies already reported that the ERN/Ne to errors was 
increased during speeded RT tasks in participants with anxiety characteristics 
(Boksem et al., 2006; Endrass, Klawohn, Schuster, & Kathmann, 2008; Gehring et 
al., 2000; Hajcak et al., 2003a, 2004; Hajcak & Simons, 2002; Luu et al., 2000). 
While some previous studies also found an effect of trait anxiety on ERN/Ne 
amplitudes both for errors and hits (Hajcak et al., 2003a), here we found an 
interaction effect between accuracy (errors vs. hits) and anxiety (low vs. high 
anxious), precluding the possibility that trait anxiety affected equally the early 
processing of errors and hits during the speeded Go/noGo task. The results for 
the ERN/Ne (peak analysis) showed that the amplitude difference between 
errors and hits was larger in high, compared to low, anxious participants, 
suggesting a higher sensitivity to errors in high anxious participants, despite 
similar behavioral performances in these two groups. These new results are 
therefore consistent with the motivational significance theory of the ERN/Ne 
(Hajcak & Foti, 2008; Hajcak et al., 2003a; Luu et al., 2000), which predicts that 
this specific error-related ERP component mainly indexes the motivational 
significance of errors. Hence, participants like high anxious individuals, who are 
more sensitive to negative events and punishment, should also react more 
strongly to errors and as a corollary, present a (relatively) larger ERN/Ne to 
errors. Our new results for the ERN/Ne component support this assumption. 
Alteration of early error-detection brain mechanisms in high anxious 
participants 
While our new ERP results are overall compatible with the motivational 
significance theory of the ERN/Ne (Hajcak & Foti, 2008; Hajcak et al., 2003a; Luu 
et al., 2000), they also provide important new information as they show a 
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dissociation in the expression of the ERN/Ne between the two groups. This global 
difference concerning the distribution of the electric field (rather than its 
strength) could not be captured using a conventional peak analysis (Picton et al., 
2000). Hence, not only the magnitude of the ERN/Ne was larger in high anxious 
participants compared to low anxious participants, but its scalp distribution was 
also altered in the former compared to the latter group. Whereas the CRN scalp 
map was shared across the two groups (and mainly involved posterior parietal 
regions – Brodmann area 7, with an extended activation toward Brodmann area 
31), the ERN/Ne scalp map had a different configuration in high vs. low anxious 
participants. The fronto-central negative activity associated with errors (ERN/Ne) 
showed a broader and more extended (pre)frontal distribution for high anxious 
participants, relative to low anxious participants, where this early negative 
activity was clearly circumscribed to a few electrode positions, including FCz. 
For each group, we found that the ERN/Ne scalp map could be reliably 
modeled by a solution with distributed generators within the dorsal ACC, 
consistent with many previous ERP studies that primarily ascribed the ERN/Ne 
either to the activity of the Premotor/Supplemental motor area or the dorsal 
ACC, or sometimes both (Dehaene et al., 1994; Herrmann et al., 2004; Luu, 
Tucker, Derryberry, Reed, & Poulsen, 2003; Miltner, Braun, & Coles, 1997; 
O’Connell et al., 2007) . However, we found that the differential scalp map for 
the ERN/Ne between the two groups could be explained by a slight shift within 
the dorsal ACC for the exact location of the intracranial generators. For low 
anxious participants, the ERN/Ne was primarily generated in the 
Premotor/Supplemental motor area and in the dorsal ACC (Brodmann areas 6 
and 32), while for high anxious participants, the maximum within the dorsal ACC 
shifted towards the front, and involved more frontal and dorsal parts of the 
medial frontal cortex (Brodmann areas 6 and 24). Furthermore, a direct 
comparison between groups (Figure 4D) revealed that high anxious participants 
recruited more anterior as well as posterior medial frontal regions during the 
time interval of the ERN/Ne, relative to low anxious participants. Noteworthy, 
this contrast disclosed that anterior medial frontal and rostral ACC regions were 
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more activated in high anxious participants, as opposed to more dorsal ACC 
regions in low anxious participants (Figure 4D). This finding may therefore 
indicate that not only cognitive but also emotional monitoring effects were 
temporarily active in high anxious participants during the early detection of 
response errors (see Bush et al., 2000). 
Interestingly, this substantial alteration of the electric field configuration 
underlying the ERN/Ne as a function of trait anxiety could be explained by the 
attentional control theory (Eysenck & Calvo, 1992; Eysenck et al., 2007). This 
model predicts that with similar task demands high anxious participants recruit 
more cognitive resources (i.e. they are less efficient) than low anxious 
participants to reach the same level of performance. Our behavioral results are 
consistent with this theory, as trait anxiety did not influence performance (see 
also Compton et al., 2007; Hajcak et al., 2003a). To compensate for this reduced 
efficiency, the use of more cognitive (or emotional) resources in the high anxious 
group could translate as a different recruitment of cognitive control areas in 
anxiety (see Braver et al., 2007; Fales et al., 2008 for converging evidence). Our 
observation of a qualitative difference in the neurophysiological expression and 
intracranial generators of the ERN/Ne with trait anxiety therefore corroborates 
this view. This effect might reflect the activation of distinct cognitive control 
processes in high anxious participants, a self-generated compensatory strategy 
used by these participants to deal with the immediate need of behavioral 
adjustments imposed by the early detection of unforced errors during this 
Go/noGo task (Eysenck & Calvo, 1992). 
More specifically, we suggest that trait anxiety alters early error-detection 
mechanisms (an important component of cognitive control) within the dorsal 
division of the ACC (Brodmann areas 24 and 32). Previous studies already 
demonstrated that different areas in the rostral division of the ACC contribute 
differentially to action monitoring and cognitive control. For example, while the 
anterior part of the rostral ACC was assumed to exhibit conflict specific effects, 
the posterior part of the rostral ACC was found to be less sensitive to conflict and 
showed more general action-monitoring effects (Milham & Banich, 2005). 
68  CHAPTER 2 
 
Moreover, different subdivisions of ACC may serve different functions, with a 
shift between emotional and cognitive operations during behavioral control 
along an anterior-posterior axis (Bush et al., 2000). Hence, our results suggest 
that high anxious participants may call extra emotional control regions within the 
rostral ACC during the early detection of errors, relative to low-anxious 
participants, who showed a more typical dorsal ACC contribution during this 
process (see Dehaene et al., 1994; Bush et al., 2000). The observed shift of the 
neural generators for the ERN/Ne within the dorsal ACC as a function of trait 
anxiety suggests that different cognitive control areas may also exist within the 
dorsal ACC. Moreover, low and high anxious participants seem to differentially 
recruit these areas, indicating that errors may acquire a different cognitive or 
motivational significance in high, as opposed to low anxious participants. Thus, 
high anxious participants not only respond stronger to self-generated errors, but 
they also react in a different way, relative to non anxious participants.  
To conclude, the results of this study show that trait anxiety can lead to 
qualitative (and not only quantitative) changes during the earliest stage of error 
monitoring. As such, these findings are consistent with the attentional control 
theory (Eysenck et al., 2007) and they may help better understand effects of trait 
anxiety on cognitive control brain mechanisms. Future ERP studies should further 
investigate what may be the influence of these qualitative changes during early 
error monitoring onto the regulatory component of this process, which 
presumably takes place later after error commission and involves other brain 
structures, including the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex. 
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CHAPTER 3: ELECTRICAL BRAIN IMAGING REVEALS THE 
EXPRESSION AND TIMING OF ALTERED ERROR-MONITORING FUNCTIONS 
IN MAJOR DEPRESSION 
“Major depressive disorder (MDD) is characterized by disturbances not only in 
affect or motivation, but also in cognitive control. These latter impairments 
sometimes include error-detection brain processes, although their actual 
expression at the electrophysiological level remains unclear. In this study, we 
compared 17 MDD patients and 17 healthy controls (HCs), while they performed 
a speeded Go/noGo task designed to explore error-monitoring functions. MDD 
patients had overall slower reaction times (RTs) than HCs for correct Go and 
incorrect noGo trials, however accuracy for Go and noGo trials did not differ 
between groups. Unwanted response errors committed by participants during the 
task were associated with two well-described error-related ERP components, the 
error-related negativity (ERN/Ne) and error positivity (Pe). Using electrical brain 
imaging, we found that whereas the ERN/Ne had the same magnitude in both 
groups at the scalp level, MDD patients showed however overactive medial 
frontal cortex (MFC; Brodmann Area - BAs 8 and 9) activation during this early 
time interval following error commission. By contrast, the subsequent Pe 
component was substantially blunted in MDD patients compared to HCs, and this 
effect was accompanied by a reduced activation of ventral anterior cingulate 
cortex (ACC; BAs 24 and 32) regions. Additional analyses showed that this Pe 
effect was related to excessive ruminative thinking in MDD patients. These results 
suggest that MDD has multiple cascade effects on early error-monitoring brain 
mechanisms. An overactive early error-detection process in MFC (ERN/Ne) could 
inadvertently unlock extra self-reflection or internal monitoring processes in these 
patients, an interference effect that would somehow prevent the rapid conscious 
appraisal of errors in ventral ACC, and in turn decrease the amplitude of the Pe 
component.”
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INTRODUCTION 
The ability to continuously assess whether our actions are goal conducive 
or not, is an important feature of cognitive control and is crucial for the flexible 
adjustment and optimization of behavior (Holroyd & Coles, 2002; Rabbitt, 1966). 
Selective impairments in this action-monitoring process can result in serious daily 
life problems or maladaptive behavior, and have often been reported in specific 
psychiatric populations (Olvet & Hajcak, 2008; Ullsperger, 2006). For example, 
prior studies in individuals with major depressive disorder (MDD) have 
demonstrated exaggerated reactions to errors or negative feedback on task 
performance (Beats, Sahakian, & Levy, 1996; Elliott, Sahakian, Herrod, Robbins, 
& Paykel, 1997; Elliott et al., 1996), an excessive concern or worry related to 
error commission (Enns & Cox, 1999; Shafran & Mansell, 2001), an increase in 
negative mood after perceived failures (Abela & D'Alessandro, 2002; Henriques 
& Leitenberg, 2002), difficulties in regulating failure-related thoughts following 
negative feedback (Conway, Howell, & Giannopoulos, 1991), as well as a 
decreased accuracy following error commission (Holmes & Pizzagalli, 2008; 
Pizzagali, Peccoralo, Davidson, & Cohen, 2006). This overactive monitoring of 
errors or negative outcome might be accounted for by selective deficits in 
executive functions (Mayberg, 1997) and eventually bolster ruminative response 
styles in these depressed participants (Nolen-Hoeksema, Wisco, & Lyubomirsky, 
2008). 
These selective impairments in action monitoring typically observed in 
depressed patients have also been revealed by earlier neurophysiological work. 
More specifically, given the well-known prefrontal-limbic dysregulation 
underlying the onset and maintenance of MDD (Mayberg, 1997), and the 
involvement of this specific brain network in error monitoring (Bush, Luu, & 
Posner, 2000; Ridderinkhof, Ullsperger, Crone, & Nieuwenhuis, 2004; Seifert, von 
Cramon, Imperati, Tittgemeyer, & Ullsperger, 2011; Ullsperger & von Cramon, 
2006), it is not surprising that executive functions deficits in MDD also concern 
this specific cognitive function. Previous studies established that error 
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monitoring subsumes not only deep midbrain dopaminergic structures (Frank, 
Worroch, & Curran, 2005; Holroyd & Coles, 2002), but also paralimbic emotion-
related brain regions, including the rostral Anterior Cingulate Cortex (rACC) (van 
Veen & Carter, 2002), the amygdala (Pourtois et al., 2010) and the orbito-frontal 
cortex (Dhar, Wiersema, & Pourtois, 2011). Likewise, error monitoring critically 
depends upon cognitive control cortical regions, including the dorsal Anterior 
Cingulate Cortex (dACC; Dehaene, Posner, & Tucker, 1994; MacDonald, Cohen, 
Stenger, & Carter, 2000) and the Prefrontal Cortex (PFC; Kiehl, Liddle, & 
Hopfinger, 2000; Menon, Adleman, White, Glover, & Reiss, 2001), all being 
selectively affected in MDD (Mayberg, 1997). In line with this framework, Holmes 
and Pizzagali (2008) showed, using scalp electroencephalogram (EEG) 
measurements, that depression is associated with an increased activation within 
midline regions that encompass the rACC and the medial PFC ~80 ms after error 
commission, as well as a disrupted connectivity between the rACC and the left 
dorsolateral PFC. While in healthy controls (HCs) an increased ACC activity 
predicted the activity in the left dlPFC ~472 ms after the commission of an error, 
this relationship was not found in MDD patients. 
As outlined in this last study (Holmes & Pizzagali, 2008), Event-Related 
Potential (ERP) experiments looking at possible alterations of error-monitoring 
functions in MDD have usually focused on two well-characterized error-related 
components, namely the error-related negativity (ERN/Ne), or error negativity 
(Ne), and the error positivity (Pe). The ERN/Ne is a negative deflection peaking ~ 
0-100 ms following an incorrect response, with a maximum amplitude over 
fronto-central midline recording sites (Falkenstein, Hoormann, Christ, & 
Hohnsbein, 2000; Gehring, Coles, Meyer, & Donchin, 1990; Gehring, Goss, Coles, 
Meyer, & Donchin, 1993). The neural generators of this component have 
consistently been found in medial frontal cortex (MFC) and dACC, with 
sometimes a contribution of more rACC regions (Dehaene et al., 1994; Holroyd, 
Dien, & Coles, 1998; van Veen & Carter, 2002). These results are compatible with 
the assumption that the dACC is an important hub for cognitive control and 
executive functions, including early error detection (Bush et al., 2000; Carter et 
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al., 1998; Devinsky, Morrell, & Vogt, 1995). A similar but smaller negativity is also 
observed following correct actions, the correct-related negativity (CRN; Vidal, 
Hasbroucq, Grapperon, & Bonnet, 2000). This observation of a reduced early 
ERN/Ne-like response for correct responses has challenged the notion that the 
ERN/Ne is selectively involved in error monitoring, and led some authors 
conclude that the ERN/Ne and CRN actually reflect activity of a generic action-
monitoring system in dACC (Roger, Bénar, Vidal, Hasbroucq, & Burle, 2010; Vidal, 
Burle, Bonnet, Grapperon, & Hasbroucq, 2003; Vidal, Hasbrouckq, Grapperon, & 
Bonnet, 2000. This early negative ERN/Ne component is followed by a large 
positive deflection during error monitoring, the Pe. The Pe usually reaches its 
maximum amplitude over centro-parietal scalp recordings along the midline 
~200-400 ms post-response onset (Falkenstein, Hohnsbein, Hoormann, & Blanke, 
1991; Falkenstein, Hoormann, Christ, & Hohnsbein, 2000; Nieuwenhuis, 
Ridderinkhof, Blow, Band, & Kok, 2001; Overbeek, Nieuwenhuis, & Ridderinkhof, 
2005). Previous studies have ascribed either the rACC as the main generator of 
the Pe (Herrmann, Rommler, Ehlis, Heidrich, & Fallgater, 2004; van Veen & 
Carter, 2002) or a network comprising MFC regions and the insula (Dhar et al., 
2011). Unlike the ERN/Ne, the Pe is thought to reflect a more elaborate, perhaps 
conscious stage of error detection (Nieuwenhuis et al., 2001). Alternatively, it 
could reflect an affective appraisal of an error (Falkenstein et al., 2000; van Veen 
& Carter, 2002), a P300 like orienting response (Ridderinkhof, Ramautar, & 
Wijnen, 2009), or the accumulation of evidence that an error has been 
committed (Steinhauser & Yeung, 2010). 
Each of these two error-related ERP components was previously shown to 
vary with MDD, even though mixed results were obtained regarding the exact 
nature and direction of these changes during early error-monitoring brain 
processes. While some studies found a larger ERN/Ne in MDD patients compared 
to Healthy Controls (HCs) (Chiu & Deldin, 2007; Holmes & Pizzagalli, 2008; 
Holmes & Pizzagalli, 2010), other studies reported similar (Compton et al., 2008; 
Schrijvers et al., 2008; Schrijver et al., 2009) or even smaller ERN/Ne amplitudes 
in MDD patients (Ruchsow et al., 2006; Ruchsow et al., 2004). Likewise, 
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discrepant findings have also been reported in these studies for amplitude 
variation of the Pe component as function of depression. While Chiu and Deldin 
(2007), Compton et al. (2008) and Holmes and Pizzagalli (2008) observed similar 
Pe amplitudes for HCs and MDD patients, Schrijvers et al. (2008) and Schrijvers et 
al. (2009) reported smaller Pe amplitudes in MDD patients compared to HCs. 
These mixed results may be explained by the fact that MDD is not a single or 
unified construct (i.e. there is a substantial heterogeneity in the form and 
expression of this disorder across patients, see Mayberg, 1997), as well as 
possible differences in depression severity (Schrijvers et al., 2009). More 
generally, this heterogeneity somehow challenges the assumption that the 
ERN/Ne component represents a stable endophenotype of internalizing 
disorders (see Olvet & Hajcak, 2008). Both depression and anxiety are typically 
described as belonging to the internalizing dimension of psychopathology 
(Vaidyanathan, Nelson, & Patrick, 2012) and accordingly, are characterized by an 
increased sensitivity to errors by higher negative affect (Clark & Watson, 1991). 
However, only high levels of trait anxiety (even at the sub clinical level), but not 
depression, have consistently been related to an augmented ERN/Ne during 
error commission (Aarts & Pourtois, 2010; Hajcak et al., 2003a). Hence, the 
picture emerges that whereas the link between an increased ERN/Ne and 
elevated levels of trait anxiety is relatively clear and consistently found across 
many studies (Olvet & Hajcak, 2008), much less is known about the actual effects 
of MDD on early error-monitoring brain processes (i.e. ERN/Ne and Pe 
components). 
Another likely source of variability across the existing studies and the 
sometimes discrepant findings might be related to the fact that effects of 
depression (or anxiety) on error-monitoring brain processes do not necessarily 
change the strength or the raw amplitude of the recorded ERP signal (especially 
when the ERP signal concerns a limited number of sites), but rather its overall 
expression at the scalp level, and hence the underlying configuration of brain 
generators that might undergo some anxiety or depression-related changes as 
well. However, these subtle changes are usually more difficult to pick up using 
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standard peak measurements (Picton et al., 2010; Pourtois, Delplanque, Michel, 
& Vuilleumier, 2008). Consistent with this interpretation, we recently found out 
that trait anxiety essentially altered the topography (more than the actual 
strength) of the ERN/Ne component, suggesting a change in the underlying 
configuration of brain networks recruited for early error detection in anxious vs. 
non-anxious individuals (see Aarts & Pourtois, 2010). Accordingly, it remains to 
be established whether in the absence of any significant change for the strength 
of the ERN/Ne or Pe component between MDD patients and HCs at the scalp 
level, a concurrent change of the topography for these two ERP components 
could be detected or not. 
The goal of our study was to address this question, and better characterize 
at the electrophysiological level possible changes of early error-monitoring brain 
processes (with a focus on the ERN/Ne and Pe components) in MDD patients. 
Using 128-channels high-density EEG, we compared in MDD patients vs. HCs the 
electrophysiological responses to commission errors performed during a 
standard and previously validated Go/noGo task (Aarts & Pourtois, 2010, 2012; 
Vocat, Pourtois, & Vuilleumier, 2008) The added value of this task is that it 
enables to collect within a short period of time (~30 min) a high number of 
(unwanted) commission errors (i.e. False Alarms - FAs) on noGo trials, in each 
and every participant, despite inter-individual differences in reaction times (RTs) 
and without inducing excessive frustration. Because depression is commonly 
associated with enhanced levels of trait anxiety and they both encompass 
internalizing disorders (Jorm et al., 1999; Mineka, Watson, & Clark, 1998; Nolen-
Hoeksema et al., 2008), we surmised that the ERN/Ne of MDD patients may be 
larger than the ERN/Ne of HCs (Olvet & Hajcak, 2008). Moreover, we predicted 
that the latter effect might be associated with overactive or abnormal activities 
in MFC regions, including dACC (see also Holmes & Pizzagalli, 2008). Regarding 
possible effects of MDD on the subsequent Pe component, we did not formulate 
clear predictions because of the mixed results previously reported in the 
literature (Chiu & Deldin, 2007; Holmes & Pizzagalli, 2008; Holmes & Pizzagalli, 
2010; Schrijvers et al., 2008; Schrijvers et al., 2009). Using standard component 
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(Picton et al., 2000) as well as alternative topographical analyses (Michel et al., 
2001; Pourtois et al., 2008), we therefore aimed at better characterizing the 
possible changes of early error-monitoring brain processes associated with MDD, 
with a focus not only on the ERN/Ne component, but also on the subsequent Pe 
component, bearing in mind that these two ERP components likely reflect 
different cognitive or affective processes during error monitoring (Overbeek et 
al., 2005; van Veen & Carter, 2006). Whereas the ERN/Ne may be related to an 
early error-detection stage operating on an internal motor representation of 
action and relying primarily on midbrain-cingulate dopaminergic loops (Frank et 
al., 2005; Holroyd & Coles, 2002), the Pe would instead index a more strategic 
and elaborate process, possibly involving specific attentional (Ridderinkhof et al., 
2009) or even interoceptive (Dhar et al., 2011) components. An unanswered 
question is whether MDD, unlike (sub clinical) trait anxiety, may influence both 
processes during error monitoring or not. Finally, because previous studies 
reported that rumination accounted for executive functions deficits in MDD 
(Watkins & Brown, 2002) and a lack of attentional flexibility (Davis & Nolen-
Hoeksema, 2000), we also assessed whether ruminative thinking as a distinctive 
cognitive style (Nolen-Hoeksema, 2000; Nolen-Hoeksema et al., 2008), besides 
levels of trait anxiety (Clark & Watson, 1991; Olvet & Hajcak, 2008), might be 
related to changes observed in MDD patients at the electrophysiological level 
(ERN/Ne and Pe components) during the early monitoring of response errors in 
our speeded Go/noGo task. 
METHODS 
Participants 
Twenty non-depressed HCs (15 females; mean age: 41, SEM = 3.27) and 22 
individuals meeting the DSM-IV criteria for MDD (15 females; mean age: 36, SEM 
= 2.66) participated in this study. The data of eight participants had to be 
excluded from the analyses because they did not commit enough errors (i.e. < 6; 
2 HCs and 5 MDD patients) or the recorded EEG data were contaminated by too 
many artifacts (i.e. more than 20%) precluding the possibility to compute reliable 
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ERP waveforms (1 HC). In total, the data of 17 HCs (14 females; mean age: 41, 
SEM = 3.77) and 17 MDD patients (10 females; mean age: 36, SEM = 3.04) were 
included in the analyses. Demographic and clinical characteristics of these 
participants are outlined in Table 1. 
Table 1 
Descriptive statistics for healthy controls (HC) and depressed patients (MDD) 
HC MDD   
  M (SEM) M (SEM) p 
N 17 17   
Age 41.24 (3.77) 35.76 (3.04) .27 
Sex 3M/14F 7M/10F .14 
Education 
STAI_T 29.63 (1.32) 63.81 (1.89) < .001 
HAM_D 0.24 (0.14) 28.12 (1.33) < .001 
BDI_II 1.59 (0.97) 33.24 (2.87) <.001 
RRS_TOT 31.24 (1.32) 77.00 (2.90) < .001 
Age at onset 30.76 (3.20) 
Length of episode (months) 7.35 (1.38) 
Number of episodes   2.76 (.35)   
These MDD ambulatory patients were recruited from a local Belgian 
psychiatric clinic and were diagnosed with MDD and/or anxiety disorders. Prior 
to testing, the Hamilton Rating Scale for Depression (HAM-D; Hamilton, 1960) 
and the Mini-International Neuropsychiatric Interview (MINI), a structured 
clinical interview (Sheehan et al., 1998), were administered to examine the 
severity of the current MDD episode (HAM-D: M = 28.12; SEM = 1.33). Exclusion 
criteria were 1) other mood disorders than MDD; 2) the intake of anti-psychotics, 
tricyclic anti-depressants and/or long lasting benzodiazepines; 3) a history of 
neurological disorder, including epilepsy, head injury and loss of consciousness; 
4) a history of electroconvulsive therapy; 5) alcohol abuse during the past year; 
6) a past or present substance dependence; 7) past or present experience of 
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psychotic episodes; or 8) learning disorders. All MDD participants had a normal 
anti-depressant medication during the time of testing (i.e. either based on 
Selective Serotonin Reuptake Inhibitors – SSRI, or Selective Noradrenalin 
Reuptake Inhibitors - SNRI). HCs were recruited using advertisements in local 
newsletters or newspapers and were free of any mediaction at the time of 
testing. 
All participants were native Dutch speakers, gave their written informed 
consent and were payed 20 Euro. The study was approved by the medical ethics 
committee of the Ghent University hospital. 
Stimuli and task 
We used a speeded Go/noGo task previously used and validated in another 
group of HCs (Figure 1; Vocat et al., 2008), as well as in a group of (sub clinical) 
high anxious individuals (Aarts & Pourtois, 2010). Visual stimuli were shown on a 
17-inch LCD screen. They consisted of an arrow (11.4° x 0.05° of visual angle at a 
60 cm viewing distance) that was presented in the center of the screen on a 
white background. Each trial started with a fixation cross that lasted for 1000 ms. 
Then, a black arrow (i.e. cue), either oriented up or down, was presented. After a 
variable interval ranging from 1000 up to 2000 ms, the black arrow became 
either green (i.e. target) or turquoise while its in-plane orientation could either 
remain identical or shift in the opposite direction. Participants were asked to 
perform a speeded color plus orientation discrimination task. When the black 
arrow turned green and the orientation remained unchanged (2/3 of the trials), 
participants were instructed to press a predefined key on the response box as 
fast as possible with a predefined finger of their dominant hand (Go trials). 
However, participants had to withhold responding when either the arrow 
became green but changed orientation (1/3 of the trials), or when the arrow 
became turquoise and kept its initial orientation (1/3 of the trials), enabling two 
types of noGo trials (based either on the orientation or color). For noGo trials, 
this color arrow remained on the screen for a maximum duration of 1000 ms. 
Instructions emphasized both speed and accuracy. 
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Figure 1. Stimuli and task. (A) On each trial, a black arrow was first presented. After a variable 
interval (1000-2000 ms), the black arrow usually (2/3 -Go trials) became green and kept its initial 
orientation (either up or down). (B) On the remaining 1/3 of the trials, it became either turquoise 
and/or green but with a change in orientation (noGo trials). 
We used a specific procedure to ensure that the number of errors was 
roughly balanced between MDD patients and HCs. This pre-requisite was 
important, given that the ERN/Ne amplitude varies according to the number of 
errors (i.e. the ERN/Ne is larger when response errors are less frequent; see e.g. 
Gehring et al, 1993). To achieve this, we used a response deadline that was 
calibrated beforehand, adjusted and updated online at the single subject level 
(see also Aarts & Pourtois, 2010 for a similar procedure). For each and every Go 
trial, the RT was compared against an arbitrary limit. If the RT was slower than 
this arbitrary limit (“slow hit”), then the participant received a negative feedback 
on task performance whereas if the RT was faster than this limit (“fast hit”), 
he/she received no feedback (see Figure 1). This procedure promotes the 
occurrence of fast RTs, and accordingly the commission of errors on 
deviant/infrequent noGo trials. Unbeknown to participants, specific short 
calibration blocks were used and interleaved throughout the experimental 
session to define and update the RT limit that was subsequently used during the 
following experimental/test blocks. For the first two test blocks, the limit was set 
to 80% of the mean RT from the first calibration block. After these 2 blocks, this 
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limit was updated and set to 90% of the mean RT to account for effects of fatigue 
and learning, before the participant completed two other test blocks. The limit 
was computed and updated a third final time, before the participant completed 
the last two test blocks (see also Vocat et al., 2008; Pourtois et al., 2010). A 
thousand ms after “slow hits”, the participant received as feedback the words 
“too slow” in Dutch printed in a red frame for 500 ms. For all the other 
conditions (Fast Hit, Error, Omission and Correct Inhibition), no feedback on task 
performance was presented in such a way to increase the monitoring of self-
generated actions based on internal motor representations. Finally, to maintain a 
constant level of attention and involvement in the task throughout the 
experimental session, the cumulative accuracy (in %) was continuously updated 
and displayed in the upper part of the screen during each inter-trial interval (with 
a central fixation cross; see also Vocat et al. 2008 for a similar procedure). 
The experiment consisted of a single practice block of 12 trials (4 Go, 4 
noGo of each condition), 3 calibration blocks of 14 trials each (10 Go and 2 noGo 
of each type) and 6 test blocks of 60 trials (40 Go trials and 20 noGo trials). Each 
calibration block was followed by two consecutive test blocks. Trial presentation 
was randomized within blocks. Stimulus presentation and response recording 
were controlled using E-prime software (V2.0., 
http://www.pstnet.com/products/e-prime/). 
Questionnaires 
Levels of depression, trait anxiety and ruminative thinking were verified, 
prior to testing, using the trait version of the State Trait Anxiety Inventory (STAI – 
Defares, van der Ploeg, & Spielberger, 1979; Spielberger, 1983), the Beck 
Depression Inventory (BDI-II; Beck, Ward, Mendelson, Mock & Erbaugh, 1961), 
the HAM-D (Hamilton, 1960) and the Rumination Response Scales (RRS; Nolen-
Hoeksema & Morrow, 1991). 
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Analysis of behavioral data 
RTs faster than 150 ms (Error: M = .93, SEM = .38; Hit: M = .36, SEM = .18) 
and longer than 800 ms (Error: M = 2.41, SEM = 1.06; Hit: M = 1.58, SEM = .41) 
were removed from the subsequent analyses. Next, RTs faster than M – 2.5 SD 
(Error: M = .00, SEM = .00; Hit: M = .01, SEM = .01) or slower than M + 2.5 SD 
(Error: M = 2.31, SEM = .48; Hit: M = 2.72, SEM = .18) were also excluded. The 
number of outliers was not significantly different between HCs and MDD 
patients, all p > .10. Color and orientation errors were collapsed together (error 
condition) since there was no significant difference or group difference between 
these two error types (see also Aarts & Pourtois, 2010; Pourtois et al., 2010 for 
similar results). Likewise, fast and slow hits were collapsed and treated as a 
single condition (hit condition). Mean RTs for errors and Hits as well as the 
number of errors and Hits were then computed and compared by means of 2 x 2 
mixed analysis of variances (ANOVAs), with group (HC vs. MDD) as between-
subjects factor and accuracy (Error vs. Hit) as within subjects variable. 
EEG recording 
Continuous EEG was acquired at 512 Hz using a 128-channel (pin-type) 
Biosemi Active Two system (http://www.biosemi.com) referenced to the CMS-
DRL ground. ERPs of interest were computed offline following a standard 
sequence of data transformations (Picton et al., 2000): (1) -500/+1000 
segmentation around the onset of the response, (2) pre-response interval 
baseline correction (from -500 ms to response onset), (3) vertical ocular 
correction for blinks (Gratton, Coles, & Donchin, 1983) using the difference 
amplitude of two electrodes attached above and below the left eye, (4) artifact 
rejection [M = -88.53/+88.53, SEM = 2.36 amplitude scale (µV) across 
participants; no significant difference between HCs (M = 92.35, SEM = 3.25) and 
MDD patients (M = 84.71, SEM = 3.25) was evidenced, t(30) = 1.67, p > .10], (5) 
averaging of trials, separately for each group (HC vs. MDD) and experimental 
condition (errors vs. hits), and (6) 30 Hz low pass digital filtering of the individual 
average data. 
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We primarily focused on two well-documented error-related ERP 
components following motor execution (Falkenstein et al., 2000), on the ERN/Ne, 
with a maximum negative amplitude over fronto-central electrodes along the 
midline early on following motor execution (0 - 100 ms post-response onset), 
immediately followed by the Pe component (150 - 300 ms post-response onset), 
with a maximum positive amplitude over more posterior and central locations 
along the midline.  
Standard peak analyses 
We performed a conventional area under the curve analysis for each of 
these two error-related ERP deflections (Picton et al., 2000). For each ERP 
component and each condition separately, we calculated the area under the 
curve, during the 25 - 55 ms interval post-response onset at electrode FCz for the 
ERN/Ne amplitude, and during the 150 - 210 ms interval post-response onset at 
electrode Cz for the Pe component. The selection of these two specific scalp 
locations (and time windows) was based on the topographic properties of the 
present dataset, as well as previous ERP studies focused on the same error-
related ERP activities (Dehaene et al., 1994; Gehring et al., 1990; Hajcak et al., 
2003a). Statistical analyses were performed on the mean amplitude of each area 
using a 2 (accuracy) x 2 (group) repeated measures ANOVA, with a significance 
alpha cutoff set to p < .05. Simple bivariate Pearson correlations as well as 
multiple linear regression analyses were also conducted to explore whether 
inter-individual variations along levels of depression (BDI-II and/or HAM-D), trait 
anxiety (STAI-T) and/or rumination (RRS) might account for amplitude changes at 
the level of the ERN/Ne or Pe component, and eventually determine which of 
these stable personality traits best predicted the magnitude of the ERN/Ne or Pe 
ERP component. 
Topographical analyses 
Although classical area under the curve analyses are already informative 
regarding local amplitude changes at a few pre-defined electrode locations 
during action monitoring, they do not inform about more global and concurrent 
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changes in the distribution of the entire ERP electric field (i.e. topography) that 
may sometimes take place regardless of these local amplitude changes (Lehmann 
& Skrandies, 1980). Therefore, in order to capture more global ERP differences 
between HCs and MDD patients during the early detection and monitoring of 
response errors, a complementing detailed topographic mapping analysis of the 
ERP data was performed, following a conventional data-analysis scheme (see 
Figure 2; Michel, Seeck, & Landis, 1999; Michel et al., 2001; Murray, Brunet, & 
Michel, 2008; Pourtois, Dan, Grandjean, Sander, & Vuilleumier, 2005; Pourtois et 
al., 2008; Pourtois, Thut, Grave de Peralta, Michel, & Vuilleumier, 2005). To 
precisely characterize topographic modulations over time and across conditions, 
we used a standard spatial cluster analysis. This pattern analysis efficiently 
summarizes complex ERP data set into a smaller number of dominant field 
configurations, previously referred to as functional microstates (Lehmann & 
Skrandies, 1980; Michel et al., 1999). The rationale and basic principles of this 
temporal segmentation method have already been extensively described 
elsewhere (Michel et al., 1999; Murray et al., 2008). Following standard practice, 
we first performed a topographic pattern analysis on the grand-average ERP data 
from -55 ms until 379 ms after response onset (222 consecutive time frames at 
512 Hz sampling rate, encompassing the ERN/Ne and Pe components), using a 
standard K-means cluster method (Pascual-Marqui et al., 1995). The optimal 
number of topographic maps explaining the whole data set was determined 
objectively using both cross validation (Pascual-Marqui et al., 1995) and 
Krzanowski-Lai (Tibshirani, Walther, & Hastie, 2001) criteria. The dominant scalp 
topographies (identified by the previous analysis) were then fitted back to the 
ERP data of each individual subject using spatial fitting procedures to 
quantitatively determine their representation across subjects and conditions. 
This procedure thus provides fine-grained quantitative values, such as the Global 
Explained Variance (GEV, or goodness of fit), which is a critical estimate of the 
significance of a given topography, not available otherwise in a classical 
component analysis (Picton et al., 2000). GEV represents the sum of the 
explained variance weighted by the Global Field Power (GFP) at each moment in 
time. The resulting GEV values were entered in ANOVAs with two within-subject 
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factors, accuracy (errors vs. hits) and map configuration (i.e. the dominant 
electric field distributions identified by the spatial cluster analysis), as well as 
group (HC vs. MDD) as between-subject factor. These analyses were carried out 
using CARTOOL software (Version 3.34; developed by D. Brunet, Functional Brain 
Mapping Laboratory, Geneva, Switzerland). 
 
Figure 2. Illustration of the advanced cluster analysis used to identify the dominant error-related 
ERN/Ne and Pe topographical components. (A) This analysis used all (128) electrodes and time-
frames spanning from -55 ms to 379 ms after response onset, encompassing these two error-
related ERP components. A butterfly view of the grand-average ERP data of HCs (errors) from -
500 to +1000 ms around the response is shown, as well as the corresponding time interval 
selected for the segmentation in topographical components. (B) Two stable maps, the ERN/Ne 
and Pe, were clearly isolated during this specific time interval. (C) Horizontal voltage maps 
confirmed that these two maps unambiguously corresponded to the ERN/Ne (first) and Pe 
(second) component during early error monitoring. (D) SLORETA was finally used to gain insight 
into the putative neural generators underlying these dominant scalp configurations. 
Source localization analyses 
Finally, to estimate the likely neural sources underlying the dominant 
error-related electrical field configurations identified by the previous analyses, 
we used a specific distributed linear inverse solution, namely standardized low-
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resolution brain electromagnetic tomography (sLORETA, Pascual-Marqui, 2002). 
sLORETA is based on the neurophysiological assumption of coherent co 
activation of neighboring cortical areas (known to have highly synchronized 
activity, see Silva, Amitai, & Connors, 1991) and, accordingly, it computes the 
“smoothest” of all possible activity distributions (i.e. no a-priori assumption is 
made regarding the number and locations of the sources). Mathematical 
validation of this distributed source localization technique has been 
demonstrated (Sekihara, Sahani, & Nagarajan, 2005). sLORETA solutions are 
computed within a three-shell spherical head model co-registered to the MNI152 
template (Mazziotta et al., 2001). The source locations were therefore given as 
(x, y, z) coordinates (x from left to right; y from posterior to anterior; z from 
inferior to superior). sLORETA estimates the 3-dimensional intracerebral current 
density distribution in 6239 voxels (5 mm resolution), each voxel containing an 
equivalent current dipole. This 3-dimensional solution space, in which the 
inverse problem is solved, is restricted to the cortical gray matter (and 
hippocampus). The head model for the inverse solution uses the electric 
potential lead field computed with a boundary element method applied to the 
MNI152 template (Fuchs, Kastner, Wagner, Hawes, & Ebersole, 2002). Scalp 
electrode coordinates on the MNI brain are derived from the international 5% 
system (Jurcak et al., 2007). The calculation of all reconstruction parameters was 
based on the computed common average reference. sLORETA units were scaled 
to ampere per square meter (A/m2). We eventually directly compared inverse 
solution results between MDD patients and HCs, separately for the ERN/Ne and 
Pe component using unpaired t-tests. 
RESULTS 
Behavior 
Accuracy and RT data are presented in Table 2. The number of errors was 
similar between MDD patients and HCs, t(32) = 1.34, p > .10. All participants 
were faster for errors compared to Hits, F(1, 32) = 37.61, p < .001, but overall, 
MDD patients reacted slower than HCs, F(1, 32) = 4.73, p < .05, but importantly 
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this latter RT slowing did not interact with accuracy, F(1, 32) = 1.29, p > .10. 
Finally, a classical post-error slowing effect (Laming, 1979; Rabbitt, 1966), 
indicated by slower RTs to Hits following errors compared to Hits following Hits, 
was evidenced, F(1, 32) = 4.99, p < .05, and this adaptation effect was similar 
between the two groups (F(1, 32) = 1.47, p > .10). 
Table 2 
Accuracy and RTs in the speeded Go/noGo task, separately for 
healthy controls (HC) and depressed patients (MDD) 
HC MDD 
M SEM M SEM p 
Number Error 29.00 4.43 21.71 3.18 .19 
Hit 232.76 3.65 223.18 5.56 .16 
Post-error 65.07 2.16 62.47 3.65 .16 
Post-hit 65.27 0.58 65.13 0.47 .19 
Speed Error 263.79 9.49 316.07 20.21 .03 
Hit 325.31 12.15 358.35 16.32 .11 
Post-error 345.95 12.80 363.67 18.73 .44 
  Post-hit 321.86 12.74 356.53 16.45 .11 
ERP components 
A clear negative deflection was observed ~40 ms after error commission, 
with a maximum amplitude over fronto central electrodes (e.g. FCz). These 
electrophysiological properties were consistent with the ERN/Ne (Figure 3AB). 
Consistent with previous ERP studies (Falkenstein et al., 1991; Gehring et al., 
1993), this early negative component was larger following errors compared to 
hits, F(1, 32) = 5.86, p < .05. Although this difference appeared to be larger for 
MDD patients [M = 2.37; SEM = .92; t(16) = -2.57, p < .05] compared to HCs (M = 
1.07; SEM = 1.08; t < 1), there was no significant effect of group, F(1, 32) = 2.37, p 
> .10, nor a significant interaction between accuracy (error vs. hit) and group (HC 
vs. MDD), F < 1 (Figure 3CD). Consistent with previous ERP studies using this 
specific Go/noGo task (Aarts & Pourtois, 2010; Dhar & Pourtois, 2011), given the 
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speed pressure imposed to participants and the relatively high number of errors 
committed within a short period of time, the ERN/Ne (errors) – CRN (hits) 
amplitude difference was actually modest at this specific electrode position 
(FCZ), though being well significant, suggesting that response errors were 
discriminated from correct responses (hits) early on following response onset. 
The ERN/Ne was followed by a large positive component that was the 
largest at central electrodes along the midline (i.e. Cz) and that was clearly 
sensitive to accuracy, being reliably larger for errors relative to hits, F(1, 32) = 
117.80, p < .001. These properties (latency, polarity, topography) were 
compatible with the generation of a Pe component during early action 
monitoring and error detection. This positive component was overall larger in 
HCs compared to MDD patients, F(1, 32) = 8.76, p < .01, but importantly, this 
effect significantly interacted with group, F(1, 32) = 5.22, p < .05. This significant 
interaction showed that the difference in Pe amplitude between errors and hits 
was larger for HCs (M = 5.77, SEM = .61, t(16) = 9.43, p < .001), compared to 
MDD patients (M = 3.76, SEM = .63, t(16) = 5.98, p < .001) (see Figure 3EF).1  
  
                                                      
1
 Since MDD patients were overall slower than HCs, we performed an additional control 
analysis on the mean amplitude of the Pe component taking into account this speed/RT 
difference. We more specifically included speed (RT for either Hits or FAs) as a regressor in an 
ANCOVA with accuracy (FA vs. Hit) as within-subjects factor and group (MDD vs. HC) as between-
subjects factor. This analysis revealed significant main effects of accuracy, F(1, 32) = 9.86, p < .01, 
and group, F(1, 32) = 6.37, p < .01, whereas the interaction between group and accuracy was still 
marginally significant, F(1, 32) = 3.44, p = .07 in this control analysis. 
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Figure 3. ERP results. (A) Grand average ERP waveforms (
the MDD patients. (C) Mean amplitude (µV) ± 1 standard error of the mean (S.E.M) of the 
ERN/Ne for errors vs. hits in HCs and (D) in MDD patients. (E) Mean amplitude (µV) ± 1 S.E.M
the Pe for errors vs. hits in HCs
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ruminative thinking alone. When RRS was included in the statistical model, none 
of the other predictors was longer significant, all p > .10. 
When we split the ERP data according to groups (HCs vs. MDD patients), 
we additionally found a marginally significant negative correlation between the 
amplitude of the ERN/Ne and trait anxiety (STAI-T; r = -.45, p = .08) as well as 
between the amplitude of the ERN/Ne and depression (BDI-II; r = -.48, p = .05) in 
HCs. In line with previous studies and models (Olvet & Hajcak, 2008), higher 
levels of sub clinical anxiety or depression were associated with larger ERN/Ne 
amplitudes. By contrast, no significant correlations between the ERN/Ne 
amplitude and these depression-related characteristics were found in the MDD 
group, all p > .10.  
Topographical components 
A spatio-temporal cluster analysis was performed on a large time-window, 
encompassing the error-related ERN/Ne and Pe components (i.e. starting 55 ms 
before response onset and ending 379 ms after response onset, corresponding 
to 222 consecutive time frames or 434 ms). A solution with 8 dominant 
maps/topographies explained 94% of the variance. Note that these dominant 
maps were identified regardless of local or global (i.e. global field power) 
changes in the amplitude or strength of the ERP signal, following standard 
practice. Next, we analyzed in greater detail the dominant maps generated 
during the time interval corresponding to the ERN/Ne and Pe, and their likely 
variations as a function of accuracy and/or group.  
During the time interval corresponding the ERN/Ne vs. CRN component 
(starting ~10 ms – before response onset and ending ~90 ms post-response 
onset), a main change in the topography between errors and Hits was evidenced 
(see also Aarts & Pourtois, 2010). Whereas the topography for hits was 
characterized by a broad negative activity extending towards prefrontal sites 
(CRN map), the scalp distribution for response errors was qualified by a negative 
activity circumscribed to a few precentral electrode positions, including FCz 
(Figure 4A; ERN/Ne map), in line with previous results obtained with the same 
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task (Aarts & Pourtois, 2010; Vocat et al., 2008). Hence, early on following 
response onset, a reliable change in the electric field configuration occurred 
between response errors and hits. This result was important because it 
suggested that beyond local amplitude variations found for the peak of the 
ERN/Ne component (FCZ electrode, see results for classical area under the curve 
analyses above), errors were unambiguously associated with a change in the 
underlying configuration of generators, relative to hits (Lehmann & Skrandies, 
1980; Pourtois et al., 2008). Following standard practice, we next performed a 
fitting of these two dominant maps back to the individual ERP data to verify, at 
the statistical level, whether this topography-related change was significant (and 
different across the two groups) or not. We therefore submitted the GEV values 
obtained for these two dominant maps after fitting to a 2 (map) x 2 (group) x 2 
(accuracy) repeated measures ANOVA. This analysis revealed a significant 
interaction between accuracy and map/scalp configuration, F(1, 32) = 60.40, p < 
.001. While the CRN map explained more variance for hits than errors, t(33) = -
9.22, p < .001, the ERN/Ne map had a symmetric profile, explaining more 
variance for errors than hits, t(33) = 3.61, p = .001. However, this interaction 
effect was similar for MDD patients and HCs, F < 1 (Figure 4B). 
Regarding the time interval corresponding to the Pe component (~145 – 
281 ms post response onset), a specific error-related topography (Pe map, with a 
maximum amplitude at electrode CZ) was identified alike, compared to hits that 
elicited a broad and distinct posterior positivity during the same time interval 
(see Figure 4C), in agreement with previous studies (Aarts & Pourtois, 2010; 
Vocat et al., 2008). Further analyses computed on the mean GEV values obtained 
for these two dominant maps confirmed a significant interaction between 
accuracy and map, F(1, 32) = 28.30, p < .001. Whereas the Pe map explained 
more variance for errors than hits, F(1, 32) = 30.73, p < .001, the other 
concurrent map (posterior positivity map) showed a symmetric effect, explaining 
more variance for hits than errors, F(1, 32) = 18.53, p < .001. Interestingly, this 
analysis also showed a significant interaction between map and group, F(1, 32) = 
7.96, p < .01 (Figure 4D). This interaction was explained by the fact that the Pe 
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map (being diagnostic of error processing) explained more variance for errors 
committed by HCs than MDD patients, t(32) = 3.67, p < .001. The same effect was 
evidenced, though much weaker, for hits, t(32) = 2.32, p < .05. However, the 
concurrent posterior positivity map associated with hits was not significantly 
influenced by group, both for errors [t(32) = -1.27, p > .10] and hits (t < 1), 
suggesting that MDD influenced primarily the neural processing of errors, but 
not hits. 
 
Figure 4. Dominant topographical components (horizontal and frontal views) during the time 
interval (-10 - 90 ms around response onset) corresponding either to the ERN/Ne (top) or Pe 
(bottom). (A) The scalp map of the ERN/Ne showed a negative activity reaching its maximum at 
FCz electrode position, and extending towards left lateral frontal electrodes. (B) The ERN/Ne 
topographical component explained more variance for errors compared to hits. (C) The scalp map 
of the Pe was characterized by a broad positive activity over central electrode positions. (D) The 
Pe topographical component explained more variance for errors compared to hits. 
Inverse solutions 
To gain insight into the putative configuration of the intracranial 
generators underlying these global topographic-dependent changes, we source-
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localized the ERN/Ne and Pe maps, separately, using sLORETA (Pascual-Marqui, 
2002). 
This analysis confirmed that the configuration of the intracranial 
generators underlying the ERN/Ne scalp map (errors) were similar between HCs 
and MDD patients. These generators primarily involved MFC/dACC regions, 
consistent with several earlier studies (Debener, Ullsperger, Fiehler, von Cramon, 
& Engel, 2005; Dehaene et al., 1994; Herrmann et al., 2004; O’Connell et al., 
2007; Vocat et al., 2008). For HCs, the neural generators of the ERN/Ne were 
mainly localized within superior frontal gyrus/dACC (maximum: 6x, 6y, 44z; BAs 
32, 24 and 6), whereas for MDD patients, they also involved the superior frontal 
gyrus/dACC (maximum: 6x, 6y, 44z; BAs 6, 8, 32 and 24), with a slight shift 
towards the front for the maxima, compared to HCs (Figure 5A). Importantly, a 
direct statistical comparison in the inverse solution space (see Table 3) between 
the two groups showed that MDD patients had a significantly stronger 
MFC/dLPFC (BA6, BA8 and BA9) activation compared to HCs, while the ERN/Ne 
of HCs was associated with an additional activation in the posterior cingulate 
cortex (BAs 29 and 30) (Figure 5B). By contrast, the CRN map was associated with 
a main generator/cluster within medial frontal/dACC regions, equally in both 
groups. The maximum was localized within the superior frontal gyrus (BA6; MNI 
coordinates: 5x, -0y, +70z) (see Table 3). 
Regarding the Pe component, sLORETA showed that its underlying brain 
generators primarily involved the insula (BA 13) and a widespread cluster 
encompassing different cingulate areas, namely BAs 23, 24 and 31 (see Figure 
5C). This network was not evidenced for the posterior positivity map associated 
with hits during the same time interval. A direct comparison between the two 
groups revealed a significantly stronger recruitment of deep/ventral cingulate 
areas (BAs 23, 24, 31 and 32; see Figure 5D) for HCs compared to MDD patients 
during the processing of errors (see Table 3). 
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Figure 5. Source localization results, based on sLORETA. (A) Inverse solution for the ERN/Ne 
topographical component, separately for HCs and MDD
dACC (BAs 32 and 24) and MFC (superior frontal gyrus 
between the two groups showed that MDD patients had a significantly stronger MFC/dLPFC (BAs 
6, 8 and 9) activation compared to HCs, while the ERN
additional activation in the posterior cingulate cortex (BAs 29 and 30) (C) Inverse solution for the 
Pe topographical component, separately for HCs and MDD patients, revealing a main extended 
cluster in the cingulate areas (BAs 23, 24 and 31) in the former participants, but not the patients. 
(D) A direct comparison between the two groups showed that HCs recruited more ventral 
cingulate areas (BAs 23, 24, 31 and 32) as well as insula regions (BA
compared to MDD patients. 
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Tabel 3 
MNI coordinates of the differential error-related peak activations 
between HCs and MDD patients, separately for the ERN/Ne and Pe 
component  
Component Regions of Interest (ROI) 
MNI 
Coordinates sLORETA 
    BA x y z p-values 
ERN/Ne Superior frontal gyrus 6 -5 -5 70 * 
8 -25 25 45 * 
9 -30 25 40 .09 
Posterior cingulate 30 15 -55 5 * 
29 10 -45 5 * 
Pe Insula 13 35 -10 15 ** 
Cingulate gyrus 23 5 -15 30 ** 
24 5 -5 30 ** 
    31 20 -45 25 ** 
Note. * p < .05; ** p < .01 
DISCUSSION 
In this study, HCs vs. MDD patients performed a speeded Go/noGo task 
and occasionally made unwanted errors on noGo stimuli while their error-related 
brain activities were tracked and compared using high density EEG. HCs and 
MDD patients were similar regarding laterality and age. Standard clinical 
interviews and results obtained at several additional questionnaires or 
inventories confirmed that the patients had clinical levels of MDD, but not the 
HCs. Importantly, we used a speeded Go/noGo task previously validated in the 
literature (Aarts & Pourtois, 2010; Dhar & Pourtois, 2011; Vocat et al., 2008) that 
offered the added value to characterize functional alterations in early error-
detection brain processes as a function of depression, when these modifications 
were not confounded by obvious changes in the behavior or task performance 
(e.g. the error rate) of MDD patients vs. HCs. Whereas MDD patients responded 
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overall slower compared to HCs, they did not commit more or less response 
errors than these healthy participants, enabling a neat comparison of error-
monitoring brain processes across these two groups, using ERP measurements. 
Despite a balanced accuracy and similar standard post-error adjustment, our ERP 
results show a statistically similar early ERN/Ne component in MDD patients and 
HCs. However, the ERN/Ne of MDD patients was associated with enhanced MFC 
activation, relative to HCs. In addition, a large difference was found for the 
subsequent Pe component during early error monitoring. This component was 
substantially blunted in MDD patients compared to HCs. Moreover, we found 
that this effect was likely explained by a reduction in the activation of ventral 
medial cingulate areas during the generation of the Pe component. Of note, this 
outcome was obtained not only based on standard peak measurements carried 
out at a few isolated standard and representative electrode positions (Picton et 
al., 2000), but also based on a thorough and experimenter-free evaluation of the 
global topography (all 128 channels taken into account) of these two specific 
error-related ERP components, using an alternative spatio-temporal cluster 
analysis (Lehmann & Skrandies, 1980; Pourtois et al., 2008). We discuss the 
implication of these new results in greater detail here below. 
Balanced behavioral performance between MDD patients and HCs 
MDD patients and HCs committed ~25 response errors. This number, which 
was balanced across groups, enabled us to compute reliable error-related ERP 
waveforms for each individual. Because of the imposed time pressure and 
specificities of our speeded Go/noGo task, we were therefore able to compare 
error-related brain activities, using scalp EEG measurements, between MDD 
patients and HCs when these brain effects were not simply accounted for by 
systematic changes in the behavior, including the number of response errors 
(Gehring et al., 1993). Although MDD patients were overall slower compared to 
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HCs, the blunted Pe component for MDD patients compared to HCs was not 
merely explained by this speed difference across groups2. 
Although this outcome suggests that MDD patients may have preserved 
error-monitoring functions when investigated at the behavioral level, we have to 
acknowledge that this result might be explained by the use of a speeded 
Go/noGo task and an individually calibrated response deadline. The added value 
of this procedure is that the likelihood of error commission is reliably increased 
within a relatively short period of time despite simple task rules and demands 
(that can easily be understood by patient populations), but inter-individual 
variability in error making is by definition somehow neutralized in these 
circumstances. Accordingly, it is likely that MDD patients would show a different 
pattern of behavioral results relative to HCs, if no such calibration procedure 
would be implemented or another interference task (e.g. flanker or Stroop), 
would be used (Degl'Innocenti, Agren, & Backman, 1998). 
Preserved ERN/Ne in MDD 
Our results for the ERN/Ne do not point to obvious error-monitoring 
impairments at the level of this early dopaminergic-dependent ERP component 
in MDD. Although the ERN/Ne was slightly larger at the scalp level in MDD 
patients compared to HCs, this difference did not reach significance. In our study, 
we included in our MDD sample severely depressed individuals (as reflected by 
their HAM-D and BDI-II scores) and this severity may potentially account for the 
lack of differential effect at the level of the ERN/Ne between MDD patients and 
HCs. Previous ERP studies already reported unchanged or even diminished 
ERN/Ne amplitudes in severely depressed individuals that are characterized by 
                                                      
2
 Although MDD patients were taking medication at the time of testing while HCs did not, 
it appears unlikely that this factor alone would account for the observed ERP differences (mostly 
concerning the Pe component) between groups, even though we cannot formally rule out this 
alternative account. Regular anti-depressant drugs (e.g. SSRI or SNRI), as used by the MDD 
patients included in our study, have not been linked to systematic alterations of the amplitude or 
morphology of error-related ERP components in previous studies (De Bruijn et al., 2004; De 
Bruijn, Sabbe, Hulstijn, Ruigt, & Verkes, 2006; Stern et al., 2010). 
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apathy, anhedonia and psychomotor retardation (Schrijvers et al., 2008; 
Schrijvers et al., 2009; Schrijvers, Hulstijn, & Sabbe, 2008). On the other hand, 
our new results showing a trend towards an increase in the amplitude of the 
ERN/Ne component with increasing levels of trait anxiety in HCs (r = -.45, p = .08) 
as well as a slightly larger (though non-significant) ERN/Ne in MDD patients 
compared to HCs, both confirm that this early error-monitoring activity is 
influenced by affective or motivational factors, besides accuracy. Moreover, 
these data also provide support for the observation that an enhanced ERN/Ne 
component is usually observed in high compared to low anxious participants 
(Aarts & Pourtois, 2010; Endrass, Klawohn, Schuster, & Kathmann, 2008; Gehring 
et al., 2000; Hajcak et al., 2003a, 2004; Hajcak & Simons, 2002; Johannes et al., 
2001; Pailing & Segalowitz, 2004). Using a complementary topographical and 
source localization analysis, we also confirmed that the ERN/Ne component was 
related to brain generators within the medial frontal gyrus (BA6) and dACC 
(BA24), whereas during the same early time interval following response onset, 
the monitoring of hits was associated with activity in medial frontal gyrus (BA6), 
as well as in non-overlapping cortical regions, including posterior parietal regions 
(BA7, with an activation extending towards BA 31) (see also Aarts & Pourtois, 
2010). The contribution of Premotor/Supplementary motor area and/or the 
dACC in early error-monitoring processes is consistent with previous ERP and 
fMRI studies (Dehaene et al., 1994; Herrmann et al., 2004; Luu, Tucker, 
Derryberry, Reed, & Poulsen, 2003; Miltner, Braun, & Coles, 1997; O’Connell et 
al., 2007; Ullsperger & von Cramon, 2004). Interestingly, we also found that the 
ERN/Ne of MDD patients was accounted for by an enhanced MFC/dLPFC (BA8 
and BA9) activity, relative to HCs. A direct comparison between groups 
confirmed that MDD recruited extra dLPFC areas (BA6, BA8 and BA9), which have 
generally been implicated in cognitive control (Botvinick, Braver, Barch, Carter, & 
Cohen, 2001; Duncan & Owen, 2000; Miller & Cohen, 2001; Ridderinkhof et al., 
2004). Other studies (Hoehn-Saric, Lee, McLeod, & Wong, 2005; Sinha, Mohlman, 
& Gorman, 2004; Thayer & Lane, 2000; Wu et al., 1991) have also related an 
increased dlPFC activity to augmented ruminative thinking or worry, which is a 
landmark of MDD (Nolen-Hoeksema, 2000; Nolen-Hoeksema et al., 2008). 
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Accordingly, the observed enhanced dlPFC activity found in MDD patients during 
the early monitoring/detection of response errors (besides the normal dACC 
activation, shared with HCs) might be related to intrusive ruminative processes, 
that would affect the interplay between dlPFC and ACC during error-monitoring 
and accordingly the size of this error-related activity, as measured using scalp 
recordings (see Pizzagalli, 2011). However, we note that we did not find evidence 
for a clear link between levels of trait-like ruminative thinking (as estimated 
using the RRS, see Nolen-Hoeksema & Morrow; Raes, Hermans, & Eelen, 2003) 
and amplitude variation at the level of the ERN/Ne component. Such a 
relationship was however revealed with the subsequent error-related ERP 
component, the Pe that was markedly blunted in MDD patients relative to HCs. 
MDD alters error-monitoring process reflected by the Pe component 
The results of our study unambiguously show that MDD patients have a 
substantially smaller Pe component, relative to HCs during early error 
monitoring, in the absence of obvious difference at the behavioral level between 
these two groups. At first sight, this result is consistent with earlier ERP studies 
examining error-monitoring brain functions in severely depressed patients 
(Olvet, Klein, & Hajcak, 2010; Schrijvers et al., 2008; Schrijvers et al., 2009). This 
finding is however at variance with other studies performed in mildly to 
moderately depressed individuals (Chiu & Deldin, 2007; Compton et al., 2008; 
Holmes & Pizzagalli, 2008) and where no systematic alteration or reduction of 
the Pe component was found. A decreased Pe component during error 
monitoring in MDD patients might potentially be explained either by symptom 
severity (which is stronger in MDD patients, as tested in our study, compared to 
moderately depressed individuals in some of these earlier studies), or by 
alterations of specific cognitive control processes involved in the early 
monitoring of response errors. First, since MDD is characterized by general 
apathy or blunted affect (DSM-IV-TR, APA, 2000), it might be that these patients 
also have overall blunted emotional reactions, including to their own/self-
generated errors, which are nonetheless usually distinctive or salient events 
from a motivational point of view (Aarts, De Houwer, & Pourtois, in revision; Luu, 
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Collins, & Tucker, 2000). Consistent with this view, previous studies have linked 
the error-related Pe component to an emotional reaction to these adverse 
events (van Veen & Carter, 2002). Alternatively, given the generally impaired 
motivation in MDD patients (DSM-IV-TR, APA, 2000) and the link between the Pe 
component and the motivational significance of an error (Overbeek et al., 2005), 
this effect might translate a change in the detection of an otherwise salient or 
behaviorally relevant event (i.e. unwanted response error). We note however 
that the post-error adjustment following errors (Danielmeier & Ullsperger, 2011; 
Notebaert et al., 2009; Rabbitt, 1966) was spared, though reduced in MDD 
patients relative to HCs in our study. Moreover, because MDD patients made as 
many fast hits as HCs (indicating indirectly that they were equally able to comply 
with task demands than HCs), a mere change in levels of “intrinsic” motivation 
during the task cannot easily account for the present ERP results. Hence, a 
decreased motivational saliency account seems unlikely given the normal, spared 
attention or cognitive control reaction following the detection of these (rare) 
negative events in MDD, as well as their preserved ERN/Ne component (Hajcak, 
Moser, Yeung, & Simons, 2005). Such an impairment could perhaps be revealed 
if more complex discrimination or interference tasks would be used to probe 
changes in early error-monitoring brain functions in MDD patients, unlike the 
more simple inhibition of a pre-potent response tendency, as explored using the 
present speeded Go/noGo task (Miyake et al., 2000). In these circumstances, it 
remains to be established whether a decreased error-related Pe component 
could be associated or even predict mal-adaptive behavioral changes following 
the detection of these events (e.g. a blunted post-error slowing effect). Finally, it 
might be the case that a blunted Pe component in MDD patients could indirectly 
result from ruminative thinking, or the consequence of this specific cognitive 
style. Consistent with this view, we found that ruminative thinking was actually 
the best predictor of (a reduction of) the Pe component recorded in our study. 
Because MDD patients automatically and repetitively focus on and orient to their 
distress, negative feelings and negative thoughts, it might be that these general 
intrusive thoughts, and maybe also negative thoughts selectively triggered by 
unwanted error commission, would consume specific attentional or cognitive 
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control resources that are normally used by Pe brain systems to timely and 
efficiently monitor and register these incorrect actions. In this view, the 
accumulation of evidence process leading to the conscious detection of a 
response error, as reflected by the Pe component (Steinhauser & Yeung, 2010), 
would be impaired since other intrusive thoughts may prevent its normal 
unfolding. This limited resource account is also consistent with the idea that the 
Pe somehow reflects a “bottom-up” attentional orienting process, similarly to 
the P300 component (Ridderinkhof et al., 2009). Presumably, if less “bottom-up” 
attention is allocated to the (internal) monitoring of actions and errors (because 
attention resources are used by a concurrent mental process, for example 
rumination), this monitoring and the conscious registration of these errors are by 
definition less effective or sharp. Interestingly, previous studies already reported 
a decreased noGo P300 in depressed individuals (Ruchsow et al, 2008). Hence, in 
this framework, the blunted Pe component in MDD patients would correspond 
to a more general deficit of bottom-up attention control, when this control has 
to be exerted on internal/motor representations.  
At any rate, future studies are needed to validate this conjecture and 
assess whether (i) the automatic detection of unwanted response errors in “high 
ruminators” (who are usually depressed) may more easily trigger an extra burst 
of rumination or negative intrusive thoughts (Conway et al., 1991), and (ii) this 
early effect predicts, or is causally related to a reduction of the Pe component 
during early error monitoring. In this regard, it might be valuable to assess 
possible changes in early error-related brain processes (with a focus on the 
ERN/Ne and Pe ERP components) of MDD patients after they completed a 
treatment or followed a cognitive behavioral therapy aimed at reducing adverse 
effects of ruminative thinking (Moore & Malinowski, 2009; Siegle, Ghinassi, & 
Thase, 2007). Likewise, since adverse effects of rumination may transiently be 
suppressed or downplayed (by using for instance specific verbal working memory 
strategies/manipulations, see McEvoy, Smith, & Gevins, 1998; McNamara & 
Scott, 2001), it may turn out to be valuable to assess whether the use of these 
specific cognitive strategies may help restore a normal Pe component during 
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error monitoring in MDD patients. Such a positive outcome would strengthen the 
link between this specific ERP component and its selective impairment in MDD 
due to interfering accessory ruminative thinking processes. 
ERN/Ne and Pe reflect different stages of error monitoring 
More generally, our new ERP results confirm that the ERN/Ne and Pe 
component likely reflect two different functional stages during early error-
monitoring (Overbeek et al., 2005). First, we confirmed that they were each 
associated with different brain networks and they were each differently 
influenced by MDD. While in our previous study using the exact same task and 
ERP methodology we showed that sub clinical trait anxiety influenced primarily 
the ERN/Ne component and its underlying brain generators, with no change at 
the level of the Pe component (Aarts & Pourtois, 2010), we found in this study a 
complementary picture. MDD primarily influenced the Pe component, while 
leaving almost untouched the ERN/Ne, though this latter component was slightly 
increased, compared to HCs. Note that this latter result rules out the possibility 
that MDD would simply be associated with a general reduction of brain 
activations (and hence the resulting ERP signal) during error monitoring. This 
dissociation between the ERN/Ne and Pe revealed by different psychopathology 
conditions (sub clinical trait anxiety vs. MDD; two internalizing disorders; see 
Krueger, 1999) indirectly suggests that these two components likely reflect 
different monitoring processes during early stages of error detection. In light of 
this dissociation, we advocate that effects of anxiety at the level of the ERN/Ne 
(i.e. augmented ERN/Ne, but not Pe) might actually reflect an automatic 
compensatory “attention control”/effort mechanism used by high anxious 
individuals to cope with their worrisome thoughts probably concerning the 
avoidance of errors/failures/adverse events in the future that are perceived as 
challenging self-efficacy (see Eysenck, Derakshan, Santos, & Calvo, 2007 for a 
similar view). Alternatively, an enhanced ERN/Ne in high anxious individuals 
could translate the activation of additional cognitive or emotional control brain 
regions (possibly involving a more rostral ACC regions), as indirectly confirmed in 
our previous ERP study (Aarts & Pourtois, 2010). By contrast, MDD patients, who 
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are characterized by an inability to experience positive affect (anhedonia), 
impaired motivation and by a perseverative focus on negative thoughts or 
feelings (i.e. rumination), are no more able to automatically regulate error 
detection alike (and hence they show a normal ERN/Ne component), while this 
excessive ruminative thinking style inadvertently consumes resources away from 
the main error-monitoring function, which in turn leads to a blunted Pe 
component in these patients. Future studies (possibly crossing data from 
psychology, biology and epidemiology) are needed to establish whether changes 
in the expression of these two early error-related brain components are related 
to different psychopathology conditions (sub clinical trait anxiety vs. MDD) and 
may eventually provide stable endophenotypes, as recently put forward in the 
literature (Olvet & Hajcak, 2008). 
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CHAPTER 4: ANXIETY DISRUPTS THE EVALUATIVE 
COMPONENT OF PERFORMANCE MONITORING: AN ERP STUDY
 1 
“Thirty low and 30 high anxious participants performed a speeded Go/noGo task 
during which they had to rely on evaluative feedback to infer whether their 
actions were timely (correct) or not. We focused on FRN, an ERP component that 
is sensitive to the valence of feedback. Depending on the context, neutral faces 
served either as positive or negative feedback. Whereas the FRN of low anxious 
individuals did discriminate between neutral faces when used either as positive or 
negative feedback, the FRN of high anxious individuals did not. However, before 
the FRN, we also found evidence for a differential perceptual effect at the level of 
the N170 face-specific component between the two feedback conditions, equally 
so in low and high anxious individuals. These results suggest that anxiety disrupts 
selectively the evaluative component of performance monitoring, which 
presumably allows to ascribe a given value (either positive or negative) to 
actions.”
                                                      
1
 Aarts & Pourtois (2012). Anxiety disrupts the evaluative component of performance monitoring: 
An ERP study. Neuropsychologia. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Depending on the situation and circumstances, the control of behavior is 
based on the monitoring of either internal or external signals, or sometimes a 
combination of both. For example, the adequacy of a given action in response to 
a familiar stimulus may be determined based on an internal representation 
allowing to compare the discrepancy between the actual and expected or 
desired action, with a swift detection of any divergence between the two 
(Gehring, Goss, Coles, Meyer, & Donchin, 1993). However, in many situations, 
performance monitoring cannot be achieved solely based on the processing of 
internal signals, but the processing of new external feedback information in the 
environment is required to establish whether the current action is appropriate 
(e.g. timely or correct), or not. Hence, the processing of feedback information 
available in the environment often indicates the appropriateness of certain 
actions and in turn allows to correct or adjust behavior if required, eventually 
leading to learning and preventing errors from recurring in the future (Holroyd & 
Coles, 2002; Rabbitt, 1966). 
Several ERP studies looking at outcome evaluation processes based on 
external feedback have described an ERP component, the feedback-related 
negativity (FRN) that is selectively associated with the processing of the valence 
or motivational significance of the feedback (Gehring & Willoughby, 2002; 
Holroyd & Coles, 2002; Miltner, Braun, & Coles, 1997). The FRN is a negative 
component peaking at fronto-central electrodes roughly 250-300 ms after 
presentation of relevant feedback information. Usually, the FRN was found to be 
larger after negative feedback on task performance (e.g. the presentation of an 
evaluation signal indicating error commission or monetary loss) compared to 
positive feedback (e.g. the presentation of an evaluation signal indicating correct 
performance or monetary reward; Holroyd, Nieuwenhuis, Yeung, & Cohen, 
2003). These findings point to the involvement of the FRN in the processing of 
the valence or reward value of the feedback. Interestingly, the FRN component 
shares many electrophysiological properties with another ERP component, the 
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error-related negativity (ERN/Ne; Falkenstein, Hoormann, Christ, & Hohnsbein, 
2000; Gehring et al., 1993), which is also involved in performance monitoring, 
though based on the processing of internal error signals. The ERN/Ne is a 
negative component generated roughly 50-100 ms following error commission 
over fronto-central scalp electrodes. In both cases, this negative ERP component 
would reflect the activation of a reinforcement learning system within the dorsal 
Anterior Cingulate Cortex (dACC) that enables a rapid evaluation of outcomes or 
actions (Frank, Woroch, & Curran, 2005; Holroyd & Coles, 2002).  
Noteworthy, although the FRN primarily reflects an evaluative component, 
this ERP component is also permeable to individual differences in affect. Because 
the hypersensitivity to negative events and the tendency to worry about 
negative outcomes are hallmarks of several affective personality traits or 
disorders like anxiety and depression (Maner & Schmidt, 2006; Mineka, Rafaeli, 
& Jovel, 2003; Wray & Stone, 2005), one may assume that performance 
monitoring may vary with these affective personality traits. Consistent with this 
hypothesis, several studies have reported an effect of anxiety or depression on 
the ERN/Ne (e.g. Aarts & Pourtois, 2010; Holmes & Pizzagalli, 2008; Olvet & 
Hajcak, 2008). By contrast, the evidence supporting a systematic modulation of 
the FRN (and hence the processing of external evaluative feedback) as a function 
of negative affect is mixed. In a recent study, De Pascalis, Varriale, & D’Antuono 
(2010) found that individuals who were more sensitive to punishment (as 
measured using the BIS/BAS; see Carver & White, 1994) had a larger FRN to 
monetary loss following incorrect noGo trials during a Go/noGo task. In an earlier 
ERP study, Tucker, Luu, Frishkoff, Quiring, & Poulsen (2003) found that (clinically) 
depressed patients had increased FRN following all feedback (i.e. feedback 
following fast, medium as well as slow responses). Surprisingly, moderately 
depressed individuals showed larger FRN following feedback evaluating slow 
responses compared to the FRN amplitude in severely depressed patients. In 
contrast to these results, Foti and Hajcak (2009) reported a blunted difference in 
FRN amplitude between negative (non-reward) and positive (reward) feedback in 
depressed individuals. When turning to anxiety, which is usually related to 
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depression (Beck, Epstein, Brown, & Steer, 1988; Mendels, Weinstein, & 
Cochrane, 1972) and punishment sensitivity (Bijttebier, Beck, Claes, & 
Vandereycken, 2009), but which is also mainly characterized by an extreme 
worry about the expectancy of possible failures in the future (Eisenberg, Baron, 
& Seligman, 1998; Mitte, 2007; Shepperd, Grace, Cole, & Klein, 2005), the results 
of two studies converged and showed a larger FRN amplitude for low, compared 
to high anxious individuals (Gu, Huang, & Luo, 2010; Simons, 2010). According to 
Yeung, Holroyd, & Cohen (2005), the FRN also reflects an evaluation process that 
is influenced by the motivational significance of ongoing actions. These authors 
reported a correlation between the amplitude of the FRN and the subjective 
involvement in the task. Consistent with this notion, two recent ERP studies 
confirmed that evaluative feedback processing (and hence the FRN component) 
is also influenced by higher-level cognitive or motivational factors (i.e. 
responsibility; see Li et al., 2010, and empathy; see Fukushima & Hiraki, 2009), 
which may, depending on the context or situation, make the evaluative feedback 
stimulus more or less salient. Hence, depending on the specific goals and needs, 
the FRN may vary in magnitude in response to evaluative performance feedback. 
These studies therefore confirm that motivational significance (besides valence) 
may be an important determinant of the amplitude modulations of the FRN 
found during standard performance-monitoring tasks. More generally, these 
results suggest that the FRN component is not encapsulated or immune to 
higher-level motivational or emotional factors, such that the affective 
predispositions of the participant may in principle modulate the size and 
expression of this performance-monitoring ERP component. In this study, we 
tested this prediction and compared the FRN of low vs. high trait anxious 
individuals during a standard speeded Go/noGo task. 
The goal of our study was to investigate effects of sub clinical trait anxiety 
on performance monitoring, when this process primarily relies on the processing 
of external evaluative feedback (with a focus on the FRN component therefore). 
Notably, these external feedback consisted of neutral and emotional faces in our 
study, because these visual stimuli usually provide important social and 
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ecologically-valid signals used to gauge the actions and intentions of our 
conspecifics in daily life situations. Moreover, because emotional faces are 
complex stimuli that carry an intrinsic emotional value (when compared to 
abstract symbolic cues) and because negative emotional faces might be 
perceived or attended differentially in high compared to low anxious individuals 
(Fox, Russo, & Dutton, 2002; Knyazev, Bocharov, Slobodskaya, & Ryabichenko, 
2008), we used an experimental procedure enabling to explore performance-
monitoring brain effects when the intrinsic valence/pleasantness of the feedback 
stimulus was controlled for and eventually neutralized. More specifically, we 
compared performance monitoring (i.e. FRN) of low vs. high trait anxious 
participants when the feedback information used was kept constant (i.e. the 
same neutral visual stimuli served as performance feedback), but the perceived 
experimental situation could be either “positive” or “negative”. This 
manipulation allowed us to compare the exact same physical stimuli (i.e. neutral 
faces) used as performance feedback for positive outcomes in one context and 
for negative outcomes in the other, and test if performance-monitoring brain 
processes (with a focus on the FRN component) differed between low vs. high 
trait anxious individuals.  
We tested the hypothesis that performance-monitoring processes of high 
anxious participants based on the processing of external evaluative feedback 
may be impaired, reflected by a blunted FRN to negative feedback in these 
participants. More specifically, we surmised that the impairment in high anxious 
individuals does not translate a relative insensitivity to outcome evaluation in 
general, but reflects instead a failure to readily compare the perceived valence of 
the feedback with the inferred (internalized) value of the action (just performed). 
In this framework, a blunted FRN component may reflect an inability to relate 
the valence of the feedback (either positive or negative) to the internalized value 
of the action (that has been made prior to feedback delivery and therefore 
awaits evaluation; see Holroyd & Coles, 2002). To indirectly validate this 
assumption, we also explored the possible relationship between “locus of 
control” (LOC; Rotter, 1966) and the FRN component. The LOC provides an 
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estimate of attribution style, defined as the disposition to ascribe the cause of 
actions or events to either internal or external drives or forces. We reasoned that 
participants with an internal (as opposed to external) LOC may probably more 
easily relate or integrate the value of the (external) evaluative feedback with the 
(internally-generated) action (i.e. cause) they have just made and which is 
evaluated by the feedback. Accordingly, if the FRN reflects the integration 
process linking the perceived valence of the feedback with the internalized value 
of the action (just performed) during performance monitoring, we may thus 
predict a larger FRN for individuals characterized by a more internal (as opposed 
to external) LOC. Moreover, because earlier studies found a relationship 
between LOC and trait anxiety (i.e. high anxious individuals have a more external 
LOC; see Archer, 1979), we sought to assess whether higher levels of trait anxiety 
may somehow downplay the possible link between LOC and the FRN (see also Gu 
et al., 2010; Hajcak, McDonald, & Simons, 2003a). 
Although we mainly focused on the FRN component in this study, given the 
strong link between this specific ERP deflection and performance-monitoring 
processes (Holroyd & Coles, 2002), we could also explore whether trait anxiety 
and/or the perceived valence of the feedback not only influenced the FRN 
component, but also an earlier structural encoding stage during evaluative 
feedback processing. Faces elicit a well-described category-selective ERP 
component (i.e. the N170), which reflects structural encoding (Bentin, Allison, 
Puce, Perez, & McCarthy, 1996; George et al., 1996). This component peaks 150-
170 ms after face stimulus onset with a maximum amplitude over right lateral 
occipital-temporal and hence it can easily be dissociated in time and space from 
the FRN deflection. Although some previous ERP studies have failed to reveal any 
change of the N170 amplitude with the emotional facial expression content of 
the faces (Eimer & Holmes, 2002), other studies have reported systematic 
modulations of this category-selective ERP component with emotional facial 
expressions, especially so for negative expressions such as fear and anger for 
which the amplitude of the N170 was augmented, compared to a neutral facial 
expression (Batty & Taylor, 2003; Campanella, Quinet, Bruyer, Crommelinck, & 
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Guerit, 2002; Righart & de Gelder, 2006; Vuilleumier & Pourtois, 2007). Based on 
these previous ERP results (Vuilleumier & Pourtois, 2007), we surmised that the 
N170 would be larger for neutral faces used as negative feedback, compared to 
positive feedback. By contrast, since previous ERP studies mainly failed to 
provide evidence for a clear effect of anxiety at this early stage of face processing 
(Kolassa, Kolassa, Musial, & Miltner, 2007; Kolassa & Miltner, 2006; Muhlberger 
et al., 2009; Rossignol, Philippot, Douillez, Crommelinck, & Campanella, 2005), 
we did not predict any strong effect of trait anxiety on the amplitude of the 
N170. 
METHODS 
Participants 
A total of 73 undergraduate students participated in this experiment in 
exchange of 20 Euro payment. Ten individuals had later to be excluded from the 
analysis due to an obvious discrepancy between the level of trait anxiety 
measured by the STAI-T during the pre-screening phase (at the beginning of the 
academic year) and their actual level of trait anxiety measured a second time at 
the day of testing (2–6 months later). Moreover, the data of 3 other participants 
had to be disregarded due to excessive noise and artifacts during the EEG 
recording. Hence, the final sample consisted of 60 participants. Using a standard 
median-split (Me = 37), we created a group of sub clinical high trait anxious 
participants and a group of low trait anxious participants. These two groups did 
not differ with respect to age and gender (see Table 1). They were all right 
handed, had no history of psychiatry or neurological disease, were free of any 
psychoactive medication and had normal or corrected-to-normal vision. They 
gave written informed consent prior to the experiment, and the study was 
approved by the local ethical committee (Faculty of Psychology & Educational 
Sciences, Ghent University). 
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Table 1. 
Descriptive statistics for the low and high anxious group 
Low anxiety High anxiety 
Negative context Positive context Negative context Positive context 
  M SEM M SEM M SEM M SEM 
SEX 3M 2M 2M 2M 
Age 20.00 0.54 20.40 0.72 19.60 0.24 19.40 0.50 
STAI-T 28.73 0.93 28.47 0.82 44.40 1.93 45.07 1.88 
STAI-S1 29.67 1.51 31.13 1.37 36.40 1.67 38.53 1.78 
STAI-S2 33.47 2.07 37.27 2.19 40.73 1.58 43.33 2.49 
LOC 12.53 0.87 11.13 0.92 12.60 0.99 12.93 0.95 
Speeded Go/noGo task 
We used a modified version of a speeded Go/noGo task previously used 
and validated in a group of low and high (sub clinical) anxious participants (Figure 
1; Vocat, Pourtois, & Vuilleumier, 2008; Aarts & Pourtois, 2010). Visual stimuli 
were shown on a 19-inch LCD screen. They consisted of an arrow (11.4° x 0.05° of 
visual angle at a 60 cm viewing distance) that was presented in the center of the 
screen on a white background. Each trial started with a black fixation cross that 
lasted for 1000 ms. Then, a black arrow (i.e. cue) either oriented up or down, was 
presented. After a variable interval ranging from 1000 ms up to 2000 ms, the 
black arrow became either green or turquoise while its orientation could either 
remain identical or shift in the opposite direction. When the black arrow turned 
green and the orientation remained unchanged, participants were instructed to 
press a predefined key on the response box as fast as possible with the index 
finger of their right hand (Go trials). However, participants had to withhold 
responding when either the arrow became green but changed orientation, or 
when the arrow became turquoise and kept its initial orientation. For noGo trials, 
this color arrow remained on the screen for a maximum duration of 1000 ms. 
Instructions emphasized both speed and accuracy. After the response, feedback 
was presented for 1000 ms (a 1000 ms blank screen preceded this feedback). 
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We used an online adaptive algorithm to set up a limit for “correct”/fast 
reaction times (RTs) (i.e. deadline procedure). The rationale of this procedure 
was to facilitate the occurrence of fast decisions and in turn increase uncertainty 
regarding the actual speed. At the beginning of the experiment, the RT limit was 
set to 300 ms (this cutoff was determined based on previous pilot testing; Vocat 
et al., 2008). This limit was adjusted online as a function of the immediately 
preceding trial history, more specifically as the mean of current and previous RT. 
If the current RT was slower than this limit (arbitrarily classified as “slow hit”), 
the participant received negative feedback. If the RT was faster than the limit, 
positive feedback was presented (arbitrarily classified as “fast hit”). Hence, 
feedback was used to stress both speed and accuracy. When the response was 
incorrect (i.e. either a false alarm - response on noGo trial, or an omission - 
absence of response on Go trial), negative feedback was presented alike. By 
contrast, participants received positive feedback when they correctly withheld 
responding on noGo trials. The added value of this adaptive algorithm is that 
uncertainty about speed RT is actually high throughout the task, which motivates 
participants to actively attend to the feedback information displayed 
systematically after each response in such a way to infer whether their actions 
are timely (fast hits/positive feedback) or not (slow hits/negative feedback). By 
contrast, feedback following actions on noGo trials, either correct inhibitions or 
false alarms, was not informative as participants could readily evaluate the 
accuracy of their actions on noGo trials using internal monitoring systems. 
Therefore, we primarily focused on the ERP responses to evaluative feedback 
following correct Go trials, corresponding either to fast hits (positive feedback) 
or slow hits (negative feedback). 
Feedback on task performance consisted of emotional or neutral faces. 
However, in order to control for the intrinsic emotional value of these faces (and 
focus on performance-monitoring processes), we created two different 
emotional contexts such that we could compare the exact same neutral face 
stimuli used in two opposite situations (either a positive outcome/fast hit or a 
negative outcome/slow hit). More specifically, in the positive context, neutral 
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faces served as negative feedback (slow hits) and were presented together with 
happy faces that served as positive feedback (fast hits, see Figure 1A). By 
contrast, in the negative context, neutral faces served as positive feedback (fast 
hits), and were presented together with angry faces that were used as negative 
feedback (slow hits, see Figure 1B). Each participant (n = 60; 30 low and 30 high 
anxious) was randomly assigned to one of these two emotional contexts (hence 
this variable was a between-subject factor). As a result, 4 experimental groups of 
equal sizes (n = 15) were created by crossing trait anxiety level (low vs. high) and 
emotional context (negative vs. positive). 
 
Figure 1. Stimuli and task. (A) In the positive context, neutral faces were used as negative 
feedback and happy faces as positive feedback. (B) By contrast, in the negative context, angry 
faces were used as negative feedback whereas the exact same neutral faces were used as 
positive feedback. 
The experiment consisted of 60 practice trials and 360 test trials. The test 
trials were divided into 6 blocks of 60 trials each (40 Go and 20 noGo trials, 10 of 
each type). Trial presentation was randomized within blocks. After the first block, 
the experimenter emphasized again the importance of speed as well as accuracy 
in this task. Between blocks, a brief self-paced pause (always shorter than 5 min) 
was implemented. Stimulus presentation and response recording were 
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controlled using E-prime software (V2.0., http://www.pstnet.com/products/e-
prime/). 
Face stimuli 
Ten different face identities (5 per gender) displaying a neutral, happy or 
angry emotional expression were selected from the Karolinska Directed 
Emotional Faces database (KDEF; Lundqvist, Flykt, & Öhman, 1998). Within each 
emotional expression category (i.e. angry, happy and neutral) faces were 
selected randomly in order to control for differences in identity and gender 
between negative and positive feedback. Based on independent ratings obtained 
for these 10 faces (Goeleven, De Raedt, Leyman, & Verschuere, 2008), we could 
establish that the arousal and intensity level of these faces did not differ 
significantly between angry and happy faces, t < 1. The neutral faces were rated 
as less arousing and intense compared either to the angry faces (intensity: t(18) = 
3.70, p < .005; arousal: t(18) = 6.90, p < .001) or the happy faces (intensity: t(18) 
= 6.15, p < .001; arousal: t(18) = 11.30, p < .001). After completing the task, every 
face used during the experiment was presented again one by one to each 
participant and he/she was asked to rate the valence of the face using a visual 
analog scale ranging from -50 (very negative) to +50 (very positive). The face 
remained on the screen until response. These subjective ratings of the faces 
allowed us (i) to check that the emotion (or lack of) displayed by the face was 
properly recognized as such by participants, and (ii) more importantly, to assess 
whether the valence of neutral faces would reliably vary across the two 
emotional contexts, in a predictive way (i.e. neutral faces in the positive context 
would be judged as relatively more negative, whereas neutral faces in the 
negative context would be judged as relatively more positive). Hence, these 
subjective ratings of the faces also provided an indirect check of the 
manipulation of the emotional context performed in our study. 
Questionnaires 
We measured levels of state anxiety both before and after the Go/noGo 
task, using the state version of the STAI. Importantly, we also measured the 
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attribution style and more specifically the LOC of each participant, using a 
standard questionnaire (Rotter, 1966). This questionnaire may be useful, as it 
provides an estimate of the inclination of participants to attribute outcomes in 
daily life situations to either internal as opposed to more external causes. Higher 
LOC scores correspond to a tendency to attribute the cause of events or 
situations to external drives or forces. Previous studies generally showed a 
positive relationship between externality and trait anxiety (Archer, 1979) and 
such positive correlation was also confirmed in our study in the low (r = .50, p < 
.005) but not in the high anxious group (r = .11, p >.10). 
EEG acquisition 
Continuous EEG was acquired at 512 Hz using a 128-channel (pin-type) 
Biosemi Active Two system (http://www.biosemi.com) referenced to the 
Common Mode Sense (CMS)-Driven Right Leg (DRL) ground. ERPs of interest 
were computed offline following a standard sequence of data transformations 
(Picton et al., 2000): (1) Re-referencing of the EEG signal using a common 
average reference; (2) -500/+1000 ms segmentation around the onset of the 
feedback stimulus; (3) pre-stimulus interval baseline correction (from -500 ms to 
feedback onset); (4) vertical ocular correction for blinks (Gratton, Coles, & 
Donchin, 1983) using the difference amplitude of two electrodes attached 
approximately 1 cm above and below the left eye; (5) a second pre-stimulus 
interval baseline correction (from -500 ms to feedback onset); (6) semi-
automatic artifact rejection [electrodes with 20% or more noise at an amplitude 
level of 100 µV were excluded, M = 6 electrodes, SEM = 1; no significant 
difference between groups (low vs. high anxiety) and contexts (negative vs. 
positive), F(1, 56) = 1.61, p > .10; amplitude (µ) scale across participants, M = -
85/+85, SEM = 2; no significant difference between groups and contexts, F(1, 56) 
= .12, p > .10; % of rejected artifacts: M = 14, SEM = 1; no significant difference 
between groups and contexts, F(1, 56) = .97, p > .10]; (7) averaging of the 
stimulus-locked ERPs for each type of feedback separately (i.e. negative feedback 
following a slow hit and positive feedback following a fast hit), and (8) low pass 
digital filtering of the individual average data (30 Hz). 
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We primarily focused on two well-documented ERP components, the FRN 
and the N170. Because peak or area measures of the FRN may confound 
variation in the FRN with differences in other adjacent ERP components, such as 
the P300, the FRN was measured base-to-peak over a fronto-central electrode 
along the midline (i.e. electrode FCz) where the FRN reaches its maximum 
amplitude (see Holroyd et al., 2004) 150-350 ms after feedback onset. More 
specifically and following standard practice (see Holroyd, Nieuwenhuis, Yeung, & 
Cohen, 2003), the FRN amplitude was quantified as the difference between (i) 
the maximum amplitude value between 150 ms and 250 ms following feedback 
onset at electrode FCz and (ii) the most negative amplitude value occurring 
between this first maximum and up to 350 ms after feedback onset at the same 
electrode location. The N170 amplitude was measured at occipito-temporal sites 
(left electrodes: D30, D31, D32, A9, A10 and A11; right: B6, B7, B8, B10, B11 and 
B12) as the maximal negative peak amplitude occurring during a restricted time-
window spanning from 150 to 200 ms post-face stimulus (feedback) onset (see 
Bentin et al., 1996). 
Data analyses 
RTs faster than 150 ms and slower than 500 ms were removed from the 
analyses (see also Aarts & Pourtois, 2010). Using these criteria, 0.42 % (SEM = 
0.13) of the RT data were found to be faster than 150 ms while 2.69 % (SEM = 
0.40) were slower than 500 ms. In total, 3.11 % of the RT data were eventually 
removed. The percentage of outliers was similar between groups (RTs faster than 
150 ms: F(1, 56) = .61, p > .10; RTs slower than 500 ms: F(1,56) = .06, p > .10) and 
contexts (RTs faster than 150 ms: F(1, 56) = .34, p > .10; RTs slower than 500 ms: 
F(1,56) = 1.63, p > .10), and no significant interaction was found between those 
two factors (RTs faster than 150 ms: F(1, 56) = 1.64, p > .10; RTs slower than 500 
ms: F(1,56) = 1.87, p > .10). 
Because the presentation of feedback information following correct 
inhibitions (on noGo trials) or response errors (i.e. False Alarms on noGo trials), 
was not informative, only ERP components in response to feedback following 
fast (positive feedback) and slow hits (negative feedback) were included in the 
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analyses. Unlike response errors or correct inhibitions, in these two conditions, 
participants had actually to rely on external feedback information to determine, 
given the speed pressure imposed, whether their responses were “correct” (fast) 
or not (slow), relative to the arbitrary limit updated on a trial-by-trial basis. We 
first performed statistical analyses in which we directly compared the exact same 
feedback stimuli (neutral faces) used either as positive (fast hits) or negative 
(slow hits) outcome. These analyses enabled to exclude low-level differences (as 
well as intrinsic pleasantness) between these two opposite evaluative outcomes.  
N170 peak amplitudes were analyzed using a mixed model ANOVA 
including the between-subject factors group (low vs. high anxiety) and context 
(negative vs. positive), and the within-subject factor electrode position (6), as 
well as hemisphere (right vs. left). The last within-subject factor was included in 
the analysis to verify if the N170 component recorded in this study was larger in 
the right compared to the left hemisphere (Bentin, et al., 1996; Itier & Taylor, 
2004). We also ran an auxiliary analysis in which we examined amplitude 
modulations of the N170 for emotional as well as neutral faces. In this more 
complex model, N170 peak amplitudes were analyzed using a mixed model 
ANOVA including the between-subject factors group (low vs. high anxiety) and 
context (negative vs. positive), and the within-subject factor electrode position 
(6), valence of feedback (negative vs. positive) and hemisphere (right vs. left).  
FRN base-to-peak amplitudes were first analyzed for neutral faces only 
using a mixed model ANOVA including the between-subject factors group (low 
vs. high anxiety) and context (negative vs. positive). Next, FRN base-to-peak 
amplitudes were analyzed for emotional and neutral faces using an ANOVA 
including the factors group (low vs. high anxiety) and context (negative vs. 
positive) and the within-subject factor valence of feedback (negative vs. 
positive). 
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RESULTS 
Trait anxiety 
Participants of each group (low vs. high anxiety) were randomly assigned to 
one of the two contexts (negative vs. positive). As expected, trait anxiety differed 
significantly between groups, F(1, 56) = 118.49, p < .001, while no main effect of 
context, F (1, 56) = .02, p > .10, and no interaction between group and context 
was observed, F (1, 56) = .10, p > .10. 
Subjective ratings of the faces 
At the end of the experimental session, participants were asked to rate the 
valence of every face used as performance feedback using a visual analog scale 
ranging from negative (-50) to positive (+50) values. Due to technical problems, 
the rating data of two low anxious individuals who were assigned to the positive 
context could not be saved properly and were lost. Critically, neutral faces in the 
positive context were evaluated as more negative (M = -18.30, SEM = 1.53) 
compared to the same neutral faces presented in the negative context (M = 
12.00, SEM = 1.92), F(1, 54) = 151.28, p < .001, confirming that these neutral 
faces used as feedback had acquired a differential valence depending on the 
emotional context. This effect was not different for low vs. high anxious 
participants, F(1, 54) = .77, p > .10. No significant main effect of trait anxiety was 
evidenced on these ratings, F(1, 54) = 2.14, p > .10. Happy and angry faces were, 
as expected, clearly rated as positive (M = 33.85, SEM = 1.37) and negative (M = -
33.83; SEM = 1.12), respectively, but these ratings did not differ between low 
and high anxious participants, F(1, 54) = .004, p > .10. 
State anxiety 
As expected, the level of state anxiety before the task differed significantly 
between the two groups, F(1, 56) = 19.73, p < .001 (see Table 1). After the 
Go/noGo task, this level of state anxiety reliably increased (see also Aarts & 
Pourtois, 2010, for similar finding), F(1, 56) = 23.88, p < .001, but low trait 
anxious individuals still had a lower level of state anxiety than high trait anxious 
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individuals, F(1, 56) = 10.00, p < .005. This increase in state anxiety level was not 
influenced by context, F(1, 56) = .51, p > .10, neither did context interact 
significantly with group, F(1, 56) = .23, p > .10. These results confirmed that the 
Go/noGo task was demanding, and that the constant and updated speed 
pressure imposed likely led to an increased experience of negative affect (equally 
so in both groups and contexts), given the intrinsic difficulty to keep producing 
fast correct responses throughout the experimental session in these conditions 
(see Aarts & Pourtois, 2010). 
Behavioral results 
After each trial, feedback on task performance was presented. Negative 
feedback (either a neutral face in the positive context or an angry face in the 
negative context) was presented following response errors (i.e. False Alarms or 
Slow Hits), while positive feedback (either a neutral face in the negative context 
or a happy face in the positive context) was presented following correct 
inhibitions (on noGo trials) or fast hits. Performance during the Go/noGo task 
was comparable between groups (low vs. high anxiety) and contexts and no 
significant interaction between group and context was evidenced (see Table 2a 
and 2b). Participants committed on average 24% or 29 errors in the speeded 
Go/noGo task and this percentage/number did not differ between groups, F(1, 
56) = 2.12, p > .10, and contexts, F(1, 56) = 1,30, p > .10. Similarly, no significant 
differences in the number of fast or slow hits were observed between groups 
(fast hits: F(1, 56) = .44, p > .10; slow hits: F(1, 56) = .74, p > .10) and contexts 
(fast hits: F(1, 56) = 2.63, p > .10; slow hits: F(1, 56) = 1.80, p > .10), and the 
interaction between group and context did not reach significance (fast hits: F(1, 
56) = .00, p > .10; slow hits: F(1, 56) = .70, p > .10) (see Table 2a). As expected 
(see Aarts & Pourtois, 2010), participants reacted faster on incorrect noGo trials 
(M = 248.67, SEM = 3.57) than on slow hits (M = 310.47, SEM = 2.96), F(1, 56) = 
677.00, p < .001, but faster on fast hits (M = 233.14, SEM = 2.31), F(1, 56) = 
7235.83, p < .001. These RTs were comparable for both groups and contexts (all 
p’s > .10). Moreover, a typical post-error slowing effect was observed indicated 
by slower decisions to hits following an error compared to hits following another 
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hit, F(1, 56) = 50.03, p < .001. This effect was not different between contexts, F(1, 
56) = .01, p > .10, and groups, F(1, 56) = 2.62, p > .10, nor did the interaction 
between group and context reach significance, F(1, 56) = .53, p > .10 (see Table 
2b), suggesting preserved behavioral performance and cognitive control abilities 
in the two groups and two contexts. Altogether, these behavioral results showed 
comparable performance (accuracy and speed) for low and high anxious 
participants, and for the two emotional contexts. This allowed us to compare the 
feedback-related ERP effects between groups and contexts, while the number of 
positive and negative feedback was balanced across groups and conditions. 
Table 2a. 
Accuracy results in the speeded Go/noGo task 
    Accuracy (Number) 
Fast Hits Slow Hits Errors 
Anxiety Context M SEM M SEM M SEM 
Low Negative 73 7 158 6 28 5 
Positive 82 5 147 5 36 5 
High Negative 69 5 158 5 24 4 
  Positive 79 6 156 5 26 4 
Note: None of the group differences were significant (p > .05) 
 
Table 2b. 
RT results in the speeded Go/noGo task 
    Speed (ms) 
Fast Hits Slow Hits Errors Post-error Hit Post-hit Hit 
Anxiety Context M (SEM) M (SEM) M(SEM) M(SEM) M(SEM) 
Low Negative 237.86 (4.56) 314.68 (6.15) 256.81 (7.22) 302.91 (8.89) 287.10 (7.76) 
Positive 226.58 (5.69) 304.45 (5.55) 242.14 (8.92) 285.30 (7.76) 273.62 (7.41) 
High Negative 234.61 (4.82) 233.50 (6.47) 247.21 (5.96) 306.78 (9.92) 286.49 (6.66) 
  Positive 233.50 (2.97) 308.77 (5.72) 248.51 (6.26) 303.89 (10.07) 280.40 (6.17) 
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ERP results 
N170 component 
Visual ERPs time-locked to the onset of the face feedback clearly showed a 
conspicuous negative deflection around 178 ms following stimulus onset (see 
Figure 2AB), with a maximum amplitude over lateral occipito-temporal 
electrodes on both sides, with a clear right hemispheric dominance (see Figure 
2CD). These properties were compatible with the face-specific N170 component 
(Bentin et al., 1996). We first carried out a statistical analysis in which we 
compared the amplitude of the N170 generated in response to the exact same 
physical stimuli (i.e. neutral faces), but in two different contexts (negative 
context where neutral faces were used as positive feedback; and positive context 
where neutral faces were used as negative feedback).Results of this analysis 
showed that the N170 was significantly larger in the right (M = -7.78) compared 
to the left hemisphere (M = -6.15), F(1, 56) = 8.20, p = .006, but more 
importantly, that this face-specific component was larger in the positive context 
(M = -8.18), compared to the negative context (M = -5.74), F(1, 56) = 5.54, p < 
.05. This result indicated a larger N170 component for neutral faces when used 
as negative feedback (i.e. positive context) relative to the same neutral faces 
when used as positive feedback (i.e. negative context). This effect did not differ 
between low and high anxious participants, F(1, 56) = .64, p > .10, nor was there 
a main effect of group, F(1, 56) = .03, p > .10. (see Figure 2EF). This result was 
important as it suggested that when carefully controlling for low-level 
differences (and intrinsic pleasantness), the valence of the feedback was 
processed differentially as a function of the emotional context, as early as 170-
180 ms post-stimulus onset, equally so for low and high anxious participants. 
Next, we performed a more complex data analysis where we included 
emotional faces as well. This analysis showed that the amplitude of the N170 
was concurrently influenced by the valence of the feedback and the context, F(1, 
56) = 33.72, p < .001. While in the negative context, the N170 was slightly larger 
for negative feedback (i.e., angry face; M = -6.13) than positive feedback (i.e. 
neutral face; M = -5.74, F(1, 56) = 3.07, p < .10), in the positive context, the N170 
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was clearly larger for positive feedback (i.e.
negative feedback (i.e. neutral face; 
effect was not modulated by the level of trait anxiety, 
(Figure 2AB). These results suggest that probably not the valence of the feedback 
per se, but instead the perceived emotionality 
increased the amplitude of
Pourtois, 2007). 
Figure 2. N170 results for emotional and neutral face feedback, separately.
waveforms (at occipito-temporal electrode B7, right hemisphere) for high (A) and low (B) anxious
participants in the negative (neutral and angry faces) and the positive context (neutral and happy 
faces). (C) N170 occipital scalp map for neutral face
feedback). (D) N170 occipital scalp map for neutral face
feedback). (E) Grand average ERP waveforms (occipito
for low and high anxious participants for neutral faces serving as positive feedback (in the 
negative context) and negative fee
electrode B7) ± 1 standard error of the mean of the N170 for neutral faces serving as positive 
feedback (in the negative context) and negative feedback (in the positive emotional context) in 
low and high anxious participants
 
 
 happy face; M = -9.46), compared to 
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FRN component 
Following the N170, another negative deflection was observed ~250 ms 
over fronto-central electrodes (e.g. FCz) consistent with the electrophysiological 
properties of the FRN (Holroyd & Coles, 2002). As expected, when computing the 
difference wave (negative feedback - positive feedback), the obtained negative 
activity reached its maximum amplitude at electrode FCz ~250 ms post-feedback 
onset. Results of the univariate ANOVA performed on the amplitude of the FRN 
in response to neutral faces, with context and group as between-subject factors 
revealed a significant effect of context, F(1, 56) = 9.51, p = .003, indicating that 
neutral faces in the positive context (which corresponded to negative feedback) 
elicited a larger FRN (M = 8.18, SEM = 0.54) than the exact same neutral faces in 
the negative context (which corresponded to positive feedback) (M = 6.13, SEM = 
0.41). However, this differential effect of context (i.e. valence of feedback) was 
different for low vs. high anxious individuals, F(1, 56) = 3.04, p = .09. Planned 
comparisons revealed that neutral faces presented in the positive context led to 
a significantly larger FRN than the same neutral faces used in the negative 
context, but only for low anxious participants, F(1, 28) = 12.06, p < .005 (see 
Figure 3ABC). No such differential effect of context was observed for the 
amplitude of the FRN for high anxious individuals, F(1, 28) = .87, p > .10 (see 
Figure 3DEF). This result suggests that, unlike low anxious participants, high 
anxious participants failed to differentiate the acquired valence of the feedback 
on task performance conveyed by these neutral faces. This finding corroborated 
the assumption of a selective performance-monitoring deficit, as evidenced here 
for the FRN amplitude, in high anxious participants. 
Next, FRN amplitudes were analyzed for neutral and emotional faces 
concurrently in an auxiliary analysis. This ANOVA revealed a significant three way 
interaction between valence, context and anxiety, F(1, 56) = 4.75, p < .05. While 
both low and high anxious individuals did not differentiate positive from negative 
feedback in the negative context, F(1, 28) = 0.22, p = .64 (Figure 3GH), a clear 
effect of feedback valence was observed in the positive context, F(1, 28) = 32.49, 
p < .001. This effect was larger in low anxious (M = 1.83, SEM = 0.33), t(14) = 
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5.47, p < .001, compared to high anxious individuals, (
t(14) = 2.27, p < .05 (Figure 3IJ). Hence, this result confirmed that the amplitude 
of the FRN component varied with the valence of the feedback, depending on 
levels of trait anxiety1. 
                                        
1
 Similar results were obtained when the STAI
were not normally distributed) were included in the analyses as a covariate, i.e., significant three
way interaction (valence x anxiety x context): 
main effect of valence: F(1, 28) = 5.20, 
= 3.59, p = .07; negative context: no significant ma
significant interaction between anxiety and valence: 
 
M = 0.60, 
             
-T scores (after log transformation because they 
F(1, 56) = 4.10, p < .05; positive context: significant 
p < .05, interaction between anxiety and valence: 
in effect of valence: F(1, 28) = 1.16, 
F(1, 28) = 1.07, p = .30. 
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Figure 3. FRN results for emotional and neutral faces, separa
waveforms (electrode FCz) for low anxious participants for neutral faces serving as positive 
feedback (in the negative context) and negative feedback (in the positive emotional context). (B) 
Mean amplitude (µV) ± 1 standard erro
neutral faces serving as positive feedback and negative feedback in low anxious participants. (C) 
Horizontal and frontal scalp topography of the FRN (260
anxious individuals, obtained after subtracting the negative feedback from positive feedback, 
showing a typical FRN voltage map distribution (i.e.
electrode position) in this group, relative to high anxious participants (compar
average ERP waveforms (electrode FCz) for high anxious participants for neutral faces serving as 
positive feedback and negative feedback. (E) Mean amplitude (µV) ± 1 standa
mean of the FRN for neutral faces serving as po
anxious participants. (F) Horizontal and frontal scalp topography of the FRN (260
stimulus onset) for high anxious individuals, obtained after subtracting the positive context from 
the negative context condition. Grand average ERP waveforms (electrode FCz) for high (G) and 
low (H) anxious participants when neutral faces were used as positive feedback and angry faces 
as negative feedback (negative context). Grand average ERP waveforms (electrode FCz) 
(I) and low (L) anxious participants when neutral faces were used as negative feedback and happy 
faces as positive feedback (positive context).
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correlation between the LOC and the amplitude of the FRN to neutral faces in 
low anxious individuals irrespective of the emotional context (r = -.49, p < .01; 
see Figure 4A), while no such association was evidenced in high anxious 
individuals (r = -.03, p > .10; see Figure 4B). This significant correlation found in 
low anxious participants indicated that the larger the FRN component, the more 
the behavior was (usually) attributed to internal causes in these individuals2. 
 
Figure 4. Correlation between FRN amplitude and subjective estimate of LOC for low (A) vs. high 
anxious (B) individuals. 
Finally, we performed additional control analyses to ascertain that these 
FRN results were not confounded by an overlapping P300 or Late Positive 
Potential (LPP) effect, given that previous ERP studies showed a blunted LPP in 
high compared to low anxious individuals (Foti, Olvet, Klein, & Hajcak, 2010; 
                                                      
2
 We also computed and analyzed response-locked ERPs, with a focus on the ERN 
component that was previously shown to vary with trait anxiety (e.g., Aarts & Pourtois, 2010), 
especially in situations where action monitoring did not rely exclusively on the processing of 
external feedbacks on task performance, but internal action monitoring (i.e., no feedback) was 
required (Olvet & Hajcak, 2009a). Response-locked ERPs revealed a clear negative component 
peaking ~30 ms post response onset, with a maximum amplitude at fronto-central electrodes 
along the midline (including FCz), and which was substantially larger for response errors relative 
to correct hits, F(1, 55) = 23.14, p < .001. These electrophysiological properties were compatible 
with the ERN/Ne (Falkenstein et al., 2000; Gehring et al., 1993). However, the ERN amplitude did 
not vary between low vs. high anxious participants, F < 1, nor between the negative vs. positive 
context, F < 1, consistent with previous findings (Olvet & Hajcak, 2009a). 
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Weinberg & Hajcak, 2010). At posterior parietal leads along the midline 
(electrode Pz), we isolated a positive component time-locked to the onset of the 
feedback, sharing similarities with the LPP. This component peaked 350 ms post-
feedback onset and lasted ~650 ms, hence showing a sustained activity. Results 
showed that the mean amplitude of this LPP component (as computed during 
this time interval at electrode Pz) was larger for positive compared to negative 
feedback, F(1, 56) = 19.29, p < .001, but this valence effect was not modulated by 
anxiety, F(1, 56) = .00, p > .10, or context, F(1, 56) = 1.33, p = .25. The interaction 
between context and anxiety did not reach significance either, F(1, 56) = .12, p > 
.10. This analysis also disclosed that the LPP was smaller in high compared to low 
anxious individuals, F(1, 56) = 4.71, p < .05, in agreement with these previous 
studies (Foti et al., 2010; Weinberg & Hajcak, 2010). These control analyses 
confirmed that the reported FRN effect (and its modulation by levels of trait 
anxiety and emotional context) did not overlap (in time and electrode locations) 
with a later LPP effect taking place during feedback processing. 
DISCUSSION 
The goal of this study was to test the assumption that high anxious 
participants may exhibit action-monitoring deficits, as reflected by an invariance 
of the FRN to opposite performance feedback. Given that low and high anxious 
individuals might already differ in the way they actually perceive the intrinsic 
pleasantness of the feedback (regardless of any influence of higher-order 
performance-monitoring brain mechanisms), we also looked at an earlier 
perceptual ERP component, namely the face-specific N170 (Bentin et al., 1996), 
and verify whether this earlier brain response could vary with the valence of the 
feedback (as implemented with a contextual modulation, see also Righart & de 
Gelder, 2006). A number of new results emerge from this ERP study. 
First, we found a comparable behavioral performance (i.e. accuracy and 
speed) between low and high anxious individuals during the speeded Go/noGo 
task, and between the positive and negative emotional context. This result 
confirmed that trait anxiety did not simply alter behavioral performance during 
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our speeded Go/noGo task (Aarts & Pourtois, 2010; Hajcak et al., 2003a) and that 
the ERP difference found at the level of the FRN between high vs. low anxious 
participants could not be related to obvious changes in the behavior across these 
two groups. Moreover, we did find evidence for an increase in levels of state 
anxiety induced by the Go/noGo task (pre-post comparison; see also Aarts & 
Pourtois, 2010), but this change was actually the same in both groups and 
contexts. Importantly, emotional ratings of the faces also confirmed that neutral 
faces acquired a different valence depending on the emotional context they 
were embedded in (i.e. they were perceived as relatively more negative when 
used as negative, compared to positive feedback), but this contextual 
modulation effect was similar in both groups, confirming preserved perceptual 
functions in high anxious participants. 
Secondly, our new ERP results show that, when controlling for the intrinsic 
pleasantness of the feedback stimuli, the face specific N170 component (Bentin 
et al., 1996) was reliably increased for neutral faces used as negative feedback, 
relative to the same neutral faces used a positive feedback (see also Vuilleumier 
& Pourtois, 2007). Importantly, this differential structural encoding of the face as 
a function of the acquired valence of the evaluative feedback was similar for low 
vs. high anxious participants. Moreover, following the N170, a larger FRN 
component was found for neutral faces serving as negative feedback compared 
to the same neutral faces serving as positive feedback, but only in low anxious 
participants. These new electrophysiological findings therefore confirm that 
performance monitoring was modulated by levels of trait anxiety, as only low, 
but not high anxious individuals, showed a systematic variation of the FRN 
amplitude as a function of the valence of the feedback. However, our ERP results 
also showed that this effect of anxiety on feedback processing was component 
specific and concerned mainly the FRN component. The dissociation found 
between the N170 and FRN component during feedback processing in high 
anxious individuals suggests that trait anxiety does not simply alter evaluative 
feedback processing in general. Instead, it specifically influences a stage of 
performance monitoring (reflected by the FRN component) during which the 
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perceived valence of the feedback is presumably compared to the internalized 
value of the action (Holroyd & Coles, 2002). However, our additional results 
obtained for the N170 component also show that the positive vs. negative 
valence of the feedback is correctly perceived as such by these high anxious 
participants, ruling out the possibility of a low-level perceptual deficit accounting 
for our FRN findings. Interestingly, we also found that across low anxious 
participants, the amplitude of the FRN was related to the attribution style (as 
measured using a standard questionnaire, see Rotter, 1966), whereas no such 
relationship could be evidenced in high anxious participants. The amplitude of 
the FRN was larger for low anxious individuals who were more inclined to 
attribute the cause or origin of their actions or behavior to internal (as opposed 
to external) drives or forces. Altogether, these new ERP results inform about the 
stage of processing following evaluative feedback onset during which trait 
anxiety may reliably influence performance monitoring. We discuss the 
implication of these new results in more detail here below. 
Spared encoding of the emotional value of the feedback in anxiety 
Our ERP results for the N170 component showed that high anxious 
individuals could actually reliably and correctly decode the intrinsic emotional 
value of the feedback information, despite an apparent deficit in linking this 
emotional value to a correct error prediction signal (as shown by the FRN). 
Hence, effects of trait anxiety on performance monitoring appear to be rather 
selective, since they mainly concern a specific stage of processing (the mid-
latency FRN component), while leaving unaffected earlier perceptual stages 
(N170 component) during evaluative feedback processing. Previous ERP studies 
already showed that context influences the early structural encoding of faces, as 
shown by enhanced N170 components for faces embedded in negative 
context/background information (Righart & de Gelder, 2006, 2008). Here, we 
found an enhanced N170 component for neutral faces associated with a negative 
outcome, relative to the exact same faces used as positive feedback. However, 
because we found that the N170 amplitude was in both contexts increased for 
emotional compared to neutral faces, it appears that the emotional significance 
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or level of arousal (instead of the valence per se) of the face may be the critical 
dimension influencing this early visual component (see also Batty & Taylor, 
2003). Importantly, when neutral faces were used as negative feedback and 
directly compared to the exact same neutral faces used as positive feedback, a 
larger N170 was observed for negative compared to positive feedback. This 
might indicate an augmented emotional significance of neutral faces in the 
positive emotional context. Crucially, our results for the N170 showed that this 
effect of emotional significance was similar in low and high anxious individuals, 
suggesting preserved perceptual emotional processes (i.e. structural encoding of 
the face) in high anxious participants during evaluative feedback processing. 
Behavioral results obtained for the ratings of the faces also corroborated this 
conclusion. 
Selective alteration of performance monitoring in anxiety 
By contrast, a modulatory effect of trait anxiety during evaluative feedback 
processing was evidenced when looking at the fronto-central FRN component. 
While this performance-monitoring component reliably discriminated between 
negative and positive feedback in low anxious participants, it did not in high 
anxious participants. Strikingly, the amplitude of the FRN for positive and 
negative feedback in high anxious individuals was similar (i.e. no larger FRN for 
negative compared to positive feedback), and comparable in both cases to the 
FRN following positive feedback in low anxious individuals. This suggests 
impaired performance-monitoring functions in anxiety. Although the 
morphology of the FRN component found in this study was slightly different 
compared to previous studies (Hajcak, Holroyd, Moser, & Simons, 2004; Holroyd, 
Larsen, & Cohen, 2004), this difference may be due to the use of complex facial 
stimuli as performance feedback, relative to simple symbolic cues in these earlier 
studies. Likewise, here outcome evaluation at the level of the FRN was actually 
based on speed (fast vs. slow hits), but not accuracy, a factor that might 
potentially account for changes in the morphology of this performance-
monitoring ERP component across studies. At any rate, future studies are needed 
to corroborate this statement. Importantly, control analyses showed that the 
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reported FRN results did not overlap with a later LPP effect (Foti, Hajcak, & Dien, 
2009; Schupp et al., 2004), the latter being indicated by a blunted LPP 
component for high compared to low anxious participants, consistent with 
previous ERP studies (Foti et al., 2010; Weinberg & Hajcak, 2010). Our ERP 
results further show that the effect of feedback valence was only observed in the 
positive context, where happy faces and “neutral” faces were presented, and 
that this difference was larger for low, compared to high anxious participants. In 
the negative context, the amplitude of the FRN did not differentiate between 
angry and “neutral” faces. These FRN results are in line with previous studies 
that did already report a comparable asymmetry, with a larger differentiation at 
the level of the FRN between neutral and positive feedback than between 
negative and neutral feedback (Hajcak, Holroyd, Moser, & Simons, 2004; Holroyd 
& Coles, 2002). 
The main ERP result showing a modulatory effect of trait anxiety on the 
FRN component is in accordance with previous studies (Gu et al., 2010; Simons, 
2010) and more generally, the reinforcement learning theory (Holroyd & Coles, 
2002). This model proposes that that the FRN component reflects the perceived 
discrepancy between the expected and the actual outcome (i.e. prediction 
error), here based on the processing of an external evaluative feedback (as 
opposed to an internal motor representation for the ERN/Ne component). A 
larger FRN in low compared to high anxious individuals suggests that trait anxiety 
likely influences the encoding of the prediction error signal during the processing 
of simple action-outcome sequences. Presumably, high anxious individuals might 
show a tendency to expect more negative external feedback/evaluations 
compared to low anxious individuals, and as a result these former participants 
would show blunted reactions to negative feedback, because the discrepancy 
between the actual and expected outcome is, by definition, smaller. Consistent 
with this notion, Maner and Schmidt (2006) showed a link between anxiety and 
pessimistic outcome expectancy. By contrast, here we did not find any 
modulation of the ERN/Ne component (and hence internal monitoring 
processes) as a function of trait anxiety, unlike previous ERP studies (Aarts & 
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Pourtois, 2010; Hajcak et al., 2003a). This discrepancy could be explained by the 
use of salient evaluative feedback in this study (i.e. emotional faces), which may 
have introduced a strong bias towards the monitoring of these external 
evaluative feedback at the cost of more internally-oriented monitoring 
processes. Interestingly, in this condition, effects of trait anxiety on internal 
monitoring brain processes (i.e. ERN/Ne component) seem to disappear, in line 
with previous ERP results (Olvet & Hajcak, 2009a). 
The assumption that trait anxiety may selectively influence a performance-
monitoring process through which the perceived valence of the feedback is 
readily integrated with the internalized value of the action is indirectly supported 
by our additional correlation analysis between LOC and the amplitude of the 
FRN. Our results show that low anxious individuals characterized by an internal 
LOC had a larger FRN, relative to low anxious individuals with a more external 
LOC. This result indirectly confirms that the FRN is not only sensitive to the 
valence of the feedback per se, but also to higher-level motivational or 
emotional factors, including the motivational significance of our actions (Gehring 
and Willoughby, 2002; Yeung et al., 2005). Noteworthy was the absence of this 
relationship in high trait anxious participants, confirming that this 
psychopathological condition (here at the subclinical level) may reliably alter 
performance-monitoring brain systems. Hence, this anxiety-related deficit during 
performance monitoring may concern a specific generative process enabling to 
readily bind the (internalized) value of the action with the perceived valence of 
the feedback. However, we have to acknowledge that because our trait anxiety 
estimate (based on a standard questionnaire in the literature) likely measures 
negative affect (or even depression) (e.g. Nitschke, Heller, Imig, McDonald & 
Miller, 2001; Rossi & Pourtois, 2011), enhanced levels of negative affect or 
internalized personality traits in general, rather than trait anxiety per se (see also 
Olvet & Hajcak, 2008), may account for the amplitude variations observed at the 
level of the FRN component in our study. 
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Conclusion 
Results of this ERP study reveal a specific performance-monitoring deficit 
associated with subclinical trait anxiety, although low and high anxious 
participants showed comparable behavioral performance during this speeded 
Go/noGo task. Our FRN results suggest that high anxious individuals have a 
selective impairment in integrating the emotional value or motivational 
significance of the feedback with the internalized value of the action executed 
1000 ms prior to feedback delivery. This effect might be imputed to a selective 
change produced by trait anxiety in the normal reinforcement learning signal 
generated during action monitoring. However, our ERP results also show that the 
rapid decoding of the emotional significance of the facial feedback information 
(as reflected by the N170 component) is not altered in high compared to low 
anxious individuals, suggesting a component specific effect of anxiety during 
evaluative feedback processing. As such, our new ERP findings help better 
characterize the precise temporal locus during which trait anxiety reliably 
changes and influences performance-monitoring brain functions. 
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CHAPTER 5: EVIDENCE FOR THE AUTOMATIC EVALUATION OF SELF-
GENERATED ACTIONS
1
 
“The accuracy of simple actions is swiftly determined through specific 
monitoring brain systems. However, it remains unclear whether this evaluation is 
accompanied by a rapid and compatible emotional appraisal of the action that 
allows to mark incorrect actions as negative/bad and conversely correct actions 
as positive/good. In this study, we used a new method to decode the affective 
value of simple actions generated by participants during a standard Go/noGo 
task. Immediately after each Go/noGo action, participants responded to the 
valence of either a positive or a negative word. Results showed that False Alarms 
performed during the Go/noGo task led to a faster evaluative categorization of 
negative words relative to positive words. This action - word evaluative priming 
effect occurred when the interval between these two events was set to either 300 
or 600 ms, but not 1000 ms. Finally, higher levels of trait anxiety were associated 
with a reduction of the evaluative priming effect. Our results suggest that simple 
actions are rapidly evaluated as positive or negative depending on the automatic 
monitoring of their perceived accuracy.” 
                                                      
1 Aarts, K., De Houwer, J., & Pourtois, G. (under revision). Evidence for the automatic evaluation 
of self-generated actions. Cognition. 
EVALUATION OF ACTIONS   137 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Human beings constantly and effortlessly categorize external stimuli in 
their environment as good or bad. This function is adaptive because it enables us 
to unlock rapidly appropriate behavioral responses, for example to approach a 
positive stimulus or avoid a negative stimulus (Cacioppo, Priester, & Berntson, 
1993; Chen & Bargh, 1999; Neumann, Förster, & Strack, 2003). Evidence for 
automatic evaluative processing has been obtained in evaluative priming studies 
(De Houwer, Hermans, & Eelen, 1998; Fazio, Sanbonmatsu, Powell, & Kardes, 
1986; Hermans, De Houwer, & Eelen, 1994). Evaluative priming refers to the fact 
that reaction times (RTs) for categorizing the valence of a target word (e.g. cold), 
are shorter when it is preceded by a prime with the same valence (e.g. cancer), 
than when it is preceded by a prime with a different valence (e.g. happy). Given 
that there is very little time between the onset of the prime and the onset of the 
target (typically less than 300 ms) and participants are asked to ignore the 
primes, these results suggest that the valence of the prime is processed 
automatically in the sense of rapidly and unintentionally. Evaluative priming has 
already been observed for a wide range of external stimuli in the environment, 
including words (Fazio et al., 1986), pictures (Hermans et al., 1994), black and 
white line drawings (Giner-Sorolla, Garcia, & Bargh, 1999), motivationally-
relevant stimuli (i.e. rewarded and unrewarded colors; see Moors & De Houwer, 
2001), odors (Hermans, Baeyens, & Eelen, 1998) and tones (Reber, Haerter, & 
Sollberger, 1999). 
Presumably, automatic evaluation is a generic function and does not only 
concern external stimuli in the environment, but also self-generated actions. 
Actions in response to stimuli are usually deemed conducive or obstructive 
depending on their actual match with goals stored in long term memory 
(Scherer, 1984, 1988). Indirect evidence supporting this view comes from recent 
psychophysiology studies showing that unwanted response errors (i.e. goal 
obstructive events) yield larger skin conductance responses and greater heart 
rate deceleration than correct decisions (Hajcak et al., 2003b), as well as a larger 
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startle potentiation (Hajcak & Foti, 2008) and differential early activation in the 
amygdala (Pourtois et al., 2010). These results suggest that errors may be 
perceived as aversive events, and accordingly be associated with enhanced 
arousal within the autonomic nervous system. It has also been shown that 
through conditioning, a specific action (e.g. a key press), can become aversive as 
evidenced by the fact that the selection of the action is faster by the presence of 
an irrelevant negative word (Beckers, De Houwer, & Eelen, 2002). Although these 
studies give first hints on the acquired emotional value of specific actions, they 
do not inform us about whether valence specific effects can be obtained as a 
function of the perceived goal conduciveness of simple self-generated actions. 
More specifically, it is likely that the post-error detection changes in autonomic 
or brain activity that were observed in previous studies merely reflect enhanced 
arousal (Hajcak & Foti, 2008) or attention orienting (Notebaert et al., 2009) 
rather than a genuine affective marking of these actions as negative events. 
Moreover, whereas the focus is mainly on response errors in these earlier 
studies, much less is known about a possible symmetric affective tagging of 
correct actions as positive events by generic internal action-monitoring brain 
systems. In other words, it still needs to be determined whether incorrect 
actions are automatically categorized as negative events relative to correct 
actions, while conversely correct actions would implicitly be associated with 
positive emotions, relative to response errors. 
We addressed this question using a novel experimental paradigm suited to 
decode online the emotional value of simple self-generated actions performed 
during a standard Go/noGo task by healthy adult participants. Participants 
performed a speeded Go/noGo task (Vocat, Pourtois, Vuilleumier, 2008), which 
was combined with an evaluative word categorization task. Unbeknown to 
participants, actions performed during the Go/noGo task (either correct or 
incorrect responses) served as primes whereas the words (positive or negative) 
were used as targets. In line with the logic underlying evaluative priming effects, 
we predicted that the time needed to categorize a target word would be 
systematically influenced by the putative valence of the preceding action, the 
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latter being presumably decoded rapidly following or even during action 
execution in specific cognitive and emotion control systems (De Bruijn, de Lange, 
von Cramon, & Ullsperger, 2009). More precisely, we expected participants to be 
faster to categorize a target word as negative if the preceding action was 
incorrect and to categorize a target word as positive if the preceding action was 
correct. 
We also examined some of the functional properties of automatic 
evaluation of correct and incorrect actions. More specifically, we tested whether 
the effect was moderated by the time between the action and the target word 
and by the affective disposition of the participants. Previous studies with word 
primes and word targets reported reliable evaluative priming effects with a short 
stimulus onset asynchronies (SOAs) between prime and target (i.e. 300 ms or 
less) but not with long SOAs (e.g. 1000 ms; see Fazio et al., 1986; De Houwer et 
al., 1998; Hermans et al., 1994). Based on these results, it was concluded that the 
automatic evaluation of words is a fast acting automatic process. In our first two 
experiments, the length of the SOA between the self-generated action and the 
presentation of the target word was constant and set to 300 ms. It was increased 
to 600 ms in Experiment 3 and to 1000 ms in Experiment 4. If the evaluation of 
correct and incorrect actions is also a fast acting automatic process (see Pourtois 
et al., 2010, for converging neuroscientific evidence) then evaluative priming 
should be observed at short (300 ms) but not long (1000 ms) SOAs. With regard 
to the moderating impact of the affective disposition of participants, we focused 
on trait anxiety. Given that anxiety and the prolonged experience of negative 
affect usually lead to altered action-monitoring effects (see Aarts & Pourtois, 
2010; Hajcak, McDonald, & Simons, 2003a), we tested whether (subclinical) high 
trait anxious individuals might show a different evaluative priming effect 
compared to low anxious participants, consistent with an impaired ability of the 
former participants to readily assign an affective value to a self-generated action 
(see Aarts & Pourtois, 2012). 
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METHOD 
Participants 
Twenty-one first-year female undergraduate psychology students (Age: M 
= 18.52; SEM = 0.40; Range = 17 - 25) participated in Experiment 1. Fifteen 
undergraduate students (14 women; Age: M = 21.4, SEM = .38, Range = 18 - 23) 
took part in Experiment 2. Twenty-two undergraduate students participated in 
Experiment 3 (19 women; Age: M = 21.73; SEM = .50, Range = 19 - 28). Finally, 20 
undergraduate students took part in Experiment 4 (18 women; Age: M = 23.05, 
SEM = .86, Range = 18 – 26). All participants were right-handed, native Dutch 
speakers who did not have a history of neurological or psychiatric disease and 
had normal or corrected-to-normal vision. The study was approved by the local 
ethics committee. All students participated in exchange for course credits or for 
money (10 Euro). 
Stimuli 
In the Go/noGo task, visual stimuli consisted of an arrow (subtending 11.4◦ 
×0.05◦ of visual angle at a 60 cm viewing distance), that was presented in the 
center of a white homogenous background, and oriented either upward or 
downward (see Figure 1). The arrow was first black, and could then turn either 
green or turquoise. These two colors were matched for luminance. These 
different combinations of color and orientation were used as cues in the 
Go/noGo task. 
In the evaluative categorization task, targets were 30 positive and 30 
negative words, either nouns or adjectives (see Table 1), and were selected from 
the Dutch affective rating list of Hermans and De Houwer (1994). T-tests showed 
that these positive and negative words differed significantly on the affective 
dimension, t(58) = 36.57, p < .001,ηp²= .95, but not on the familiarity dimension, t 
< 1, nor with respect to the number of letters, t < 1. 
  
EVALUATION OF ACTIONS  141 
  
Table 1.  
Target words selected from the Dutch affective rating list of Hermans and De 
Houwer (1994) 
Positive targets Negative targets 
Hawaii (Hawaii) trouw (fidelity) ruw (rude) stank (stench) 
engel (angel) lente (spring) haat (hate) drugs (drugs) 
goud (gold) baby (baby) moord (murder) virus (virus) 
regenboog (rainbow) parfum (parfume) aids (aids) puist (pustule) 
bruid (bride) knuffel (hug) vals (false) zweer (sore) 
applaus (applause) feest (part) pijn (pain) oorlog (war) 
hemel (heaven) oprecht (sincere) dief (thief) kanker (cancer) 
geboorte (birth) zomer (summer) dood (dead) hitler (hitler) 
vrede (peace) humor (humor) graf (tomb) geweren (guns) 
spel (game) bloemen (flowers) sluw (sly) ongeval (accident) 
geschenk (gift) omhelzing (embrace) hoer (hore) brutaal (impudent) 
cadeau (present) vakantie (holiday) koud (cold) vulgair (vulgar) 
trots (proud) droom (dream) zwak (weak) ongezond (unhealthy) 
melodie (melody) leven (life) spin (spider) hatelijk (hasty) 
romantiek (romanticism) liefde (love) vuil (dirty) vijandig (hostile) 
Procedure 
Participants performed a standard speeded Go/noGo task (Vocat et al., 
2008) interleaved with a visual word categorization task (see Figure 1). Actions 
performed during the speeded Go/noGo task actually served as primes whereas 
words were deemed targets in analogy with a conventional prime-target 
sequence during evaluative priming. Each trial started with a fixation cross that 
lasted for 500 ms. Afterwards, a black arrow, either oriented up or down, was 
presented at the position previously occupied by the fixation cross. After a 
variable interval ranging from 1000 ms to 2000 ms, the black arrow became 
either green or turquoise while its orientation could either remain identical or 
shift in the opposite direction compared to the initial black arrow. When the 
black arrow turned green and the orientation remained unchanged, participants 
were instructed to press a pre-defined button of the response box as fast as 
possible with the index finger of their left hand (Go trials). However, participants 
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had to withhold responding when either the arrow became green but changed 
orientation, or when the arrow became turquoise and kept its initial orientation, 
enabling two noGo trial types. Instructions emphasized both speed and accuracy, 
such that not only accuracy, but also the perceived speed was later evaluated as 
being correct or incorrect. For each trial, speed was evaluated using an 
individually calibrated RT limit computed during a training block that preceded 
each session of two test blocks. This limit was thus calculated and updated three 
times in total (before Blocks 1 and 2 – Session 1, before Blocks 3 and 4 – Session 
2, and before Blocks 5 and 6 – Session 3). This allowed us to deal with unspecific 
learning effects over time and maintain a similar number of correct and incorrect 
responses throughout the experiment. For the first session, the upper limit was 
set to 70% of the mean RT from the first training block. For the two subsequent 
sessions, this upper limit was updated and set to 80% of the mean RT during the 
respective training block. Hence, this procedure required participants to respond 
at least 30% faster (first session) or 20% faster (second and third sessions) on Go 
trials than their average speed during the respective training block. This 
procedure ensured a sufficient number of response errors on noGo trials and 
allowed us to distinguish between Fast Hits (i.e. responses on Go trials that were 
emitted more quickly than the individually-titrated RT limit) or Slow Hits (i.e. 
responses on Go trials that took longer than the RT limit). Errors were formally 
defined as overt responses on noGo trials (i.e. FAs), while correct inhibitions 
corresponded to withheld responses on the same noGo trials. 
Three hundred milliseconds after an action was executed, a target word 
was presented. The same 300 ms SOA was used in Experiment 2 because this 
experiment was mainly run to provide a replication of the results obtained in 
Experiment 1. The SOA was set to 600 ms in Experiment 3 and to 1000 ms in 
Experiment 4 in order to assess whether an evaluative priming effect was 
sensitive to the time elapsed between prime (action) and target (word). For 
correct inhibitions, the target word was presented 1500 ms after the 
presentation of the colored arrow plus the length of the SOA. Participants were 
instructed to categorize the valence of the target word (positive or negative) as 
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fast and as accurately as possible by pressi
response box using their dominant hand. Hence, the evaluative word 
categorization task was executed with a different effector than the Go/noGo 
task. The target word remained on the screen until the participant responded
3000 ms elapsed. In order to balance the presentation of positive vs. negative 
words following Fast Hits, Slow Hits, Correct Inhibitions, and FAs, the target word 
that was presented following an action was selected randomly on each trial. 
After the word categorization, participants received feedback informing them 
about their accuracy for the two consecutive tasks. The feedback for the 
Go/noGo task indicated whether the performed action was correct (and fast 
enough), incorrect or too slow, while the fee
could be either correct or incorrect. Both feedback signals remained on the 
screen for 2000 ms. 
Figure 1. Stimuli and task. Participants had to respond by pressing a button of the response box 
as fast as possible with their non
initial orientation (A), but not otherwise (B).
After a practice phase including 24 trials, the experiment was divided into 3 
sessions, each starting with a training block (containing 28 t
 
ng one of two predefined keys of the 
dback for the word categorization 
-dominant hand only when the arrow became green and kept its 
 
rials: 20 Go and 8 
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 or 
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noGo trials), followed by two test blocks (each containing 72 trials: 48 Go and 24 
noGo trials). Note that participants were unaware that training blocks were 
actually used as calibration blocks to compute the RT limit used during the two 
following test blocks. Trial presentation was randomized within blocks. Between 
blocks, a small break (no longer than 5 min) was introduced. The whole 
experiment included 540 trials and lasted on average 50 min. Stimulus 
presentation and response recording were controlled using E-prime software 
(V2.0., http://www.pstnet.com/products/e-prime/). 
Accuracy and RTs (correct responses) for the evaluative word 
categorization task were analyzed using repeated measures analyses of variance 
(ANOVAs) as a function of (i) the valence of the target word (either positive or 
negative) and (ii) the type of action (FA, Fast Hit or Slow Hit) preceding word 
presentation. We did not include in these analyses RTs and errors for target 
categorization when a response on noGo trials was correctly inhibited because 
no overt (Go) action was performed in this condition. Additional statistical 
analyses confirmed that the evaluative categorization was not influenced by 
these preceding correct inhibitions as the speed to categorize negative words did 
not differ significantly from the speed to categorize positive words (all Ts < 1 in 
Experiments 1-4). 
After completion of the three experimental sessions, the Dutch version of 
the trait version of the Spielberger State-Trait Anxiety Inventory (STAI) (Defares, 
van der Ploeg, & Spielberger, 1979; Spielberger, 1983) was filled out by the 
participants. 
RESULTS 
In all four experiments, trials with RTs shorter than 150 ms or longer than 
500 ms in the Go/noGo task were discarded, as were trials in which the RT on the 
evaluative categorization task exceeded 2.5 SD from the mean RT per condition 
(see Table 2). Two participants (female) were not included in the statistical 
analyses of the data of Experiment 4 because they did not commit sufficient (i.e. 
minimum 10) FAs to compute reliable accuracy or RT estimates for each 
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condition separately (i.e. positive words following FAs vs. negative words 
following FAs). Hence, in Experiment 4, only the data of the remaining 18 
participants were included in the analysis. 
Table 2. 
Percentages outlier trials in the Go/noGo task (< 150 ms or > 500 ms) and in the 
evaluative categorization task (< or > than RTs ± 2.5 SD) 
  
 
Exp 1 Exp 2 Exp 3 Exp 4 
Criterium Condition M SEM M SEM M SEM M SEM 
< 150 ms FAs 4.25 1.27 3.02 0.87 5.78 1.33 6.63 2.21 
 
Fast 6.69 2.02 4.47 1.76 9.34 2.40 10.44 4.33 
> 500 ms FAs 3.04 1.71 0.90 0.32 2.37 1.36 2.81 0.97 
 
Slow 6.45 1.11 3.73 1.23 7.90 1.92 7.16 1.08 
> or <than Negative 2.89 0.21 2.91 0.22 5.60 1.13 3.30 0.21 
RTs ± 2.5 SD Positive 2.82 0.15 3.10 0.28 3.30 0.76 3.38 0.19 
Evaluative Categorization Task 
Speed 
In Experiment 1, the ANOVA performed on the mean RTs for correct 
responses revealed a significant interaction effect between action type and word 
type, F(2, 40) = 13.51, p < .001, ηp²= .40. This interaction resulted from faster 
evaluative categorizations when the valence of the word was congruent with the 
putative affective value of the action. More specifically, RTs for negative words 
following FAs were shorter compared to RTs for positive words following FAs, 
t(20) = -2.57, p < .05, ηp²= .25, while symmetrically, participants tended to 
categorize positive words faster compared to negative words when they 
followed Fast Hits, t(20) = 1.81, p = .08, ηp²= .14. Following Slow Hits, no 
significant RT difference emerged between negative and positive words, t < 1. 
The main effect of word type was not significant, F < 1. By contrast, the ANOVA 
revealed a significant main effect of action type, F(2, 40) = 26.04, p < .001, ηp² = 
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.57, reflecting longer RTs for words following FAs1 compared to words following 
either Fast Hits, F(1, 20) = 30.00, p < .001, ηp² = .60, or Slow Hits, F(1, 20) = 30.25, 
p < .001, ηp² = .60, an effect in line with a systematic post-error slowing 
(Danielmeier & Ullsperger, 2011; Rabbitt, 1966). Shorter RTs were also observed 
for words following Fast Hits compared to Slow Hits, F(1, 20) = 6.10, p < .05, ηp² = 
.23 (see Figure 2A). 
An almost identical interaction effect between action type and word type 
was found in Experiment 2, F(1, 28) = 13.60, p < .001, ηp² = .49, and Experiment 
3, F(2, 42) = 14.62, p < .001, ηp² = .41, but not in Experiment 4, F < 1
2. Also no 
effect of word type was observed for Experiments 2-4 (Experiment 2: F(1, 28) = 
2.02, p > .10, ηp² = .13; Experiment 3: F(1, 42) = 1.56, p > .10, ηp² = .07; 
Experiment 4:F < 1, ηp² = .02) while the post-error slowing effect was observed in 
all experiments (Experiment 2: F(2, 40) = 26.80, p < .001, ηp² = .66; Experiment 3: 
F(2, 42) = 5.13, p < .05, ηp² = .20; Experiment 4: F(2, 34) = 15.49, p < .001, ηp² = 
.48; see Figure 2BCD). 
                                                      
1
Because this general RT slowing following FAs compared to Fast Hits might lead to an 
artificial increase in evaluative priming for FAs compared to Fast Hits, we also analyzed log 
transformed RTs. This analysis confirmed a significant interaction effect between action type and 
word type, F(2, 40) = 16.41, p< .001, ηp²=.45. RTs for negative words following FAs were shorter 
compared to RTs for positive words following FAs, t(20) = -2.23, p = .04, ηp²= .20, while 
participants categorized positive words faster compared to negative words when they followed 
Fast Hits, t(20) = 3.71, p< .001, ηp²= .41. 
2
We performed an omnibus ANOVA on the RT data collected across the four experiments 
to verify that the categorization of the target word was reliably influenced by the putative 
affective value of the preceding action, only when a short (Experiments 1 and 2) but not long SOA 
(Experiment 4) was used between these two events, consistent with our prediction. This analysis 
confirmed a significant three-way interaction between action type, word type and SOA, F(4, 146) 
= 3.96, p < .01, ηp² = .10. 
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Figure 2. Mean RTs (+ 1standard error of the mean (SEM)for bars) for co
categorizations as a function of prime type (FA, Fast Hit or Slow Hit) and word type (Negative or 
Positive Words) in (A) Experiment 1 (SOA = 300ms), (B) Experiment 2 (SOA = 300 ms), (C) 
Experiment 3 (SOA = 600 ms) and (D) Experiment 4 (SOA
Accuracy 
In Experiment 1, the ANOVA p
responses) revealed a significant interaction between action type (FA, Fast Hit, 
Slow Hit) and word type (Negative Word, Positive Word), 
ηp² = .23. This interaction indicated that participants were less accurate to 
categorize words as positive following FAs, compared to negative words 
following FAs, t(20) = 2.81, 
categorizing positive vs. 
>.10,ηp² = .09, or Slow Hits, 
main effect of action type approached significance, 
.13, indicating higher accurac
7.58, p < .05, ηp² = .28 (see Table 3). Finally, the main effect of word type was not 
significant, F < 1. 
A similar interaction between action type and word type was observed in 
Experiment 2, F(1, 28) = 14.
14.62, p < .001, ηp² = .41, but not in Experiment 4, 
 
rrect evaluative 
 = 1000ms). * p< .05. 
erformed on accuracy data (i.e.
F(2, 40) = 6.05. 
p < .05, ηp² = .28. Accuracy was similar for 
negative words following either Fast Hits, t(20) = 
t(20) = -1.01, p > .10, ηp² = .05. Furthermore, the 
F(2, 40) = 3.00, 
y following Fast Hits compared to FAs, 
39, p < .001, ηp² = .51, and Experiment 3, 
F(1, 34) = 1.63, 
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 % correct 
p< .01, 
-1.38, p 
p = .06, ηp² = 
F(1, 40) = 
F(2, 42) = 
p > .10, ηp² = 
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.09. Also, a similar effect of action type was observed in Experiments 2-4 
(Experiment 2: F(2, 28) = 4.17, p < .05, ηp² = .23; Experiment 3, F(2, 42) = 9.28, p < 
.001, ηp² = .30; Experiment 4, F(2, 34) = 8.17, p = .001, ηp² = .33). A significant 
effect of word type was observed in Experiment 2, F(1, 28) = 6.11, p < .05, ηp² = 
.30 and Experiment 3, F(1, 42) = 6.56, p < .05, ηp² = .24, with less accurate 
categorizing for negative compared to positive words. This effect was not 
observed in Experiment 4, F(1, 34) = 1.63, p > .10, ηp² = .09 (see Table 3). 
Table 3. 
Mean accuracy (% correct responses) in the evaluative categorization task. 
Exp 1 Exp 2  Exp 3  Exp 4  
    Neg Pos Neg Pos Neg Pos Neg Pos 
FAs M 94.72 89.50 98.06 90.36 97.34 86.01 96.17 92.39 
SEM 1.83 1.66 0.92 1.43 0.72 3.07 1.69 2.31 
Fast Hits M 94.27 95.92 98.14 97.39 96.07 97.27 98.56 98.28 
SEM 1.25 1.18 0.80 1.31 0.95 0.71 0.40 0.43 
Slow Hits M 92.48 94.11 95.96 96.58 95.52 97.62 97.67 97.39 
  SEM 1.75 1.29 1.66 0.64 0.62 0.52 0.58 0.51 
Note. Exp = Experiment, Neg = Negative,Pos = Positive 
Go/noGo task 
To explore performance during the Go/noGo task, we analyzed the number 
and speed of executed actions during that task as a function of action type (FA, 
Fast Hit, Slow Hit). The analysis of the number of actions revealed a significant 
main effect, F(2, 40) = 50.57, p < .001, ηp² = .72. The number of FAs was 
significantly smaller than the number of Fast Hits, t(20) = -5.50, p < .001, ηp² = 
.60. Moreover, participants made significantly less Fast Hits compared to Slow 
Hits, t(20) = -4.501, p < .001, ηp² = .50. As expected, a significant main effect of 
action type was also observed for speed, F(2, 40) = 275.36, p < .001, ηp² = .93. RTs 
for Slow Hits were longer than RTs for Fast Hits, t(20) = -24.37, p < .001, ηp² = .97, 
while RTs for FAs were shorter than RTs for Slow Hits, t(20) = 3.14, p = .005, ηp² = 
.94, but longer than RTs for Fast Hits, t(20) = -17.38, p < .001, ηp² = .33 (see Table 
EVALUATION OF ACTIONS  149 
  
4). A similar main effect of action type on the number of actions and speed was 
also observed in Experiments 2-4 (see Table 4). 
Table 4. 
Mean accuracy (number),latencies (ms) and effect sizes during the Go/noGo task. 
      Exp 1 Exp 2 Exp 3 Exp 4 
Accuracy FAs M 58.10 60.47 61.73 45.89 
SEM 6.33 5.73 6.10 5.20 
Fast Hits M 106.00 78.87 102.45 98.67 
SEM 6.62 10.49 8.33 9.31 
Slow Hits M 162.00 198.20 162.55 165.39 
SEM 6.27 11.02 8.45 8.97 
Effect of action ηp² .72*** .76*** .60*** .70*** 
FA vs. Fast ηp² .60*** .14 .33** .56*** 
FA vs. Slow ηp² .03 .69*** .90*** .30* 
Fast vs. Slow ηp² .50 .90*** .39** .45** 
Speed FAs M 234.7 222.40 223.78 229.00 
SEM 5.33 2.66 4.62 5.69 
Fast Hits M 221.77 204.93 209.25 223.50 
SEM 6.34 5.76 7.23 8.32 
Slow Hits M 307.50 276.60 286.51 301.61 
SEM 7.02 3.80 8.32 8.12 
Effect of action ηp² .93*** .91*** .60*** .88*** 
FA vs. Fast ηp² .33*** .44** .36** .06 
  FA vs. Slow ηp² .94** .96*** .85*** .90*** 
Note. * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001 
Relation between trait anxiety levels and the magnitude of the evaluative 
priming effect 
To put to the test our third prediction, we assessed whether levels of trait 
anxiety of our participants were related to the size of the evaluative priming 
effect. To address this, for each participant of Experiments 1-3 (i.e. all 
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experiments in which a significant evaluative priming effect was found), the 
magnitude of evaluative priming was calculated as the difference in RT between 
incongruent action-word pairs (i.e.
congruent action-word pairs (i.e.
this difference score, the higher the influence of the preceding affective value of 
the action on the current evaluative categorization. Using a standard Pearson 
coefficient correlation analysis, we found across participants of Experiments 1
a significant negative correlation between levels of trait anxiety and these 
evaluative priming scores, ,
showed that participants with higher levels of trait anxiety had a smaller 
evaluative priming effect. When including the non
results of Experiment 4 in this analysis, the correlation w
r = -.19, p > .10. 
Figure 3. Significant negative correlation between evaluative priming effect [measured as the 
difference in RT latency between incongruent trials (i.e.
congruent trials (i.e. FAs-Negative and Fast Hits
using a standard questionnaire, see Methods). This correlation was calculated for participants of 
Experiments 1-3 together where a significant evaluative priming effect was 
 
 
  
 FA–positive and Fast Hit–negative) and 
 FA–negative and Fast Hit–positive). The larger 
 r = -.28, p < .05 (see Figure 3). This correlation 
-significant evaluative priming 
as no longer significant, 
 FAs-Positive and Fast Hits
-Positive)] and levels of trait anxiety (measured 
evidenced.
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-Negative) and 
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DISCUSSION 
The results of our experiments reveal that simple self-generated actions 
during a speeded Go/noGo task are swiftly evaluated along a negative-positive 
dimension. This internal appraisal influences the valence categorization of an 
immediately following target word, even though these two different and non-
overlapping events (i.e. action and word) belong to two clearly separated tasks 
performed with two different effectors. Our findings have several important 
implications that we address below.  
Affective value of the action primes evaluative categorization 
We are the first to report evaluative priming effects that are triggered by 
the putative affective value which is rapidly and in an online manner assigned to 
self-generated actions (correct vs. incorrect) via an internal meta cognitive 
feedback mechanism (Fernandez-Duque, Baird, & Posner, 2000; Winkielman, 
Schwarz, Fazendeiro, & Reber, 2003). These evaluative priming effects suggest 
that FAs were evaluated as more negative compared to Hits (either Fast or Slow, 
see results of Experiments 1-3) while Fast Hits were evaluated as more positive 
compared to FAs (see results of Experiments 2-3). Therefore, our behavioral 
results go beyond earlier studies showing that different psycho physiological 
reactions, like larger skin conductance responses, greater heart rate deceleration 
and larger startle potentiation usually follow incorrect compared to correct 
actions (Hajcak & Foti, 2008; Hajcak et al., 2003b). The novel contribution of our 
study is to show that beyond these enhanced arousal or attention orienting 
effects following the detection of these adverse events, dedicated internal 
monitoring systems enable organisms to rapidly map specific affective values 
(either negative or positive) onto self-generated actions (either incorrect or 
correct). This mechanism appears to operate along a genuine valence dimension, 
which is not restricted to errors or a specific class of deviant outcomes (De Bruijn 
et al., 2009). In addition to showing that actions performed during a simple 
Go/noGo task are actually quickly evaluated as negative or positive, our results 
suggest that this affective marking of the action functions at an abstract level of 
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action representation, as opposed to being bound to a specific motor output or 
command. The latter conclusion is supported by the fact that the exact same key 
presses were performed for correct (either Fast or Slow Hits) and incorrect 
actions (FAs) during our Go/noGo task. This abstract online affective appraisal of 
the action may in fact concern goal conduciveness (Frijda, 1987; Scherer, 1984, 
1988), that is, an evaluation of whether an action is conducive (positive/Fast 
Hits) or obstructive (negative/FAs) for reaching the goals set out by the Go/NoGo 
task. 
For FAs, we not only observed evaluative priming but also post-error 
slowing (Laming, 1979; Rabbitt, 1966) as indicated by slower evaluative 
categorizations following FAs than hits (either fast or slow). However, this 
general slowing effect did not interact with the evaluative priming effect. This 
lack of interaction suggests that the perceived accuracy of actions is quickly 
evaluated and used to guide future emotional as well as cognitive processing. 
Whereas post-error slowing likely deals with enhanced cognitive or attention 
control aimed at preventing errors to repeat over time (Botvinick, Braver, Barch, 
Carter, & Cohen, 2001; Notebaert et al., 2009), evaluative priming seems to 
reflect the online and internal tagging of a specific affective value (negative vs. 
positive) to a particular action (incorrect vs. correct). This idea is supported by 
the observation that the size of the evaluative priming effect did reliably 
correlate (negatively) with levels of trait anxiety (r = -.28, p< .05) while no such 
relationship was found between anxiety and post-error slowing (r = -.004, p = 
.98) even though evaluative priming and post-error slowing were clearly related 
to one another (r = .42, p = .001). This relationship between evaluative priming 
and post-error slowing suggests that the emotional tagging of the action may be 
boosted if more efforts are exerted to prevent errors to reoccur, consistent with 
recent theoretical accounts (see Verguts, Notebaert, Kunde, & Wuhr, 2011). 
More generally, our new results are compatible with recent neuroscience 
findings showing that not only cognitive control systems are involved in action 
monitoring (and they likely include regions of the dorsal ACC besides deeper 
dopaminergic midbrain structures; see Klein et al., 2007), but also emotion 
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control systems (including the amygdala) play an important role in this process, 
at a similar early latency following action execution (see Pourtois et al., 2010). 
Functional properties of automatic evaluation of actions 
Another important new result of our study concerns the actual time-course 
of the action-word evaluative priming effect. It is well established that especially 
at short intervals (SOA) between the prime and the target, a substantial priming 
effect is observed (Fazio et al., 1986; Hermans, De Houwer, & Eelen, 2001). Here 
we found that the putative affective value of action influenced the subsequent 
evaluative categorization process only if the SOA was either 300 ms or 600 ms. 
However, we did not find a similar evaluative priming effect with an SOA of 1000 
ms, whereas previous studies with word primes failed to find an effect with SOAs 
longer than 300 ms. This discrepancy might be due to the task-relevance of the 
(action) prime in our experiments. More specifically, whereas the action primes 
in our experiments were self-generated and informative regarding performance 
on the Go/NoGo task, the prime words in previous studies were provided by the 
experimenter and essentially irrelevant for any task.  
Finally, we observed that the evaluative priming effect was clearly related 
to the level of trait anxiety of our participants, as the evaluative priming effect 
became smaller with increasing levels of trait anxiety. This observation is in 
accordance with results from evaluative priming studies using external stimuli as 
primes that already reported blunted priming effects in high anxious participants 
(Berner & Maier, 2004; Glaser & Banaji, 1999; Maier, Berner, & Pekrun, 2003). 
More generally, this significant correlation is consistent with previous action-
monitoring studies which have shown that high trait anxious participants usually 
exhibit action-monitoring deficits, indicated by impairments to decode or read 
out the actual value of their actions using internal monitoring processes and 
swiftly relate it to (positive or negative) external performance feedback 
information presented in the environment (Aarts & Pourtois, 2012; Hajcak, 
McDonald, & Simons, 2003a). Consistent with this view, a correlational analysis 
showed that participants with higher levels of trait anxiety exhibited a blunted 
evaluative priming effect. Hence, these results suggest that in these individuals, 
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the rapid attribution process linking a specific value (either positive or negative) 
to an action (either correct or not) may somewhat be impaired, such that their 
online and internal action-monitoring processes can in turn only weakly prime 
the immediately following evaluative categorization process. Alternatively, high 
anxious participants may show less priming than low anxious participants if they 
have a bias to focus exaggeratedly their attention on internal representations 
(Eysenck, 1992; Muris et al., 2005). However, this alternative account appears 
unlikely because high anxious participants were as fast (non-significant action 
type x word type x anxiety level interaction: F(2, 148) = 1.14, p> .10) and accurate 
(non-significant action type x word type x anxiety level interaction: F< 1) as low 
anxious participants in orienting towards the target word following the action. 
Likewise, high and low anxious participants emitted a similar number of FAs, 
t(74) = -1.36, p > .10, nor did they differ in response speed, t< 1, during the 
speeded Go/noGo task. Hence, the present results also suggest that our new 
action-word evaluative priming paradigm may be suited to reveal specific 
impairments in action-monitoring processes, such as observed in 
psychopathological conditions or in individuals with certain personality traits 
(e.g. enhanced levels of trait anxiety). 
Conclusions 
The results of this study show, for the first time, that the valence of simple 
self-generated actions is swiftly appraised. Unwanted FAs made during a simple 
Go/noGo task are actually perceived as more negative events compared to Fast 
Hits, while the latter events are perceived as more positive than the former 
outcomes. This affective appraisal of the action is in all likelihood based on the 
actual perceived goal conduciveness of the action, as achieved through a rapid 
and efficient internal action-monitoring process. If a target word is presented 
within 600 ms following one of these two actions and shares the same intrinsic 
valence as the goal conducive or obstructive action, then participants are quicker 
and better at categorizing this word as either positive or negative, revealing a 
genuine action-word evaluative priming effect. No such effect is seen if 1000 ms 
elapses between the action and the onset of the target word, suggesting that 
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this effect is short-lived and automatic. Finally, this effect is blunted in 
participants showing enhanced levels of trait anxiety, suggesting that (i) it is most 
likely the affective value of the action used as prime which is driving this strong 
evaluative priming effect; (ii) these participants have action-monitoring 
difficulties in linking specific affective values (either positive or negative) to their 
self-generated actions (either correct or incorrect). 
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CHAPTER 6: DIFFERENTIAL AFFECTIVE COLORING OF SELF-
GENERATED ERRORS VS. CORRECT RESPONSES: EVIDENCE FROM ERPS 
“The accuracy of simple actions is swiftly determined through specific 
monitoring brain systems. Event-related brain potential (ERP) studies have shown 
that error commission is associated with the generation of the error-related 
negativity (ERN/Ne), an early action-monitoring component following response 
onset. However, the exact functional meaning of this automatic evaluation of 
actions remains unclear. Whereas some studies have emphasized that it primarily 
reflects a basic reinforcement learning signal, other authors have suggested that 
it also indexes a motivational-significance effect, given that response errors 
usually call for rapid changes in the behavior, and have a negative connotation. 
In this study, we used a new method to decode indirectly the affective value of 
simple actions generated by participants during a standard Go/noGo task. 
Immediately after each response on the Go/noGo stimulus, participants 
categorized the valence of either a positive or a negative word. EEG was recorded 
concurrently. Behavioral results showed that response errors performed during 
the Go/noGo task led to a faster evaluative categorization of negative compared 
to positive words, with a symmetric result obtained following correct actions. 
Remarkably, this RT facilitation for the word (i.e. evaluative priming effect) was 
positively correlated to the magnitude of the early negative ERP component 
generated 300 ms earlier in response to the Go/noGo stimulus. Moreover, we 
found that whereas response errors influenced early perceptual stages of 
emotion word processing (EPN effect), correct responses mainly influenced a later 
process during emotion word processing (LPP effect). These results suggest that 
response errors are automatically assessed as more negative events compared to 
correct actions, an affective effect that can be captured by amplitude variations 
at the level of the ERN/Ne component. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In daily life situations, we have to rapidly evaluate the outcome of our self-
generated actions, and adapt our behavior appropriately when a potential 
mismatch is detected between the actual and the intended or desired action. 
Although this evaluative process seems to be largely automatic, few studies have 
actually corroborated this assumption and focused on a better characterization 
of the rapid and effortless decoding of the affective value of self-generated 
actions. According to the reinforcement learning framework (Frank, Woroch, & 
Curran, 2005; Holroyd & Coles, 2002), the accuracy of self-generated actions is 
swiftly determined via dedicated fronto-striatal loops in the brain. These 
monitoring systems quickly detect any deviance between the actual and 
intended or desired action, and in turn trigger a cascade of alerting reactions and 
remedial processes, when such a discrepancy is noticed (Rabbitt, 1966). Previous 
studies have shown that these alerting reactions concern not only changes in 
cognitive control, but also in emotion control brain processes (Carter et al., 1998; 
Hajcak & Foti, 2008; MacDonald, Cohen, Stenger, & Carter, 2000; Ochsner & 
Gross, 2005; Ridderinkhof, Nieuwenhuis, & Braver, 2007; van Veen & Carter, 
2006) . For example, self-generated response errors committed during standard 
laboratory interference tasks have been associated with larger skin conductance 
reactions and a greater heart rate deceleration than correct actions (Hajcak et 
al., 2003b), as well as a larger startle potentiation (Hajcak & Foti, 2008), and 
differential early activation in the amygdala (Pourtois et al., 2010). 
In a recent study (Aarts, De Houwer & Pourtois, in revision), we sought to 
assess whether self-generated actions were indeed not only swiftly marked as 
being correct or not by these putative reinforcement learning systems, but also 
as being good or bad, and hence quickly appraised along an affective dimension. 
To address this question, we developed a new paradigm in which actions 
performed by participants during a standard Go/noGo task were immediately 
followed by evaluative words (either positive or negative) requiring overt 
discrimination. We conjectured that if actions (serving as primes) were 
automatically appraised along an affective dimension, then the processing of the 
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valence of the immediately following word (serving as targets) should 
systematically be influenced at the behavioral level, as reflected in an evaluative 
priming effect (Fazio, Sanbonmatsu, Powell, & Kardes, 1986; Hermans, De 
Houwer, & Eelen, 1994): participants should be faster at categorizing negative 
words following errors compared to positive words, but faster for positive than 
for negative words following correct actions. The results of our behavioral study 
confirmed these predictions (see Aarts et al., in revision). Therefore, these 
results suggest that self-generated actions are quickly tagged by meta-cognitive 
systems (Fernandez-Duque, Baird, & Posner, 2000; Winkielman, Schwarz, 
Fazendeiro, & Reber, 2003) not only as being correct or not, but also as being 
good or bad. In the present study, we used event-related potentials (ERP) 
methods to gain insight into the electrophysiological time-course and possible 
manifestations of this evaluative priming effect. 
Previous ERP studies have already shed light on the electrophysiological 
markers of action evaluation or performance monitoring. More specifically, 
several converging ERP studies described a specific ERP component associated 
with the early detection of response errors within the anterior cingulate cortex 
(ACC) (i.e. the error-related negativity – ERN, or negativity error - Ne; Dehaene, 
Posner, & Tucker; Falkenstein, Hohnsbein, Hoormann, & Blanke, 1991; Gehring, 
Coles, Meyer, & Donchin, 1990; Gehring, Goss, Coles, Meyer, & Donchin, 1993). 
The ERN/Ne corresponds to a negative deflection peaking ~ 50 ms following the 
(motor) onset of an error, with a maximum amplitude over fronto-central 
midline recording sites, consistent with underlying brain generators likely located 
in the ACC (Dehaene et al., 1994; Holroyd, Dien, & Coles, 1998; van Veen & 
Carter, 2002). Correct actions performed under speed pressure are also 
associated with the generation of a similar but smaller, negative component at 
the same fronto-central recording sites and early latency following response 
onset (i.e. the correct-related negativity (CRN); Allain, Carbonnell, Falkenstein, 
Burle, & Vidal, 2004; Vidal, Burle, Bonnet, Grapperon, & Hasbroucq, 2003; Vidal, 
Hasbroucq, Grapperon, & Bonnet, 2000). The CRN is probably sharing generic 
brain generators in the ACC with the ERN/Ne (Roger, Bénar, Vidal, Hasbroucq, & 
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Burle, 2010). This early action-monitoring deflection (ERN/Ne-errors; CRN-
correct responses) is usually followed by a large error-related component, the 
error-positivity (Pe), which peaks ~200 - 400 ms post-response onset over 
centro-parietal recording sites along the midline (Falkenstein, Hohnsbein, 
Hoormann, & Blanke, 1991; Falkenstein, Hoormann, Christ, & Hohnsbein, 2000; 
Nieuwenhuis, Ridderinkhof, Blow, Band, & Kok, 2001; Overbeek, Nieuwenhuis, & 
Ridderinkhof, 2005). Unlike the ERN/Ne that is reflecting an automatic (in the 
sense of preconscious) stage of error detection, the Pe is thought to reflect a 
more elaborate, perhaps conscious stage of error detection, likely reflecting the 
accumulation of evidence that an error has been committed (Nieuwenhuis et al., 
2001; Steinhauser & Yeung, 2010) 
Although the ERN/Ne is thought to reflect primarily a reinforcement 
learning “mismatch” signal that rapidly informs about a discrepancy between the 
actual and the expected motor outcome (Frank et al., 2005; Holroyd & Coles, 
2002) or perhaps about the occurrence of a response conflict between an 
erroneous and error-correcting response Botvinick, Braver, Barch, Carter, & 
Cohen, 2001, other studies have emphasized the link between the (size of the) 
ERN/Ne and concurrent changes in motivation or affect. Overactive error-
monitoring processes and increased ERN/Ne (but not Pe) amplitudes have for 
example been observed in patients with obsessive compulsive disorders 
(Endrass, Klawohn, Schuster, & Kathmann, 2008; Gehring, Himle, & Nisenson, 
2000; Hajcak & Simons, 2002; Johannes et al., 2001; Nieuwenhuis, Nielen, Mol, 
Hajcak, & Veltman, 2005), in healthy students showing higher levels of sub 
clinical trait anxiety (Aarts & Pourtois, 2010; Hajcak, McDonald, & Simons, 2003a; 
Moser, Moran, & Jendrusina, 2012) or negative affect (Hajcak, McDonald, & 
Simons, 2004). In line with these studies, Luu, Collins, & Tucker (2000) initially 
suggested that the ERN/Ne component may reflect a negative motivational or 
affective reaction to errors, even though, no study to date has formally linked 
amplitude-changes at the level of the ERN/Ne to the (implicit) differential 
emotional or motivational processing of these adverse or negative events. A first 
goal of our study was to assess whether such a brain-behavior relationship could 
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be found, given that our previous study confirmed that self-generated response 
errors were “automatically” marked as more negative compared to correct 
actions (see Aarts et al., in revision). More specifically, we sought to demonstrate 
that if the ERN/Ne reflects the automatic affective evaluation of self-generated 
actions, then its amplitude might be related to the evaluative priming effect or to 
how fast participants categorized the emotional words following actions are 
either positive or negative. Such an outcome would provide more direct (possibly 
causal) evidence for the involvement of this early action-monitoring ERP 
component in the automatic affective marking of self-generated actions (Luu et 
al., 2000; Pourtois et al., 2010). 
Moreover, the use of ERP methods enabled us to track the time-course of 
the action-word evaluative priming effect. Hence, the second main goal of our 
study what to use this time-resolved neurophysiological technique to better 
characterize when precisely following emotional word onset the processing of 
the valence of the word was substantially influenced by the affective value of the 
just preceding self-generated action. To address this question, we primarily 
focused on two specific time intervals/components following emotional word 
onset during which reliable differential effects of the emotional valence and/or 
arousal value of the word were systematically found across several earlier ERP 
studies, namely the EPN and LPP (Kissler, Assadollahi, & Herbert, 2006). 
Depending on the task demands and specific verbal stimulus sets used, early, late 
or a combination of both effects can be seen following (written) emotional word 
onset. Usually an enhanced early posterior negativity (EPN) has been found ~ 
200-250 ms post-stimulus onset for emotional in comparison to neutral words 
(Herbert, Junghöfer, & Kissler, 2008; Kissler, Herbert, Peyk, & Junghöfer, 2007; 
Kissler, Herbert, Winkler, & Junghöfer, 2009; Schacht & Sommer, 2009a). 
Emotional words also lead to a larger ERP signal than neutral words at the level 
of the P300 component (Naumann, Bartussek, Diedrich, & Laufer, 1992) or the 
Late Positive Potential - LPP (Naumann et al., 1992). These two differential ERP 
effects (EPN and LPP) for emotional relative to neutral words are thought to be 
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related primarily to the processing of the arousal value of the words (Kissler et 
al., 2006). 
As it turned out, the action-word sequence led to a substantial distortion of 
the ERP signal time-locked to the onset of the emotional words in our study. This 
distortion was primarily accounted for by large residual effects (occurring in the 
pre-stimulus baseline) of the preceding actions (especially in the case of 
response errors eliciting prominent ERN/Ne and Pe components) onto the visual 
ERP generated in response to the emotional words. These words were always 
presented 300 ms (fixed interval) following action execution, in accordance with 
our previous behavioral study (Aarts et al., in revision) where we found that this 
specific interval between the offset of the action and the onset of the word was 
optimal to obtain a reliable evaluative priming effect. However, this specific 
setting was apparently not compatible with the recording of artifact-free ERP 
components generated in response to the visual emotional words. To overcome 
this limitation and to be able to identify nonetheless reliable EPN and LPP-like 
effects with high confidence, participants performed an additional “localizer” 
experiment. In this auxiliary experiment, the negative and positive words 
presented during the main evaluative categorization task were presented now in 
isolation (without any interfering actions embedded between these visual 
stimuli) and in random order, in addition to neutral words used as a control 
condition. The ERP data recorded during this localizer allowed us to carefully 
characterize, using an independent ERP data set, the emotion-related EPN and 
LPP effects related to the differential processing of these emotional written 
words, compared to neutral words. During this localizer experiment, participants 
performed a standard one-back task (requiring the detection of rare, immediate 
repetitions of the same words) in order to balance task demands and attention 
across these three conditions (i.e. neutral, positive and negative words). The 
information gathered from this independent “localizer” run regarding the latency 
and morphology of visual emotional word processing ERP effects allowed us to 
establish whether the distorted EPN and/or LPP components recorded during the 
main evaluative priming experiment were reliably modulated by the putative 
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valence of the preceding action. Accordingly, we assessed whether the 
processing of positive vs. negative words was different at the level of the EPN 
and/or LPP when the preceding action was a response error. We also assessed 
whether positive vs. negative words were associated with different EPN and/or 
LPP effects when the preceding action was a correct response. 
METHODS 
Participants 
Twenty undergraduate students (18 female; Age: M = 21.65, SEM = .39) 
took part in the present study. The data of five participants had to be excluded 
from the analyses because the number of EEG epochs per condition was too 
limited in order to calculate reliable ERP waveforms (i.e. < 10; n = 4) or because 
of excessive noise in the continuous EEG data (n = 1). The final sample contained 
15 participants (14 female; Age: M = 21.4, SEM = .38). They were all right-
handed, native Dutch speakers who did not have a history of neurological or 
psychiatric disease, and had normal or corrected-to-normal vision. The study was 
approved by the local ethics committee. All participants were paid 20 Euro. 
Stimuli 
Go/noGo task 
Visual stimuli consisted of an arrow (subtending 11.4◦ ×0.05◦ of visual angle 
at a 60 cm viewing distance) that was presented in the center of a white 
homogenous background, and oriented either upward or downward (see Figure 
1). The arrow was first black, and could then turn either green or turquoise. 
These two colors were matched for luminance. These different combinations of 
color and orientation were used as cues in the Go/noGo task. 
Evaluative categorization task 
Targets were 30 positive and 30 negative words, either nouns or adjectives 
(see Table 1), and were selected from the Dutch affective rating list of Hermans 
and De Houwer (1994). T-tests showed that these positive and negative words 
differed significantly on the affective dimension, t(58) = 36.57, p < .001,ηp² = .95, 
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but not on the familiarity dimension, t < 1, nor with respect to the number of 
letters, t < 1. 
Word repetition detection task 
Thirty positive, 30 negative and 30 neutral words, either nouns or 
adjectives (see Table 1), were selected from the Dutch affective rating list of 
Hermans and De Houwer (1994). The positive and negative words were the same 
as those used for the evaluative categorization task. T-tests showed that neutral 
words were significantly different from negative and positive words on the 
affective dimension, F(2, 89) = 620.72, p < .001, but not on the familiarity 
dimension, F(2, 89) = 1.48, p > .10, nor with respect to the number of letters, F < 
1. 
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Table 1. 
Words selected from the Dutch affective rating list of Hermans and De Houwer 
(1994) 
Positive Negative Neutral 
applaus (applause) aids (aids) autobus (bus) 
baby (baby) brutaal (impudent) beton (concrete) 
bloemen (flowers) dief (thief) boog (arc) 
bruid (bride) dood (dead) bord (plate) 
cadeau (present) drugs (drugs) broek (pant) 
droom (dream) geweren (guns) buik (belly) 
engel (angel) graf (tomb) doos (box) 
feest (part) haat (hate) eend (duck) 
geboorte (birth) hatelijk (hasty) gemiddeld (average) 
geschenk (gift) hitler (hitler) geur (smell) 
goud (gold) hoer (hore) golf (wave) 
Hawaii (Hawaii) kanker (cancer) hek (fence) 
hemel (heaven) koud (cold) hoed (hat) 
humor (humor) moord (murder) hoofdsteun (head support) 
knuffel (hug) ongeval (accident) inkt (ink) 
lente (spring) ongezond (unhealthy) klei (clay) 
leven (life) oorlog (war) krant (newspaper) 
liefde (love) pijn (pain) kruid (herb) 
melodie (melody) puist (pustule) mand (basket) 
omhelzing (embrace) ruw (rude) muren (walls) 
oprecht (sincere) sluw (sly) normaal (normal) 
parfum (parfume) spin (spider) olifant (elephant) 
regenboog (rainbow) stank (stench) schaar (scissors) 
romantiek (romanticism) vals (false) slager (butcher) 
spel (game) vijandig (hostile) takken (branches) 
trots (proud) virus (virus) tas (bag) 
trouw (fidelity) vuil (dirty) venster (window) 
vakantie (holiday) vulgair (vulgar) vierkant (square) 
vrede (peace) zwak (weak) voet (foot) 
zomer (summer) zweer (sore) wolk (cloud) 
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Procedure 
Go/noGo task and evaluative categorization task 
Participants performed a standard speeded Go/noGo task (Vocat, Pourtois, 
& Vuilleumier, 2008) interleaved with a visual word categorization task (see 
Figure 1). Actions performed during the speeded Go/noGo task actually served as 
primes whereas words were used as targets in analogy with a conventional 
prime-target sequence during evaluative priming. Each trial started with a 
fixation cross that lasted for 500 ms. Afterwards, a black arrow, either oriented 
up or down, was presented at the position previously occupied by the fixation 
cross. After a variable interval ranging from 1000 ms to 2000 ms, the black arrow 
became either green or turquoise while its orientation could either remain 
identical or shift in the opposite direction compared to the initial black arrow. 
When the black arrow turned green and the orientation remained unchanged, 
participants were instructed to press a pre-defined button of the response box as 
fast as possible with the index finger of their left (non-dominant) hand (Go trials). 
However, participants had to withhold responding when either the arrow 
became green but changed orientation, or when the arrow became turquoise 
and kept its initial orientation, enabling two noGo trial types. Instructions 
emphasized both speed and accuracy, such that not only accuracy, but also the 
perceived speed was later evaluated as being either correct or incorrect. For 
each trial, speed was evaluated using an individually calibrated RT limit 
computed during a training block that preceded each session of two test blocks. 
This limit was thus calculated and updated three times in total (before Blocks 1 
and 2 – Session 1, before Blocks 3 and 4 – Session 2, and before Blocks 5 and 6 – 
Session 3). This procedure allowed us to deal with unspecific learning effects 
over time and maintain a high number of response errors throughout the 
experimental session. For the first session, the upper limit was set to 70% of the 
mean RT from the first training block. For the two subsequent sessions, this 
upper limit was updated and set to 80% of the mean RT during the respective 
training block. Hence, this procedure required participants to respond at least 
30% faster (first session) or 20% faster (second and third sessions) on Go trials 
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than their average speed during the respective training block. This procedure 
ensured a sufficient number of response errors on noGo trials and allowed us to 
distinguish between Fast Hits (i.e. correct responses on Go trials that were made 
faster than the individually-titrated RT limit) and Slow Hits (i.e. correct responses 
on Go trials that were made slower than the RT limit). Errors were formally 
defined as overt responses on noGo trials (i.e. False Alarms - FAs), while correct 
inhibitions corresponded to correctly withheld responses on the same noGo 
trials. 
Three hundred milliseconds after an action was executed, a target word 
was presented. For correct inhibitions, the target word was presented 1800 ms 
after the presentation of the colored arrow. Participants were instructed to 
categorize the valence of the target word (positive or negative) as fast and as 
accurately as possible by pressing one of two predefined keys of the response 
box using their dominant hand. Hence, the evaluative word categorization task 
was executed with a different effector than the Go/noGo task. The target word 
remained on the screen until the participant responded or 3000 ms elapsed. In 
order to balance the presentation of positive vs. negative words following Fast 
Hits, Slow Hits, Correct Inhibitions, and FAs, the target word that was presented 
following an action was selected randomly on each trial. After the word 
categorization, participants received feedback informing them about their 
accuracy for the two consecutive tasks. The feedback for the Go/noGo task 
indicated whether the performed action was correct (and fast enough), incorrect 
or too slow, while the feedback for the word categorization could be either 
correct or incorrect. Both feedback signals remained on the screen for 2000 ms. 
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Figure 1. Stimuli and task. (A) Go trial,
After a practice phase including 24 trials, the experiment was divided into 3 
sessions, each starting with a training block (containing 28 trials: 20 Go and 8 
noGo trials), followed by two test blocks (each containing
noGo trials). Note that participants were unaware that training blocks were 
actually used as calibration blocks to compute the RT limit used during the two 
following test blocks. Trial presentation was randomized within blocks. Bet
blocks, a small break (no longer than 5 min) was introduced. The whole 
experiment included 540 trials and lasted on average 50 min. Stimulus 
presentation and response recording were controlled using E
(V2.0., http://www.pstnet.com/products/e
Word repetition detection task (localizer)
In this task (always following the Go/noGo plus evaluative categorization 
tasks), participants had to press a predefined button on the response 
they detected a word that was identical to the previous one (i.e. one
Hence, we used a low-load memory task requiring a shallow lexical and semantic 
processing of the words, while task demands were balanced across the three 
emotion word conditions. Every word (N=30 per emotion category) was 
  
 (B) NoGo trial. 
 72 trials: 48 Go and 24 
-prime software 
-prime/). 
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presented once in random order for 550 ms and immediately followed by a blank 
screen (1000 ms). In total, 6 words (2 words of each emotion category) out of 90 
were repeated and had to be overtly detected. The appearances of these 6 
immediate repetitions in the word list were alternated across participants. 
Analyses of behavioral data 
Go/noGo task 
Accuracy and RTs were analyzed separately using repeated measures 
analyses of variance (ANOVAs) with the type of action (FA, Fast Hit or Slow Hit) 
as within-subject factor. 
Evaluative categorization task 
Accuracy and RTs (for correct responses) were analyzed using ANOVAs as a 
function of (i) the valence of the target word (either positive or negative) and (ii) 
the type of action (FA, Fast Hit or Slow Hit) preceding word presentation. We did 
not include in these analyses trials corresponding to correct inhibitions because 
no overt action was performed in this condition. Separate statistical analyses 
performed on these trials showed that the evaluative categorization was not 
significantly influenced by these correct inhibitions. Following a correct 
inhibition, the speed to categorize negative words was similar to that used to 
categorize positive words (t < 1). 
Word repetition detection task (localizer) 
Accuracy was analyzed using repeated measures ANOVA with the type of 
emotion word (negative, neutral, positive) as within-subject factor. 
EEG acquisition and pre-processing 
Go/noGo task 
Continuous EEG was acquired at 512 Hz using a 128-channel (pin-type) 
Biosemi Active Two system (http://www.biosemi.com) referenced to the CMS-
DRL ground. ERPs of interest were computed offline following a standard 
sequence of data transformations (Picton et al., 2000): (1) -500/+1000 ms 
segmentation around the motor response, (2) pre-response interval baseline 
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correction (from -500 ms to 0 ms), (3) vertical ocular correction for blinks 
(Gratton, Coles, & Donchin, 1983) using the difference amplitude of two 
electrodes attached above and below the left eye, (4) artifact rejection [M = -
72/+72, SEM = 2.0 amplitude scale (µV) across participants], (5) averaging of 
trials for each of the two main conditions separately (FA vs. Fast Hit), and (6) 30 
Hz low pass digital filtering of the individual average data. We primarily 
contrasted FAs to Fast Hits but not Slow Hits, because these latter trials were 
more frequent than FAs, whereas Fast Hits were almost as frequent as FAs. 
Moreover, unlike FAs or Fast Hits, Slow Hits did not lead to any significant 
evaluative priming effect (see behavioral results here below). 
Evaluative categorization task 
The sequence of data transformations was similar to the one used for the 
Go/noGo task with the notable exception that the baseline correction was not 
performed using the entire pre-stimulus interval (500 ms preceding word onset), 
but using the -50/+50 ms around word stimulus onset in order to downplay as far 
as possible lingering effects of the preceding response-related ERPs (e.g. ERN/Ne 
and Pe components following error commission) on the current visual ERPs 
elicited by the emotion word, which always followed the action with a constant 
interval of 300 ms. Four different ERP averages were computed for each 
participant: negative words following FAs; positive words following FAs; negative 
words following Fast Hits; positive words following Fast Hits. 
Word repetition task (localizer) 
The sequence of data transformations was similar to the one used for the 
Go/noGo task and three individual ERP averages corresponding to the three 
main emotion word conditions were eventually computed. The deviant 
immediate repetitions of words (n=6) requiring overt detection were not 
included in these averages.  
 
 
172   CHAPTER 6 
 
ERP data analyses 
Go/noGo task 
We primarily focused on two well-documented error-related ERP 
components following incorrect response onset (Falkenstein et al., 2000), on the 
ERN/Ne, with a maximum negative amplitude over fronto-central electrodes 
along the midline (electrode FCz) early on following motor execution (~0 - 100 
ms post-response onset), immediately followed by the Pe component (~150 - 
300 ms post-response onset), with a maximum positive amplitude over more 
posterior and central electrode locations along the midline (electrode Cz). For 
each ERP component and each condition separately (FA vs. Fast Hit), we 
calculated the area under the curve, during the 0-60 ms interval post-response 
onset at electrode FCz for the ERN/Ne amplitude, and during the 170-210 ms 
interval post-response onset at electrode Cz for the Pe component. The selection 
of these two specific scalp locations (and time windows) was based on the 
topographic properties of the present dataset, as well as based on converging 
results obtained in previous ERP studies using the same task (Aarts & Pourtois, 
2010). 
Statistical analyses were performed on the mean amplitude of each area 
using a paired t-test (FA vs. Fast Hit). We also performed brain-behavior 
correlation analyses using the amplitude of the ERN/Ne (or CRN in the case of 
Fast Hits) and RTs for the evaluative categorization task. We sought to assess 
whether the error-related brain reactions occurring during the Go/noGo task 
might predict the size of the RT facilitation for the immediate orthogonal 
emotion word categorization task. More specifically, we assessed whether the 
ERN/Ne-CRN amplitude difference (reflecting accuracy sensitivity roughly) might 
be related to the RT facilitation for congruent trials (FA-negative word and Fast 
Hit-positive word) compared to incongruent trials (FA-positive word and Fast Hit-
negative word). We therefore computed an evaluative priming effect by 
subtracting congruent trials from incongruent trials and evaluated, using a 
Pearson coefficient correlation, whether this priming effect might be related to 
amplitude changes occurring at the level of the ERN/Ne-CRN component. We 
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also assessed whether the evaluative priming effect may be predicted by 
amplitude changes occurring at the level of the Pe component and accordingly 
we computed a similar amplitude difference between FAs and Fast Hits for this 
later deflection. 
Word repetition task (localizer) 
A major problem arose for the visual ERPs recorded during the main 
evaluative categorization task because the baseline of these ERPs was strongly 
contaminated by the residual activity from the preceding action. To indirectly 
overcome this problem and to be able to explore the electrophysiological time-
course of emotion word processing depending on the accuracy of the preceding 
action (FA vs. Fast Hit) despite an obvious distortion of the ERP 
signal/morphology, we used an additional word repetition task as an 
independent localizer. This localizer was primarily used to establish time intervals 
during which a reliable ERP difference could be detected between emotional and 
neutral words, with a proper pre-stimulus baseline. To formally isolate these 
emotion-sensitive time periods, we submitted the ERP data of the localizer to a 
standard topographical mapping analysis. The rationale and basic principles of 
this analysis have been extensively described elsewhere (Michel, Seeck, & Landis, 
1999; Murray, Brunet, & Michel, 2008; Pourtois, Delplanque, Michel, & 
Vuilleumier, 2008). The topographical analysis was run on the ERP data from 
stimulus onset until 500 ms after emotion word stimulus onset (i.e. 256 
consecutive time frames at 512 Hz sampling rate), using a standard clustering (or 
spatio-temporal segmentation) method (K-means; Pascual-Marqui et al., 1995). 
Following standard practice, the dominant scalp topographies (identified in the 
group-averaged data) that were found to discriminate between neutral and 
emotional words (with a focus on the EPN and LPP components) were then fitted 
to the ERPs of each individual subject using spatial fitting procedures to 
quantitatively determine their representation across subjects and conditions. For 
each time interval (either EPN or LPP), the resulting Global Explained Variance 
(GEV) values were finally entered in a repeated-measure ANOVA with two 
within-subject factors, emotion (neutral, negative and positive) and map 
174   CHAPTER 6 
 
configuration (i.e. the electric field distributions previously identified by the 
spatial cluster analysis). These analyses were carried out using CARTOOL 
software (Version 3.34; developed by D. Brunet, Functional Brain Mapping 
Laboratory, Geneva, Switzerland). 
Evaluative categorization task 
The previous analysis enabled us to identify two non-overlapping time 
intervals (corresponding to the EPN and LPP) during which the processing of 
emotional (either positive or negative) words differed from neutral words. These 
specific time intervals were then used during the main evaluative categorization 
task to assess whether the accuracy of the preceding action influenced emotion 
word processing or not. In a first step, we ran paired t-tests (negative vs. positive 
words; alpha level set to .01) for all 128 electrodes concurrently, separately for 
FAs and Fast Hits, on the amplitude of the ERP signal during these two specific 
emotion sensitive time intervals (EPN and LPP). Given the obvious distortion of 
the ERP signal induced by the preceding action, we had to perform this first 
analysis comparing positive to negative words separately for FAs and Fast Hits. 
This first-pass statistical analysis allowed us to reveal clusters of electrodes 
where a reliable difference occurred between the processing of negative vs. 
positive words, separately for FAs and Fast Hits. In a second step, we verified, 
using repeated measures ANOVAs whether the amplitude of the ERP signal at 
these pre-selected clusters and during these two specific time-intervals was 
reliably influenced by the type of action (FA vs. Fast hit) as well as the valence of 
the word (negative vs. positive). 
RESULTS 
Behavioral results 
Outliers 
Trials with RTs shorter than 150 ms (FAs: M = 3.02, SEM = .87; Fast Hits: M 
= 4.47, SEM = 1.76) or longer than 500 ms (FAs: M = .90, SEM = .39; Slow Hits: M 
= 3.73, SEM = 1.23) during the Go/noGo task were discarded, as were trials of the 
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evaluative categorization task for which the RT exceeded 2.5 SD above or below 
the mean RT computed per condition (Negative: M = 2.91, SEM = .22; Positive: M 
= 3.10, SEM = .28). 
Go/noGo task 
The number of actions (FA, Fast or Slow Hit) differed significantly, F(2, 28) = 
44.22, p < .001. Participants made as many FAs as Fast Hits, t(14) = -1.55, p > .10. 
Moreover, participants made significantly less Fast Hits compared to Slow Hits, 
t(14) = -5.58, p < .001, as well as less FAs compared to Slow Hits, t(14) = -11.06, p 
< .001. Action types also reliably differed regarding speed, F(2, 28) = 138.97, p < 
.001. RTs for Slow Hits were longer than RTs for Fast Hits, t(14) = -15.02, p < .001, 
while RTs for FAs were shorter than RTs for Slow Hits, t(14) = -17.30, p < .001, but 
longer than RTs for Fast Hits, t(14) = 3.32, p < .01 (see Table 2). These results 
were compatible with previous findings obtained with the same Go/noGo task 
(Aarts & Pourtois, 2010, 2012). 
Table 2. 
Mean number of actions and RT latencies (ms) during the Go/noGo task, 
separately for each condition. 
      Number Speed (ms) 
      M SEM M SEM 
FAs M 60.47 5.73 222.40 2.66 
Fast Hits M 78.87 10.49 204.93 5.76 
  Slow Hits M 198.20 11.02 276.60 3.80 
Evaluative Categorization Task 
Speed 
The ANOVA performed on the mean RTs for correct responses revealed a 
significant interaction effect between action type and word type, F(1, 28) = 
13.60, p < .001. This interaction resulted from faster evaluative categorizations 
when the valence of the word was congruent with the putative affective value of 
the action. More specifically, RTs for negative words following FAs were shorter 
compared to RTs for positive words following FAs, t(14) = -3.28, p < .01, while 
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symmetrically, participants tended to categorize positive words faster compared 
to negative words when they followed Fast Hits, t(14) = 6.30, p < .05. Following 
Slow Hits, no significant RT difference emerged between negative and positive 
words, t < 1. The main effect of word type was not significant, F(1, 28) = 2.02, p > 
.10. By contrast, the ANOVA revealed a significant main effect of action type, F(2, 
28) = 26.80, p < .001, reflecting overall longer RTs for words following FAs 
compared to words following either Fast Hits, F(1, 14) = 32.47, p < .001, or Slow 
Hits, F(1, 14) = 31.29, p < .001, an effect in line with a systematic post-error 
slowing (Danielmeier & Ullsperger, 2011; Rabbitt, 1966) (see Figure 2A). 
Accuracy 
The ANOVA performed on accuracy data (i.e. % correct responses) revealed 
a significant interaction effect between action type (FA, Fast Hit, Slow Hit) and 
word type (Negative Word, Positive Word), F(1, 28) = 14.39, p < .001. This 
interaction indicated that participants were less accurate to categorize words as 
positive following FAs, compared to negative words following FAs, t(14) = 4.32, p 
< .001. Accuracy was similar for categorizing positive vs. negative words 
following either Fast, t < 1, or Slow Hits, t < 1. Furthermore, the main effect of 
action type approached significance, F(2, 28) = 4.17, p < .05, indicating higher 
accuracy following Fast Hits compared to FAs, F(1, 28) = 13.41, p < .01. Finally, 
the main effect of word type was also significant, F(1, 28) = 6.11, p < .05 (see 
Figure 2B). 
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Figure 2. (A) Mean RTs (+ 1 SEM for bars) for correct evaluative categorizations as a function of 
prime type (FA, Fast Hit, or Slow Hit) and word type (Negative or Positive Words). (B) Mean 
accuracy in percentages (+ 1 SEM for bars) for correct evaluative categorizations as a function of 
prime type (FA, Fast or Slow Hit) and word type (Negative or Positive Words). 
ERP results 
Go/noGo task 
When participants committed FAs, there was a clear sharp negative 
deflection that peaked roughly ~30 ms post-response onset, with a maximum 
amplitude at fronto-central electrodes along the midline, including FCz. These 
electrophysiological properties are consistent with the ERN/Ne. Consistent with 
previous ERP studies (Falkenstein et al., 1991; Gehring et al., 1993), the 
amplitude of the ERN/Ne was reliably larger for FAs (i.e. response errors), 
relative to Fast Hits (i.e. correct responses) where a smaller negative component 
(CRN) was also visible, t(14) = -4.0, p < .001 (see Figure 3A). 
This early negative component was immediately followed by a large 
positive potential, with maximum amplitude over more posterior scalp positions, 
including Cz. This error-related positive component was strongly attenuated for 
Fast Hits, t(14) = 5.06, p < .001 (see Figure 3A). These electrophysiological 
properties were compatible with the generation of a genuine error-related Pe 
component (Falkenstein et al., 2000; Ridderinkhof, Ramautar, & Wijnen, 2009. 
Remarkably, we found that the evaluative priming effect [defined as the RT 
difference between incongruent (FA-positive word and Fast Hit-negative word) 
and congruent trials (FA-negative word and Fast Hit-positive word)] was actually 
related to the difference between the ERN/Ne and CRN component, r = -.50, p = 
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.05 (see Figure 3B). This result was important, because it suggests that the more 
the early fronto-central negative deflection following response onset 
differentiated between incorrect and correct actions, the larger the evaluative 
priming effect (i.e. RT facilitation for categorizing the valence of a word that was 
presumably compatible with the inferred value of the preceding action). These 
results confirmed that this early action-monitoring component is not only 
responsible for coding the accuracy of the action (correct vs. incorrect), but also 
probably its concurrent emotional or motivational significance (good for correct 
actions vs. bad for response errors). Moreover, despite the modest sample size 
(n=15), we found an almost significant correlation between the size of the 
ERN/Ne and the RT difference between negative and positive words following 
errors, r = -.49, p = .07 (see Figure 3C). This correlation showed that participants 
with a larger ERN/Ne component had subsequently a larger RT facilitation for 
categorizing negative relative to positive words. Symmetrically, we also observed 
a trend for an association between the CRN generated for Fast Hits and the 
subsequent RT facilitation to categorize positive relative to negative words 
following these correct actions, r = .39, p = .15 (see Figure 3D). This suggested 
that smaller CRN amplitudes were related to larger RT facilitations for positive 
compared to negative words. We did not find a similar correlation between the 
Pe component and the general evaluative affective priming effect, r = -.31, p > 
.10. 
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Figure 3. ERP results during the speeded Go/noGo task. (A) Grand average ERP waveforms 
(electrode FCz) for FAs and Fast Hits. FAs elicited an early negative component (ERN/Ne), 
followed by a large positive deflection (Pe), whereas Fast Hits elicited only a smaller early 
negative activity (CRN). (B) A significant positive correlation was found between the evaluative 
priming effect and the absolute amplitude difference between the ERN/Ne and CRN component. 
(C) A negative correlation was found between the ERN/Ne amplitude and the absolute RT 
difference between positive and negative words. (D) By contrast, a positive correlation was found 
between the CRN amplitude and the absolute RT difference between negative and positive 
words. 
Word repetition detection task (localizer) 
Using the topographical analysis, we found that the ERP signal was reliably 
influenced by the emotional content (positive or negative, relative to neutral) of 
the word during two non-overlapping time intervals. This analysis accounted for 
90% of the variance. The first interval was 184-203 ms post-word onset, and the 
second spanned from 326 until 393 ms post-word onset. These latencies were 
compatible with an EPN and LPP effect, respectively (see Figure 4AB). Consistent 
with a sensitivity of these two ERP components to the emotional or arousal value 
conveyed by the words, statistical analyses performed on the GEV values 
extracted for these two topographical components confirmed that the EPN 
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topography explained more variance for emotional compared to neutral words 
[negative: t(14) = 2.38, p < .05; positive: t(14) = -1.82, p = .09] (see Figure 4C), 
and the LPP topography alike [negative: t(14) = 2.75, p < .01; positive: t(14) = -
2.83, p < .05] (see Figure 4D). 
 
Figure 4. ERP results obtained for the localizer experiment. (A) The voltage map (horizontal and 
back views) of the EPN (184-210 ms post-word onset) for emotional vs. neutral words was 
characterized by a negative activity mainly at right occipital electrodes. (B) The voltage map 
(horizontal and back views) of the LPP (326-393 ms post-word onset) for emotional vs. neutral 
words showed a broad positive activity over centro-parietal electrode positions. (C) The EPN 
topographical component explained more variance for emotional compared to neutral words 
(see results section for exact numerical values). (D) Likewise, the LPP topographical component 
explained more variance for emotional compared to neutral words (see results section for exact 
numerical values). 
Evaluative categorization task 
Self-generated actions had a deleterious effect on the morphology and 
expression of visual ERPs generated in response to the visual words during the 
main evaluative categorization task. Action type (either FAs or Fast Hits) had a 
major influence on the expression of these ERPs time-locked to the onset of the 
word (see Figure 5AB). This substantial distortion of the ERP signal and the 
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presence of large response-locked ERP components during the pre-stimulus 
onset baseline (ERN/Ne and Pe components for errors, see also Fig. 3A) led us to 
establish the presence of reliable EPN and LPP effects during emotion word 
processing using an independent localizer (see Figure 4), where no self-
generated actions were interleaved and could alter visual ERPs to word onset, as 
in the main experiment (see methods). 
 
Figure 5. Grand average ERP waveforms (electrode Cz) time-locked to the onset of the word (A) 
during the localizer (neutral, positive and negative) and (B) during the main evaluative 
categorization task (positive and negative words either following FAs or Fast Hits). 
A first statistical analysis based on running t-tests (see methods) showed 
that following errors (but not correct responses), a significant difference 
occurred between positive and negative words during the time-interval 
corresponding to the EPN at right occipital (B11, B14, B15) and left frontal 
electrodes (D2, D12, D19, D28 and D25). At these electrodes, the amplitude of 
the ERP signal was reliably larger for incongruent (positive words) compared to 
congruent (negative words) trials. By contrast, following correct actions (Fast Hits 
but not FAs), a reliable difference emerged between positive and negative words 
mainly during the time interval corresponding to the LPP component, mainly at 
right frontal electrodes (C1-C7 and C23), as well as at some additional scalp 
positions (A21, A22, A23, A30, B13, D7, D22, D23 and D24). At these electrode 
locations, the LPP signal was larger for incongruent (negative words) compared 
to congruent (positive words) trials alike. 
In a second step, we ran repeated measures ANOVAs on the mean 
amplitude of the ERP signal extracted during these two non-overlapping time 
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intervals and verified whether the processing of positive vs. negative words was 
reliably influenced earlier (i.e. during the EPN interval) following errors (FAs) 
compared to correct responses/Fast Hits, that primarily influenced the ERP signal 
during the interval, likely corresponding to the LPP component. The ANOVA 
performed on the ERP signal during the EPN interval with the within-subject 
factors electrodes (n = 12: B5-B16 corresponding to the right occipital cortex), 
action type (FA vs. Fast Hit) and word valence (negative vs. positive) revealed a 
significant interaction between action type and word valence, F(1, 154) = 5.22, p 
< .05 and showed a larger ERP (EPN) signal for incongruent compared to 
congruent trials. Moreover, this congruency effect was driven by smaller 
amplitudes for positive words following a FA compared to negative words, F(1, 
154) = 9.37, p < .01, while no such differential effect was observed following Fast 
Hits, F < 1 (see Figure 6AB). 
Interestingly, for the LPP component, we found a mirror-symmetric result. 
The repeated measures ANOVA run on the mean amplitude of the LPP signal 
with the within subjects factors electrodes (n = 7; C1-C7 corresponding to right 
frontal cortex), action type (FA vs. Fast Hit) and word valence (negative vs. 
positive) revealed a significant interaction between action type and word 
valence, F(1, 84) = 6.34, p < .05. This significant interaction translated generally 
larger LPP amplitudes for incongruent compared to congruent trials, F(1, 84) = 
6.34, p < .05 but in contrast to the earlier evaluative priming effect found at the 
level of the EPN, this later LPP effect was driven by a significant differentiation 
between positive and negative words following fast hits, F(1, 84) = 27.78, p < 
.001, but not following FAs, F < 1 (see figure 6CD). 
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Figure 6. Main ERP results during the evaluative categorization task. (A) Grand average ERP 
waveforms (for a representative right occipital electrode - B6), separately for positive and 
negative words following FAs. The amplitude of the EPN was larger for positive compared to 
negative words. (B) No similar differential effect was seen (same electrode B6) for positive vs. 
negative words following Fast Hits. (C) Grand average ERP waveforms (for a representative right 
fronto-central electrode - C2), separately for positive and negative words following FAs. No LPP 
difference was seen between these two conditions. (D) By contrast, the amplitude of the LPP 
(same electrode C2) was enhanced for negative compared to positive words following Fast Hits. 
Asterisks indicate p <. 05. 
DISCUSSION 
The goal of the present ERP study was twofold. (i) To establish whether the 
magnitude of the ERN/Ne (error) – CRN (correct response) component generated 
“automatically” early on following action execution might actually be related to 
how quick participants could later discriminate positive vs. negative visual words, 
in line with an action-word evaluative priming effect (see Aarts et al., in revision). 
(ii) Furthermore, we aimed at clarifying the actual electrophysiological 
manifestations of this action/prime – word/target evaluative priming effect, by 
focusing on visual ERPs generated in response to these emotional words (and 
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more specifically the emotion-sensitive EPN and LPP ERP components). Our 
results show that the evaluative priming effect was related to the ERN/Ne-CRN 
difference. Because the ERN/Ne-CRN difference provides a reliable estimate of 
how well or strong participants differentiated “online” incorrect from correct 
actions during the Go/noGo task early on following response onset based on 
internal motor representations, this significant correlation with the evaluative 
priming effect suggests that these former monitoring brain processes are 
somehow related to the automatic processing of the affective or motivational 
value of self-generated actions. Given the compelling early electrophysiological 
time-course of these monitoring processes (ERN/Ne and CRN components), 
these “emotional” effects are likely to be automatic or preconscious 
(Nieuwenhuis et al., 2001). To the best of our knowledge, these ERP results 
provide the first direct electrophysiological evidence for the involvement of the 
ERN/Ne-CRN component in the processing of the affective values of self-
generated actions. 
Moreover, our new ERP results allowed us to clarify what are the actual 
electrophysiological correlates of this evaluative priming effect, here triggered by 
the rapid affective evaluation of self-generated actions. More specifically, we 
found that during an early time interval following emotional word onset (180-
200 ms post-stimulus onset, corresponding to the early phase of the EPN 
component, as established using an independent “localizer” experiment), a 
significant ERP difference arose between positive vs. negative words following 
FAs over right occipital electrodes, indicated by a larger ERP signal for 
incongruent, compared to congruent action-word pairs in terms of “shared” 
affective content (positive words following FAs vs. negative words following FAs, 
respectively). During this early EPN time period, no differential valence effect 
between positive and negative words was found following Fast Hits. By contrast, 
such a valence-related ERP difference was well found for these correct responses 
during a later and non-overlapping time period, likely corresponding to the LPP 
component (320-390 ms post-stimulus onset). During this second time period, 
incongruent action-word pairs (negative words following Fast Hits) elicited a 
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larger ERP signal than congruent pairs (positive words following Fast Hits), 
following Fast Hits only, but not FAs. These ERP results suggest therefore that 
incongruent action-word pairs may be associated with an enhanced emotional or 
arousal reaction during the sensory processing of the emotional words, this 
effect being earlier for emotional words following FAs than Fast Hits. 
The ERN/Ne-CRN is linked to the online automatic processing of the affective 
value of self-generated actions 
Whereas previous studies already showed that unwanted response errors 
unlocked psycho physiological emotional reactions consistent with the detection 
and processing of aversive events (Hajcak & Foti, 2008), as well as differential 
brain responses in the amygdala (Pourtois et al., 2010), the evidence linking 
response errors to negative affect (or conversely correct responses to positive 
emotions) was primarily correlational in nature in these earlier studies. 
Moreover, the accumulating neurophysiological evidence linking enhanced 
ERN/Ne-CRN amplitudes to internalized psychopathological traits or 
characteristics, including anxiety and depression (Olvet & Hajcak, 2008; 
Vaidyanathan, Nelson, & Patrick, 2012), does not enable to draw strong 
conclusions regarding an altered emotional tagging of response errors in these 
anxious or depressed participants. In all these ERP studies, no significant change 
in behavior or emotional reactions following errors was seen or reported 
between high vs. low anxious, or between depressed vs. non-depressed patients. 
Accordingly, our new behavioral and ERP results are important because they 
show for the first time that self-generated actions performed during a standard 
Go/noGo task are rapidly appraised along a genuine affective dimension (FAs 
were evaluated as more negative compared to Fast Hits while conversely Fast 
Hits were automatically “tagged” as more positive than FAs; see behavioral 
results). This evaluative priming effect was related to inter-individual variations 
at the level of the magnitude of the response-locked ERN/Ne and CRN 
component, unambiguously linking this early action-monitoring ERP component 
to the automatic affective marking of actions (Aarts & Pourtois, 2010; Hajcak & 
Foti, 2008; Luu et al., 2000), presumably operating via specific meta cognitive 
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control systems working on the byproduct of an internal representation of motor 
actions, given the extremely rapid time-course and unfolding of these ERN/Ne-
CRN brain effects in ACC (Fernandez-Duque et al., 2000; Winkielman et al., 
2003). Our novel results show that across participants, the ones who showed a 
large difference between the ERN/Ne (errors) and CRN (correct responses) had a 
larger RT facilitation for processing the valence of the subsequent emotional 
words when it was actually “shared” with that of the actions (i.e. congruent vs. 
incongruent action-word pairs), compared to participants showing a more 
modest ERN/Ne-CRN differentiation. 
Our new results may thus help interpret indirectly the functional meaning 
of these abnormal and enhanced ERN/Ne-CRN components typically seen in 
either high anxious or clinically depressed participants. These overactive early 
action-monitoring effects could reflect a selective impairment in extracting 
“online” the normal emotional/affective value of self-generated actions in these 
participants, a somewhat deleterious generic action-monitoring deficit that could 
potentially cause (i) a reduced affective priming effect at the behavioral level 
(see Aarts et al., in revision), as well as (ii) specific problems in integrating online 
the affective value of self-generated actions with the valence of external 
evaluative feedback stimuli shown after these specific actions (Aarts & Pourtois, 
2012). Future studies are needed to establish what factors may cause the onset 
and maintenance of these early overactive action-monitoring effects at the level 
of the ERN/Ne and CRN, because they seem to underlie selective problems 
related to the rapid/automatic decoding of the emotional values of self-
generated actions. Dysfunctional primary reinforcement learning signals 
generated in the basal ganglia and swiftly guiding action-monitoring processes at 
the cortical level within the dACC could potentially account for these early 
abnormal affective reactions following action execution (Cavanagh, Figueroa, 
Cohen, & Frank, 2011; Frank et al., 2005; Holroyd & Coles, 2002). 
Interestingly, our correlation analysis also showed that when using the 
mean ERN/Ne amplitude alone (instead of the ERN/Ne-CRN amplitude 
difference), inter-individual changes in the size of this error-related component 
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alone were almost significantly linked (despite a modest sample size, n=15) to 
the subsequent RT facilitation for negative compared to positive words following 
the onset of these adverse events (r > .35, p = .07). This trend suggests that the 
larger the ERN/Ne amplitude, the quicker negative words were discriminated 
from positive words, a finding in line with earlier psycho physiological results 
showing an enhanced startle responses following errors compared to correct 
responses during a flanker task (Hajcak & Foti, 2008). In this earlier study alike, 
inter-individual variations at the level of this automatic defensive response (Shi & 
Davis, 2001) were actually predicted by the magnitude of the ERN/Ne 
component.  
Action valence influences early stages of emotional word processing 
A second major finding of our ERP study concerns the actual 
electrophysiological time-course and manifestations of this action-word affective 
priming effect. Early on following word onset (180-200 ms post-stimulus onset; 
EPN effect), we found that positive words led to a larger EPN ERP signal than 
negative words, following FAs. No such modulation was seen after Fast Hits. 
Later on, 320-390 ms post-word onset (LPP effect) negative words led to a larger 
LPP ERP signal than positive words, following Fast Hits, but not following FAs. 
Importantly, these two specific time intervals (EPN and LPP) were identified and 
based on the results obtained from an independent localizer experiment that 
allowed to reveal these two time periods of interest during which the visual 
processing of emotional words (either positive or negative) reliably differed from 
neutral words in the same participants. The first effect likely corresponded to an 
EPN effect, whereas the later effect to a LPP effect. Our new ERP results 
therefore suggest that FAs led to an earlier influence during the sensory 
processing of the emotional value of the words, than did Fast Hits. 
Since the occipital EPN component has mainly been related to a motivated 
attentional capture effect depending on arousal and possibly depending on 
direct feedback effects from deeper limbic structures (Sabatinelli, Bradley, 
Fitzsimmons, & Lang, 2005; Sabatinelli, Flaisch, Bradley, Fitzsimmons, & Lang, 
2004); a larger EPN is typically found for more arousing compared to less 
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arousing pictures or words (Herbert et al., 2008; Kissler et al., 2007; Kissler et al., 
2009; Schacht & Sommer, 2009a, 2009b). Accordingly, the results of the present 
study suggest that an incongruency between the valence of the word and the 
accuracy of the action (i.e. FA-positive word) led to an enhanced arousal reaction 
180-200 ms post-word onset, relative to congruent FA-negative words pairs. 
Response errors are usually deviant events that “automatically” call for a change 
in the behavior and are accompanied by defensive emotional (Hajcak & Foti, 
2008) or attentional orienting reactions (Notebaert et al., 2009), such that their 
potential influence on the subsequent emotion word processing could take place 
earlier than the concurrent and symmetrical priming effect triggered by Fast 
Hits/correct responses. Because Fast Hits and FAs had similar frequencies of 
occurrence during the Go/noGo task, this differential priming effect during 
emotional word processing between these two action types cannot easily be 
related to uncontrolled endogenous attentional factors. At any rate, this EPN 
effect manifested itself as an augmented arousal for positive words following 
FAs, compared to negative words following similar FAs. Hence, the present 
behavioral evaluative priming effect found at the behavioral level could actually 
result not so much from a sensory facilitation for negative emotional words that 
necessarily shared the same intrinsic valence than the preceding self-generated 
actions (i.e. response errors; see Grill-Spector, Henson, & Martin, 2006), but 
instead, from an interference effect created by the perceived mismatch for the 
association of positive words with earlier response errors. 
On the other hand, the LPP component has generally been associated with 
top-down fronto-parietal (endogenous) attention selection mechanisms (H. T. 
Schupp et al., 2000) and was usually larger for high compared to low arousing 
stimuli alike (Olofsson, Nordin, Sequeira, & Polich, 2008; Schupp, Flaisch, 
Stockburger, & Junghöfer, 2006). Accordingly, the presentation of negative 
(compared to positive) words following Fast Hits might unlock an enhanced 
endogenous orienting reaction, given the perceived affective incongruence 
between the preceding action, and the current emotional valence of the 
(negative) word. Unlike the early (perhaps automatic) EPN effect found following 
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errors during emotional word processing, this later LPP effect following Fast Hits 
could likely translate an attention-dependent change in the perceived emotional 
arousal of the words. As a result, a differential processing of negative compared 
to positive words would occur during a later time interval following Fast Hits (LPP 
effect), than FAs (EPN effect). 
In sum, our results show that self-generated actions (performed during a 
standard speeded Go/noGo task with simple, non-emotional visual symbolic 
cues) are automatically appraised along an affective dimension, such that 
unwanted response errors (FAs) facilitate the processing of negative words 
shown after these specific actions, whereas conversely, correct responses (Fast 
Hits) lead to RT facilitation for positive words. This behavioral effect 
unambiguously indicated that response errors are implicitly and automatically 
perceived as more negative events compared to correct responses. Our new ERP 
findings show that the earliest action-monitoring brain effect (ERN/Ne-CRN 
component generated for the responses performed during the Go/noGo task) 
predicted the subsequent RT facilitation during emotion word processing, 
suggesting that this former ERP deflection is linked to the motivational 
significance of self-generated actions. Finally, we also found that whereas 
response errors automatically influenced the early sensory processing of the 
subsequent emotional words (EPN effect), correct responses influenced the 
processing of these emotional words alike, but during a later and non-
overlapping time interval (LPP effect). 
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CHAPTER 7: GENERAL DISCUSSION 
Whereas response errors have for a long time been considered in 
psychology primarily as interfering events reflecting attentional lapses or 
stochastic breakdowns in cognitive control (to be eventually removed from 
subsequent data analyses), the last two decades have witnessed a tremendous 
paradigm shift whereby the processing of response errors (and more generally 
performance monitoring) has now become a major and central theme in 
cognitive and affective neuroscience (O(Connell et al., 2007; Padilla, Wood, Hale, 
& Knight, 2006). Response errors are associated with specific reinforcement 
learning signals in the human brain (Frank, Woroch, & Curran, 2005; Holroyd & 
Coles, 2002), and they usually set free a cascade of affective and/or attention 
orienting effects (Botvinick, Braver, Barch, Carter, & Cohen, 2001; Hajcak, 
McDonald, & Simons, 2003b; Notebaert et al., 2009). Response errors also often 
have a negative connotation for participants who inadvertently commit them, 
and accordingly they are seen as aversive events, even though this aspect has 
actually received much less attention in the literature. However, it seems to be 
especially the case in high anxious, dysphoric or depressed individuals who 
usually show a hypersensitivity (and hyperactivity in specific brain regions, 
including the dACC) towards these adverse events. The main goal of my doctoral 
research was to better characterize these links between error-monitoring brain 
functions and negative affect, using both standard behavioral measures, as well 
as concurrent scalp ERP measurements informing about the brain dynamic 
underlying this process. 
In this dissertation, I used specific task settings enabling to unlock a large 
number of unwanted response errors in well-controlled laboratory conditions, 
within a short period of time, and in every participant, without inducing 
excessive frustration. These errors correspond to false alarms in the present 
case, or failures to inhibit a prepotent response tendency (Miyake et al., 2000). I 
primarily focused on well-defined electrophysiological markers of error detection 
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and performance monitoring, namely the ERN/Ne, CRN, Pe and FRN ERP 
components. Previous ERP studies have already shown that individuals with high 
negative affect and internalizing disorders are characterized by an overactive 
error-monitoring brain system, in particular when focusing on the ERN/Ne 
component (Olvet & Hajcak, 2008; Vaidyanathan, Nelson, & Patrick, 2012). 
However, what this early overactive error monitoring in negative affect exactly 
reflects, remains largely underspecified. Does it correspond to a more global 
executive control deficit, or rather, a differential emotional reaction when facing 
these specific negative events (Carter et al., 1998; Luu, Collins, & Tucker, 2000; 
Vidal, Hasbrouckq, Grapperon, & Bonnet, 2000)? These questions form the core 
of the experiment work reported in this doctoral dissertation. 
To address these questions, I first investigated error-monitoring brain 
functions in (sub clinical) trait anxious participants (Chapter 2) or clinically 
depressed (major depression disorder – MDD) patients (Chapter 3), using 
standard ERP peak analyses, but also complementing topographic and source 
localization methods. Comparing the results of these two studies (Chapters 2 and 
3) enabled me to demonstrate that sub clinical trait anxiety and MDD have 
actually dissociable effects on early error-monitoring brain processes. The results 
of these two studies (Chapters 2 and 3) show that error-monitoring deficits in 
MDD are not corresponding to a mere amplification (or reduction) of the neural 
alterations seen in high anxious individuals; they seem to be qualitatively 
different. Second, I compared effects of sub clinical trait anxiety on internal 
(Chapter 2) vs. external action-monitoring brain processes (Chapter 4). Although 
these two systems may share a common or generic fronto-striatal neural 
network involved in reinforcement learning (Frank et al., 2005; Holroyd & Coles, 
2002; Ullsperger & von Cramon, 2006), the question arose whether detrimental 
effects of trait anxiety on early error monitoring based on internal motor 
representations (Chapter 2) were also visible when performance had primarily to 
be monitored based on external evaluative feedback (Chapter 4). The ERP results 
of the study carried out in Chapter 4 confirmed that effects of trait anxiety on 
action monitoring are not restricted to the swift monitoring of internal cues, but 
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also present during the processing of external evaluative feedback. Accordingly, 
ERP studies carried out in Chapters 2 to 4 informed about the 
electrophysiological time-course (and probable loci in the human brain) during 
which either (sub clinical) trait anxiety or depression influenced error-detection 
or performance-monitoring brain processes. However, these ERP studies alone 
did not immediately highlight what may eventually be changed in these anxious 
participants or depressed individuals during early error detection or performance 
monitoring, given that these electrophysiological effects were evidenced without 
obvious changes in the behavior (i.e. accuracy or speed with the speeded 
Go/noGo task) as a function of negative affect. To further address this question, I 
also devised a new experimental method (based on the priming phenomenon) 
suited to infer indirectly the actual affective value of self-generated actions, 
including response errors (Chapter 5). Results of this study confirmed the 
prediction that response errors were automatically marked as negative events 
(and this effect was blunted in high anxious participants, see Chapter 5). I 
therefore ran a last ERP study (Chapter 6) to gain insight into the 
electrophysiological markers of this automatic affective tagging of self-generated 
actions. Results of this ERP study showed that (i) the ERN/Ne-CRN component 
likely encodes not only the perceived accuracy but also concurrently the affective 
or motivational value of self-generated actions; and (ii) this affective marking of 
self-generated actions is different (at the ERP level) for response errors vs. 
correct responses. I now provide an outline of the main new experimental 
findings presented in each chapter, before discussing more thoroughly each of 
the three main research questions addressed in this dissertation. 
In Chapter 2, I tested the prediction that early detection brain mechanisms 
(as reflected by the ERN/Ne component) are not simply overactive in high 
anxious individuals, as previously put forward in the literature (Olvet & Hajcak, 
2008; Vaidyanathan et al., 2012), they are also undergoing qualitative and 
traceable changes compared to low anxious participants. Low vs. high anxious 
individuals performed a speeded Go/noGo task while high-density (128 channels) 
EEG was recorded concurrently. Trait anxiety did not influence the error making 
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behavior (i.e. the number and speed of unwanted false alarms made on noGo 
trials). However, the earliest electrophysiological marker of error detection (i.e. 
ERN/Ne) was not only larger in high compared to low anxious individuals, it was 
also associated with different and non-overlapping rostral/ventral ACC effects in 
high anxious individuals. By contrast, the subsequent Pe component was not 
influenced by levels of trait anxiety. These results therefore suggest an early 
differential emotional or motivational processing of response errors in anxiety, 
or at least the recruitment of non-overlapping ACC regions during early error 
detection. 
Because anxiety and depression are overlapping and usually considered as 
comorbid negative affect disorders (Clark & Watson, 1991; Mineka, Watson, & 
Clark, 1998; Watson et al., 1995), I used a very similar method and task in 
Chapter 3, but explored early error-monitoring brain functions in clinically 
depressed patients, as opposed to sub clinical anxious individuals in Chapter 2. 
The same speeded Go/noGo task was administered to a sample of depressed 
patients vs. healthy controls, while EEG was recorded concurrently. Like it was 
already found for anxiety (Chapter 2), depression did not change the expression 
of the error making behavior in this task; it mainly slowed down RTs, regardless 
of the experimental condition. However, ERP results showed that during early 
error processing, the ERN/Ne amplitude was not numerically augmented in these 
depressed patients, although additional topographical and source localization 
analyses showed that they recruited additional dorsolateral prefrontal areas 
(besides the classical medial frontal and dorsal ACC regions) during this early 
time interval following error commission, compared to the controls. This result 
suggests the engagement of auxiliary cognitive control processes in depression 
early on following error detection, probably related to interfering ruminative 
thinking processes in these patients. More importantly, I found that the 
subsequent error-related Pe component was significantly smaller in depressed 
individuals, and this effect was mainly explained by an abnormal recruitment of 
ventral cingulate areas. Interestingly, this later electrophysiological effect during 
error monitoring was strongly related to the specific trait-related rumination 
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characteristic of these patients, suggesting that probably rumination, more than 
depression per se, may actually influence this specific stage of (conscious) error 
detection. Altogether, the new ERP results reported in Chapters 2 and 3 point to 
dissociable effects of anxiety vs. depression on the early detection and 
monitoring of response errors.  
In Chapter 4, I evaluated whether trait anxiety could influence “external” 
performance-monitoring brain processes equally well as “internal” error-
monitoring processes (see Chapter 2), in keeping with the assumption of a 
shared neural system in these two cases (Holroyd & Coles, 2002). Therefore, a 
modified version of the speeded Go/noGo task was used, in which salient 
feedback on task (speed) performance was presented after each and every 
action, and low vs. high trait anxious individuals were recruited in this ERP 
experiment. In contrast to what was found in Chapter 2 (internal monitoring 
processes), no clear effect of anxiety was seen at the level of the ERN/Ne-CRN or 
Pe component in this experiment (Chapter 4), but the FRN effect time-locked to 
the onset of the evaluative feedback (i.e. externally-oriented performance 
monitoring) was reliably reduced in high compared to low anxious participants, 
suggesting that trait anxiety may actually produce generic action-monitoring 
impairments, not restricted to the processing of internal (motor) representations 
(as reflected by the ERN/Ne component, see Chapter 2). Results reported in 
Chapter 4 confirmed that high anxious individuals experience difficulties to 
evaluate whether their actions are correct (fast) or not (slow), when uncertainty 
is high, and external evaluative feedback stimuli need therefore to be processed 
rapidly in order to eventually assist or guide performance monitoring. 
In Chapter 5, I devised a new behavioral experiment based on a standard 
evaluative priming technique suited to decipher the putative affective value of 
self-generated actions, including response errors. The basic principle of the 
experiments reported in Chapter 5 was to verify whether response errors were 
“automatically” marked as more negative events, compared to correct 
responses. In this study (Chapter 5), every self-generated action made during the 
Go/noGo task was, after a specific delay (i.e. 300 ms in Experiments 1 and 2; 600 
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ms in Experiment 3; 1000 ms in Experiment 4) followed by the presentation of a 
visual evaluative word that had to be quickly categorized as either positive or 
negative (hence I used a dual task setting). In accordance with a classical 
evaluative priming effect (Fazio, Sanbonmatsu, Powell, & Kardes, 1986; Hermans, 
De Houwer, & Eelen, 2001), I observed that the putative valence of the self-
generated actions reliably influenced the processing of the subsequent 
emotional words: Negative words were categorized faster following response 
errors than correct responses, with a symmetrical effect for positive words. This 
priming effect was dependent on the length of the SOA: only at short (300 or 600 
ms), but not at long SOAs (1000 ms) did the self-generated actions prime the 
processing of the subsequent evaluative words, in accordance with the hallmark 
of an evaluative priming effect. These results confirm that response errors are 
“automatically” marked as more negative events compared to correct responses, 
probably via dedicated meta-cognitive control systems (Fernandez-Duque, Baird, 
& Posner, 2000; Winkielman, Schwarz, Fazendeiro, & Reber, 2003). Moreover 
and importantly, I found that this action-word priming effect was smaller in high 
compared to low anxious individuals, suggesting that trait anxiety may influence 
the early automatic decoding of the emotional or motivational value of self-
generated actions, including response errors (see also results of Chapter 2). 
In Chapter 6, I explored, using EEG methods, the actual 
electrophysiological correlates of the action-word evaluative priming effect 
found in the previous chapter. First, I found that across participants, the 
magnitude of the evaluative priming effect (i.e. RTs for incongruent action-word 
pairs vs. congruent pairs) could partly be predicted by the ERN/Ne-CRN 
amplitude difference time-locked to the onset of the action, confirming that this 
early action-monitoring ERP component is somehow involved in the affective 
processing of self-generated actions. Moreover, I found that response errors 
actually influenced early perceptual stages of emotion word processing, namely 
at the level of the early posterior negativity (EPN) ERP component (Herbert, 
Junghöfer, & Kissler, 2008; Schupp, Flaisch, Stockburger, & Junghöfer, 2006), 
during this action-word evaluative priming effect, while correct responses mainly 
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influenced a later stage of emotional word processing, namely at the level of the 
late positive potential (LPP) ERP component (Hajcak, MacNamara, & Olvet, 2010; 
Olofsson, Nordin, Sequeira, & Polich, 2008; Schupp et al., 2000). These ERP 
results provide thus important information regarding the electrophysiological 
time-course of this action-word evaluative priming effect. They show a temporal 
precedence of response errors compared to correct responses during this 
priming effect, which may tentatively be explained by the enhanced motivational 
or affective value of these (deviant) aversive events. 
I now turn to the discussion of the three main research questions 
addressed in this dissertation and by doing so, I provide an integration of the 
results obtained in the five different chapters into a broader theoretical context. 
First, the dissociable effects of trait anxiety vs. depression on the ERN/Ne vs. Pe 
ERP component are discussed. Second, the differential effects of trait anxiety on 
“internal” vs. “external” action-monitoring processes are carefully reviewed. 
Finally, I discuss more thoroughly the notion of an automatic affective tagging of 
self-generated actions, and to which extent this process may be impaired 
selectively in anxiety or depression, and backed up by amplitude changes at the 
level of the ERN/Ne-CRN ERP component. The discussion ends with possible 
implications and relevance of the present ERP and behavioral results for the 
classification of internalizing disorders in psychopathology (with a focus on 
anxiety and depression), followed by the presentation of two possible future 
research perspectives. 
ERN/NE-ANXIETY VS. PE-DEPRESSION? 
The results of the studies reported in Chapters 2 and 3 show that neither 
sub clinical trait anxiety (Chapter 2) nor depression (Chapter 3) simply disrupts 
error detection or adaptation effects at the behavioral level, at least with the 
specific Go/noGo task used in these studies and which promotes a fast and 
impulsive response mode. The number of response errors was similar between 
high vs. low anxious individuals (Chapter 2) or between healthy controls vs. 
clinically depressed patients (Chapter 3). RTs of high anxious individuals were as 
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fast as controls while depressed patients were overall slower compared to 
healthy controls, but importantly, this effect was general and not condition 
specific. These observations were important because (1) they confirm that 
negative affect (either trait anxiety or depression) does not simply alter 
executive functions or performance monitoring in general when investigated 
using a simple speeded Go/noGo task (Eysenck, Derakshan, Santos, & Calvo, 
2007), and moreover (2) they allow to exclude the possibility that unbalanced 
behavioral performance between groups could account for the observed ERP 
differences during early error-monitoring processes. Because the signal to noise 
ratio of error-related ERP components, including the ERN/Ne and Pe, strongly 
depends on the actual number of trials included in the averages (Gehring, Goss, 
Coles, Meyer, & Donchin, 1993; Olvet & Hajcak, 2009b), the reported ERP 
differences between high anxious or depressed vs. healthy controls could not be 
ascribed to asymmetries in the resulting error-related ERP signal across groups. 
Interestingly, a direct comparison of the ERP results obtained in Chapters 2 
and 3 points to notable dissociable effects of trait anxiety vs. depression on the 
error-monitoring brain machinery. Whereas trait anxiety mainly influenced the 
earliest stage of error monitoring (i.e. ERN/Ne-CRN component) but left 
unchanged the subsequent Pe component (Chapter 2), I found a symmetric 
outcome for depression (Chapter 3). In the former case, a larger ERN/Ne (relative 
to the CRN) was found in high anxious participants, and this early effect was 
associated with the activation of rostral ACC regions, while in the latter case a 
blunted Pe component was found, with a corresponding decrease of ventral ACC 
activations. These results therefore confirm that trait anxiety and depression 
have different (remote) effects on early error-monitoring brain processes. These 
findings also lend support to the notion that these two early error-related ERP 
components (ERN/Ne vs. Pe) likely reflect different stages of processing during 
early error monitoring (Nieuwenhuis, Ridderinkhof, Blow, Band, & Kok, 2001; 
Overbeek, Nieuwenhuis, & Ridderinkhof, 2005; Ridderinkhof, Ramautar, & 
Wijnen, 2009). Previous ERP studies already showed a functional dissociation 
between the ERN/Ne and the Pe component, either based on specific 
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experimental manipulations (e.g. error awareness; Dhar, Wiersema, & Pourtois, 
2011; Endrass, Franke, & Kathmann, 2005; Klein et al., 2007; Nieuwenhuis et al., 
2001; O'Connell et al., 2007), or based on pharmacological manipulations (e.g. 
dopaminergic drugs; De Bruijn, Hulstijn, Verkes, Ruigt, & Sabbe, 2004). The 
results of these earlier studies were compatible with the assumption that the 
ERN/Ne reflects a rapid, perhaps automatic (in the sense of unconscious, see 
Moors & De Houwer, 2006) stage of error detection, which is dependent upon 
fronto-striatal dopaminergic brain systems (Chase, Swainson, Durham, & 
Benham, 2011; Frank et al., 2005; Holroyd & Coles, 2002). By contrast, the 
subsequent error-related Pe component could translate a more elaborate 
process during error detection, maybe related to the accumulation of evidence 
about error commission (Steinhauser & Yeung, 2010), or error awareness (Dhar 
et al., 2011; Endrass et al., 2005; Nieuwenhuis et al., 2001; O’Connell et al., 
2007){ #45;  #511;  #266;  #450}, or the (conscious) detection of a salient event 
(Falkenstein, Hoormann, Christ, & Hohnsbein, 2000). These latter processes 
would be less dependent upon direct dopaminergic inputs, although few ERP 
studies have actually explored possible links between this specific 
neurotransmitter (or other ones, including serotonin or maybe norepinephrine; 
see Nieuwenhuis, Aston-Jones, & Cohen, 2005) and amplitude changes at the 
level of the Pe component. The results reported in Chapters 2 and 3 show that 
different forms of negative affect (trait anxiety vs. depression) may have 
different influences on these early error-monitoring brain processes. Previous 
ERP studies already reported dissociations between the ERN/Ne and Pe 
component in patients with obsessive compulsive disorders (Ruchsow et al., 
2005), in schizophrenic patients with and without psychosis (Bates, Liddle, Kiehl, 
& Ngan, 2004), or in individuals with high vs. low negative affect (Hajcak, 
McDonald, & Simons, 2004). 
An increased ERN/Ne accompanied by the recruitment of rostral ACC 
regions in high anxious individuals (Chapter 2) was interpreted as reflecting 
either a higher motivational significance of response errors in these participants 
(Hajcak & Foti, 2008; Hajcak et al., 2003b; Luu et al., 2000) or alternatively, a 
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change in effort or attentional control (Eysenck et al., 2007). In this latter 
framework, anxious individuals are characterized by excessive worrisome 
thoughts concerning negative events that might happen in the future, and this 
narrowing down of the action-thought repertoires has a deleterious effect on 
executive functions and performance monitoring. However, the attentional 
control theory posits that high anxious individuals somehow compensate for 
these problems by increasing efforts or the amount of resources, which leads to 
a drop in efficiency when task demands or complexity increases. Although still 
speculative at this stage, I interpreted an increased ERN/Ne component in high 
anxious, associated with rostral ACC activations (Chapter 2), along these lines. 
This specific interpretation (i.e. the overactive ERN/Ne in high trait anxious 
individuals resulting from a rostral ACC activation would somehow translate a 
compensatory mechanism in these individuals) is also indirectly supported by 
earlier findings in the literature linking effort to an increased ERN/Ne (Luu et al., 
2000; Tops, Boksem, Wester, Lorist, & Meijman, 2006), as well as to stronger 
ACC activity (Paus, Koski, Caramanos, & Westbury, 1998). However, because I did 
not manipulate or measure directly “efforts” (or efficiency, for example by 
comparing the processing of response errors made during a simple vs. dual-task 
setting) in Chapter 2, additional studies are needed to corroborate the 
assumption that an increased ERN/Ne in trait anxiety could reflect a change in 
“efforts” and/or efficiency. Using the same framework, one could thus conclude 
that the absence of an increased ERN/Ne in depressed individuals (Chapter 3) 
indicate that they are probably not using (online) a similar compensatory 
mechanism to deal with their response errors, early on following their onset. In 
contrast, because of their distinctive ruminative thinking style, the Pe 
component is substantially reduced in depressed patients. Because the Pe 
component likely reflects other processes involved in error-awareness per se 
(Nieuwenhuis et al., 2001), or attention orienting towards motivationally 
significant events (Davies, Segalowitz, Dywan, & Pailing, 2001; Ridderinkhof et 
al., 2009), or the accumulation of evidence for error commission (Steinhauser & 
Yeung, 2010), it appears that the omnipresent ruminative thoughts in depressed 
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patients may consume (attentional) resources away from the efficient 
(conscious) monitoring and registration of response errors. 
In sum, anxiety-related alterations at the level of the ERN/Ne might be 
accounted for by changes in attention control mechanisms, whereas depression-
related alterations at the level of the Pe would result from the intrusion of 
rumination. It is interesting to note that in the former case, the enhanced 
ERN/Ne could very well arise due to a proactive compensatory mechanism used 
by high anxious individuals to deal with these somehow adverse or unexpected 
events challenging self-efficacy, while in the latter case the ruminative thinking 
style of depressed patients somehow block or interfere with reactive monitoring 
processes during an efficient and rapid (conscious) registration of response 
errors (Pe effect). I come back to these considerations and conjectures in the 
section 5.1 below. 
ANXIETY-RELATED CHANGES OF INTERNAL (ERN/NE) VS. EXTERNAL (FRN) 
DRIVEN PERFORMANCE MONITORING 
Whereas in Chapter 2, I found a clear modulation of the ERN/Ne-CRN 
component as a function of trait anxiety, this effect was no longer seen in 
Chapter 4, where the same Go/noGo task was used however, but salient 
performance feedback, based on static emotional faces, was now presented to 
low. vs. high anxious participants. This apparent discrepancy might also be due to 
the fact that the average level of trait anxiety was actually lower in the high 
anxious group selected in Chapter 4 (STAI-T: M = 45; SEM = 1), compared to the 
high anxious group included in Chapter 2 (STAI-T: M = 52; SEM = 1). Given that 
previous ERP studies reported larger ERN/Ne amplitudes with higher levels of 
trait anxiety (Hajcak, McDonald, & Simons, 2003a; Olvet & Hajcak, 2008; 
Vaidyanathan et al., 2012; Weinberg, Olvet, & Hajcak, 2010), this factor might 
have played a significant role. However, we note that it is also extremely difficult 
to balance properly trait anxiety levels of samples of student participants across 
different studies. Alternatively, the use of salient (emotional facial) feedback 
after each and every action made during the Go/noGo task (Chapter 4) may 
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modulate the link between the ERN/Ne-CRN component and trait anxiety, as 
demonstrated earlier (Olvet & Hajcak, 2009a). Interestingly, when action 
monitoring is substantially helped out or assisted by the presentation of external 
evaluative feedback (informing about the accuracy or speed of self-generated 
actions), the overactive ERN/Ne component in trait anxiety is usually no longer 
visible (Olvet & Hajcak, 2009), suggesting that effects of trait anxiety on 
performance monitoring are not rigid, but they are instead context dependent. 
Accordingly, in (experimental) situations where evaluative feedback is salient and 
informative regarding task performance, participants might swiftly shift their 
action-monitoring processes from the use of internal (motor) to external (visual) 
cues. As a result, the overactive ERN/Ne in trait anxiety would somehow be 
corrected, and become comparable to the ERN/Ne of low anxious individuals. 
More generally, these observations and the new ERP results reported in 
Chapters 2 and 4 somehow challenge the notion that the ERN/Ne provides a 
reliable endophenotype of internalizing disorders, including anxiety (Olvet & 
Hajcak, 2008). In this model, amplitude variations at the level of the ERN/Ne-CRN 
component are seen as a latent variable between a specific genetic makeup or 
biological predisposition, and a clear cut symptomatology (or phenotype) 
characterized by worry and distress (Gottesman & Gould, 2003). The results 
showing that low and high anxious participants show comparable ERN/Ne and 
CRN components during early error/action monitoring when external evaluative 
feedback was presented concurrently (Chapter 4) are not consistent with this 
general framework. Yet, they also show that the processing of this external 
evaluative feedback on task performance was altered in high, compared to low 
anxious individuals (Chapter 4). Whereas both groups showed a comparable 
early emotional effect at the level of the occipito-temporal N170 ERP component 
during feedback processing (this early face-specific component being larger for 
neutral faces indicating negative compared to positive feedback, see Bentin, 
Allison, Puce, Perez, & McCarthy, 1996; Vuilleumier & Pourtois, 2007), anxiety 
influenced selectively the subsequent medial frontal FRN component, which is 
involved in performance-monitoring processes (Hajcak, Moser, Holroyd, & 
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Simons, 2006; Luu, Tucker, Derryberry, Reed, & Poulsen, 2003; Miltner, Braun, & 
Coles, 1997) . High anxious participants did not exhibit a normal FRN amplitude 
variation compared to low anxious individuals depending on the valence of the 
feedback. These results suggest that high anxious participants were still able to 
decipher properly the “extrinsic” emotional value of the feedback (N170 effect), 
but they could not relate it to the putative affective value of their action (FRN 
effect), even though it was made several hundred milliseconds before feedback 
delivery. 
This selective FRN impairment in trait anxiety (Chapter 4) during evaluative 
feedback processing is noteworthy, given the tight overlap between 
(dopaminergic-dependent) fronto-striatal brain systems underlying the 
generation of the ERN/Ne and FRN components (Frank et al., 2005; Holroyd & 
Coles, 2002). These two ERP components are assumed to reflect similar or 
generic monitoring processes, either based on internal (motor) cues (ERN/Ne) or 
external (visual) cues (FRN). Therefore, the novel ERP results reported in 
Chapters 2 and 4 provide evidence for this specific interpretation. Note however 
that in one case, an overactive ERP component (ERN/Ne, Chapter 2) is observed 
during action monitoring based on internal cues, whereas in the other case, a 
blunted ERP activity is reported when the monitoring is driven by external 
evaluative cues (FRN, Chapter 4). However, in both cases, one may assume a 
common or generic action-monitoring deficit in high anxious participants 
(Holroyd & Coles, 2002). A blunted FRN component in high anxious participants 
could be interpreted as reflecting a breakdown in the swift integration process 
linking the valence of the evaluative feedback to the affective (or prediction 
error) value of the self-generated action, prior to feedback delivery (Chapter 4). 
This assumption was indirectly verified using a complementary correlation 
analysis across participants between amplitude variations at the level of the FRN 
component and a trait-like measure of attribution style and/or locus of control 
(Rotter, 1966). Results showed that participants who had an internal (as opposed 
to external) locus of control (i.e. meaning that they usually believe that changes 
in the environment are causally related or explained by their behavior or actions) 
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had a larger FRN component differentiating between positive and negative 
feedback (Chapter 4). However, this significant correlation was only found for 
low, but not high anxious participants, suggesting indirectly that external 
performance monitoring is disrupted in these individuals because they are no 
longer able to relate the content or value of their self-generated actions to 
external performance feedback shown after them and normally readily exploited 
by participants to gauge online the outcome of their behavior (FRN effect). 
Hence, trait anxiety appears to exert pervasive effects on action-monitoring 
brain systems. Although the actual expression of these anxiety-related 
impairments could vary depending on specific contextual or situational factors 
(see Chapters 2 and 4), the basic assumption is that they likely result from a 
generic deficit in generative brain mechanisms underlying performance-
monitoring abilities, and likely encompassing (dopaminergic-dependent) fronto-
striatal loops in the human brain (Frank et al., 2005; Holroyd & Coles, 2002), 
although the link between these specific brain systems and these error-related 
ERP components recorded at the scalp level remains by definition indirect. 
SELF-GENERATED ACTIONS “AUTOMATICALLY” ACQUIRE AN AFFECTIVE COLOR 
As outlined here above and in the introduction of this dissertation, error 
detection, and performance monitoring more generally, cannot be assimilated to 
a dry cognitive process encapsulated in the dACC (see also Figure 3 in the 
introduction). This process is rapidly and dynamically modulated or guided by 
phasic changes in levels of midbrain dopamine in order to eventually facilitate 
learning, as stated by the dominant reinforcement learning theory (Frank et al., 
2005; Holroyd & Coles, 2002). Moreover, we already know that the processing of 
these motivational events (response errors or negative feedback) is also related 
to specific defensive emotional reactions (Hajcak & Foti, 2008), and differential 
amygdala effects (Polli et al., 2009; Pourtois et al., 2010). Finally, we have already 
reviewed abundant neurophysiological evidence linking overactive early error-
related components with negative affect (Hajcak et al., 2003a, 2004; 
Vaidyanathan et al., 2012). The ERP results reported in Chapters 2-4 are broadly 
GENERAL DISCUSSION  205 
  
consistent with this framework. Altogether, the present ERP results and the 
existing literature suggest that response errors are not only quickly evaluated as 
incorrect actions by dedicated brain systems, but they are also usually appraised 
in parallel as goal obstructive events, and in turn they necessarily bear a negative 
valence. However, all the results and findings reviewed so far remain somehow 
correlational in nature. Accordingly, in the last part of my doctoral dissertation 
(Chapters 5 and 6), I addressed this specific question and worked on a new 
method suited to infer indirectly the actual affective values of self-generated 
actions, including response errors. Such a “methodological” and theoretical 
development appears necessary to more directly relate and understand changes 
in early error-monitoring brain functions seen in negative affect (see Chapters 2 
to 4), with possible alterations in this fundamental appraisal process. 
Results obtained in Chapter 5 provide direct evidence for the rapid and 
automatic evaluation of self-generated actions. Errors are more negative than 
correct responses (i.e. fast hits during the Go/noGo task), while conversely, 
correct responses were treated as more positive than response errors (i.e. false 
alarms during the same Go/noGo task). This was the case when the interval 
(SOA) between the action (prime) and the word (target) was set to 300 or 600 
ms, but not 1000 ms, suggesting an automatic tagging of these self-generated 
actions, likely via dedicated meta-cognitive control systems (Fernandez-Duque et 
al., 2000; Winkielman et al., 2003). How exactly does this affective marking of 
actions operate, and which brain regions or neural networks are involved, 
remain important questions for future research (see also Chapter 6). Moreover 
and importantly, this action-word priming effect was weaker in participants 
scoring high on a standard trait-related anxiety questionnaire. Remarkably, I also 
found in Chapter 6 that this effect was related to the size of the ERN/Ne-CRN 
component. Accordingly, the observation of an altered ERN/Ne (or FRN) 
component during performance monitoring in negative affect (see Chapters 2 to 
4) could actually be explained by selective problems in ascribing a given affective 
value (either positive or negative) to self-generated actions (either correct or 
not). Therefore, I surmise that performance-monitoring deficits typically 
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observed in participants scoring high on negative affect scales could very well 
result from a specific impairment in deciphering online the actual affective value 
of their actions (positive vs. negative; good or bad; see Cacioppo & Gardner, 
1999), more than a problem in decoding rapidly the perceived accuracy of these 
actions (correct vs. incorrect). This framework appears relevant and valid at first 
sight to account for a wide range of behavioral or ERP effects seen in high 
anxious individuals during error detection and/or action monitoring. However, 
future studies are needed to gain insight into the genesis and maintenance of 
this peculiar performance-monitoring deficit in high trait anxious individuals (or 
depressed patients). 
Results of Chapter 6 shed light on the electrophysiological time-course of 
this action-word evaluative priming effect. This effect was found to influence 
earlier stages of processing after word presentation for response errors, 
compared to correct responses (Chapter 6). The EPN component (Herbert et al., 
2008; Schupp et al., 2006) was larger for positive words than negative words 
following response errors. Symmetrically, the LPP component (Schupp et al., 
2000) was larger for negative words than positive words following correct 
responses. This differential effect of action valence (or action type) on the 
electrophysiological time course of emotional word processing might be 
explained by the enhanced salience or behavioral relevance of response errors 
compared to correct responses (Pourtois et al., 2010; Sander, Grafman, & Zalla, 
2003). Accordingly, response errors influenced early perceptual stages during 
emotion word processing (EPN effect), while correct responses did so too, but 
during a later time interval when other processes likely related to attention 
control or motivated attention mechanisms likely came into play (LPP effect). At 
any rate, these preliminary ERP results (Chapter 6) confirm the differential 
processing of response errors compared to correct responses, including 
regarding the putative affective coloring of these two different action types. 
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POSSIBLE CLINICAL RELEVANCE OF THE PRESENT FINDINGS 
To better understand action monitoring in relation to negative affect from 
an affective neuroscience perspective appears valuable from a clinical point of 
view, in particular when considering the numerous attempts made in the 
literature to classify or organize mental disorders using specific taxonomies, 
while taking into account not only the phenotype, but also the underlying 
neurobiological or neurophysiological markers best characterizing specific 
mental disorders (Vaidyanathan et al., 2012). Classically, mental disorders are 
identified in psychopathology or psychiatry based on self-report measures 
and/or reliable and observable changes in the behavior, broadly defined (e.g. 
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders – DSM; American 
Psychiatric Association - DSM-IV, 2000). However, recently, the National Institute 
of Mental Health launched the Research Domain Criteria (RDoC) initiative, with 
the aim to characterize psychiatric disorders in terms of their neurobiological 
underpinnings (Insel & Cuthbert, 2009) by using and crossing experimental and 
neuroimaging methods. A similar attempt is provided by the “converging 
biomarker” approach, which is not focusing on specific neural circuits (and 
potential alterations), but on specific neurophysiological indicators, including 
specific ERP components, in order to clarify possible sources of heterogeneity or 
inconsistency within and across specific disorders or interrelated sets of 
disorders (Gilmore, Malone, & Iacono, 2010; Nelson, Patrick, & Bernat, 2011). 
With respect to anxiety and depression, this approach allows for example to 
identify and validate shared factors among these two disorders (e.g. negative 
affect), as well as isolate possible separate characteristics (e.g. arousal in anxiety 
vs. low positive affect in depression) as defined by Clark and Watson (1991), and 
eventually relate these common or distinct factors to specific neurobiological 
markers. Applied to our new neurophysiological findings, we would suggest that 
a large ERN/Ne (see Chapter 2) or a small FRN component (see Chapter 4) could 
provide reliable biomarkers of trait anxiety, while a blunted Pe component (see 
Chapter 3) would possibly characterize depression. We believe that such a 
modern approach, capitalizing on the cross-fertilization of 
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psychiatry/experimental psychopathology and brain-imaging/neurophysiology 
(e.g. ERP components), might provide a valuable alternative or tool from a 
clinical point of view, compared to other attempts currently put forward in the 
field, including the hypothesis stating that the ERN/Ne component alone 
provides a reliable endophenotype for internalizing disorders (Olvet & Hajcak, 
2008). 
As a caveat, we note however that these specific “neurobiological” markers 
(i.e. a large ERN/Ne and/or a smaller FRN component in high trait anxious 
individuals vs. a blunted Pe component in depressed patients) can probably not 
easily be generalized to other anxiety disorders without special attention (and 
careful validation work), given that although obsessive-compulsive disorder 
(OCD), post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), generalized anxiety disorder (GAD) 
or specific phobia (SP) may share some common basic features and alterations of 
specific brain regions, current neurobiological models of these disorders largely 
emphasize the lack of overlap in the underlying neural networks across them 
(Etkin & Wager, 2007; Shin & Liberzon, 2010). A potential way to address this 
problem would be to better constrain the neurobiological data and models 
available in the affective neuroscience literature with information gathered in 
neurophysiology (e.g. ERP) about the commonalities vs. differences in 
performance-monitoring abilities/impairments across these different negative 
affect disorders. Previous error-monitoring ERP studies already showed that an 
increased ERN/Ne component might actually be particularly related to the worry 
or apprehension component of anxiety, such as observed in OCD (Endrass et al., 
2010) or GAD (Weinberg et al., 2010), but much less to the concurrent arousal 
component, such as in specific phobia (Moser, Hajcak, & Simons, 2005). Crossing 
results from neurophysiology, imaging and psychiatry might help delineate the 
boundaries between these non-overlapping negative affect disorders, and 
eventually guide their diagnosis and treatment in clinical practice. 
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FUTURE DIRECTIONS 
ERN/Ne vs. Pe: Proactive vs. reactive control? 
According to recent models of cognitive control (Braver, 2012), this 
fundamental ability is not a unitary construct, but it consists of proactive and 
reactive control mechanisms. In this view, proactive control is seen as a form of 
“early selection” through which a sustained and anticipatory maintenance of 
goal-relevant information allows for optimal cognitive performance. This 
function is related to dopaminergic inputs. By contrast, reactive control acts as a 
“late correction” mechanism that is mainly activated when needed, such as after 
the detection of an interfering event (e.g. response error or negative feedback). 
Unlike proactive control, reactive control does not depend on dopaminergic 
inputs. This general framework appears valuable to interpret some of our novel 
ERP findings, as well as generate specific predictions for future experiments or 
research. 
I mainly interpreted the altered ERN/Ne component in anxious individuals 
(Chapter 2) as reflecting possibly a compensatory “attention control” mechanism 
(Eysenck et al., 2007), namely an increase in the amount of efforts or resources 
spent in the task in order to prevent in the future the re-occurrence of these 
negative events associated with worrisome thoughts, and eventually maintain a 
high accuracy. As such, this mechanism resembles a proactive control 
mechanism, which would therefore be exacerbated in high anxious individuals. 
Moreover, because the ERN/Ne (and FRN) component has previously been linked 
to specific dopaminergic-related reinforcement learning changes in the human 
brain (Frank et al., 2005; Holroyd & Coles, 2002), this early ERP component likely 
qualifies as a good candidate or ERP marker of proactive control (see Braver, 
2012). 
By contrast, the blunted Pe component seen in depressed patients 
(Chapter 3) during early error monitoring and likely indexing a decreased 
(conscious) action-monitoring control because of excessive interfering 
ruminative thoughts, could indirectly be linked to an impaired reactive control 
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mechanism during error monitoring in these patients. In one case (anxiety), the 
disorder would result from an overactive proactive control mechanism (ERN/Ne 
component) without changes at the level of the reactive control systems (Pe 
component). By contrast, in the other case (depression), a deleterious reactive 
control mechanism would explain the observed error monitoring deficits. 
Therefore, we propose that the dissociable effects of anxiety vs. depression on 
early error-related ERP components (ERN/Ne vs. Pe component) might actually 
arise thanks to selective alterations in proactive vs. reactive cognitive control 
mechanisms. 
To put to the test this assumption, future studies could for example 
manipulate the valence or nature of the feedback on task performance during 
the same speeded Go/noGo task (see also Chapter 4), given that penalty 
incentives have been suggested to produce a shift towards reactive control, 
while the encounter of reward incentives produced a shift towards proactive 
control (Braver, Paxton, Locke, & Barch, 2009; Locke & Braver, 2008). 
Accordingly, it might be interesting to explore in future ERP studies changes in 
early error-related brain activities (ERN/Ne and Pe component) when correct 
responses are rewarded, or alternatively response errors are punished, 
producing an increase in proactive or reactive cognitive control, respectively. 
According to this dual mechanisms framework (Braver, 2012), the first 
manipulation should normally lead to a larger ERN/Ne component in high 
anxious individuals (Chapter 2), whereas the latter condition might actually 
restore a normal Pe component in depressed patients (Chapter 3). 
The affective value of self-generated actions and the locus of control 
A specific feature of high anxious individuals is that they usually show an 
increased tendency to attribute the causes of their actions to external factors or 
forces (i.e. external locus of control; Archer, 1979). These “externalizing” 
individuals are thus prone to believe that the outcome of their action is 
contingent upon events happening outside their personal control or volition. By 
contrast, “internalizing” participants usually believe that the outcome of their 
action is causally related to their behavior or “intrinsic” forces (Zimbardo, 1985). 
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The perceived link between self-generated actions and their outcome seems 
thus to be weaker in distressed individuals, and therefore it might result in a 
decreased capacity to tag or read out, using dedicated internal monitoring 
systems, specific affective or motivational values associated with these actions. 
The novel ERP results (Chapter 4) and behavioral findings (Chapter 5) reported in 
this doctoral dissertation provide indirect evidence for this account. However, 
additional studies are needed to verify whether the differential attribution style, 
or “locus of control” per se, in high anxious individuals can account for the 
observed changes at the electrophysiological level (e.g. ERN/Ne and FRN 
components; see Chapters 2 and 4), as well as the observed reduction of the 
action-word affective priming effect (Chapter 5) during error detection or 
performance monitoring. 
This could be achieved for example by directly manipulating the perceived 
locus of control or overall perceived controllability or competence in low vs. high 
anxious individuals, and assess how these manipulations could eventually 
influence early error-monitoring brain functions (ERN/Ne and Pe effects; see also 
Inzlicht & Al-Khindi, in press), as well as feedback processing (FRN effect). In this 
context, the manipulation in well-controlled laboratory conditions of the content 
and/or veracity of the feedback given on task performance may provide an 
interesting avenue for future research (see also Chapter 4). A decreased 
controllability and a shift towards external evaluative cues may be obtained 
when feedback given on task performance become somehow unpredictable (see 
also Chapter 4). Such an effect should normally yield a shift from internal (motor-
related) to external (visually-driven) action-monitoring processes, with traceable 
effects at the ERN/Ne and FRN levels (Eppinger, Kray, Mock, & Mecklinger, 2008; 
Frank et al., 2005). An opposite or symmetric manipulation could eventually be 
tested, whereby the perceived controllability and the use of internal monitoring 
cues could artificially be reinforced throughout the experimental session, for 
example by omitting now and then to present feedback on task performance. It 
would be particularly interesting to explore if and how trait anxiety or depression 
may reliably influence the unfolding of these action-monitoring processes. 
  
NEDERLANDSTALIGE SAMENVATTING 
INLEIDING 
Een accurate en snelle detectie van fouten is noodzakelijk om ons gedrag 
aan te passen (Holroyd& Coles, 2002). Onderzoek heeft echter aangetoond dat 
fouten of incorrecte acties niet enkel dienen als motivationele signalen die het 
leren bevorderen, maar verschillende onderzoekers hebben ook aangetoond dat 
de detectie van een fout gepaard gaat met emotionele veranderingen zoals 
defensieve reacties, die bijvoorbeeld tot uiting komen in een sterkere “startle 
response” (Hajcak & Foti, 2008; Pourtois et al., 2010), en een verhoogde 
waakzaamheid, orienting of aandacht (Notebaert et al., 2009; Ridderinkhof, 
Ramautar, & Wijnen, 2009). Deze bevindingen worden ook ondersteund door 
studies in de affectieve neurowetenschappen die laten zien dat mensen die 
gevoelig zijn voor negatief affect, zoals angstige of depressieve mensen, over een 
overactief of hypersensitief foutenmonitoring systeem in de hersenen 
beschikken (Olvet & Hajcak, 2008; Vaidyanathan, Nelson, & Patrick, 2012). Wat 
dit hyperactief systeem in deze groepen met negatief affect betekent, is echter 
niet helemaal duidelijk. Heeft dit te maken met problemen in de executieve 
controle, of duidt dit op een verschillende motivationele/affectieve reactie t.o.v. 
fouten? 
Fouten worden al zeer vroeg (in de orde van milliseconden) in de hersenen 
gedetecteerd m.b.v. de excellente temporeel sensitieve techniek “het elektro-
encefalogram” (EEG). Wanneer het EEG wordt geregistreerd tijdens het maken 
van een fout en vervolgens gemiddeld worden over het totale aantal fouten dat 
gemaakt wordt tijdens een taak, ontstaat er in het EEG een ‘event-related 
potential’ die de cognitieve informatieverwerking tijdens een fout reflecteert. 
Onderzoekers hebben in deze foutengerelateerde potentiaal een zeer vroege, 
binnen de 100 ms, en scherpe negativiteit geobserveerd die geregistreerd wordt 
op frontocentrale elektroden (Fcz) en gegenereerd wordt door het dorsale 
214  NEDERLANDSTALIGE SAMENVATTING 
 
gedeelte van de anterieure cingulate cortex (ACC), en hebben dit de “error-
related negativity” of fouten gerelateerde negativiteit (ERN/Ne) genoemd 
(Falkenstein, Hoormann, Christ, &Hohnsbein, 2000; Frank, Woroch, &Curran, 
2005; Holroyd & Coles, 2002). Deze component wordt geacht de vroege, 
generieke en automatische reactie op fouten te weerspiegelen en wordt meer 
specifiek verondersteld de mismatch weer te geven tussen een gewenste of 
intentionele actie en de eigenlijke actie (Holroyd & Coles, 2002). Een 
gelijkaardige maar kleinere negativiteit wordt soms ook geobserveerd na 
correcte acties en wordt de correct gerelateerde negativiteit (CRN) genoemd. 
Sommige onderzoekers veronderstellen dat de ERN/Ne en de CRN dezelfde 
processen reflecteren (Falkenstein et al., 2000; Roger, Bénar, Vidal, Hasbroucq, & 
Burle, 2010; Vidal, Burle, Bonnet, Grapperon, &Hasbroucq, 2003). Deze ERN/Ne 
component wordt gevolgd door een grote positieve component, de “error 
positivity” (Pe), die het maximaal is 150-300 ms na het maken van een fout en 
wordt gegenereerd door meer rostrale ACC gebieden alsook door de posterieure 
cingulate cortex en de insula (Dhar, Wiersema, &Pourtois, 2011; Falkenstein, 
Hohnsbein, Hoormann, & Blanke, 1991; Falkenstein et al., 2000; Herrmann, 
Rommler, Ehlis, Heidrich, & Fallgatter, 2004; Nieuwenhuis, Ridderinkhof, Blow, 
Band, & Kok, 2001; O'Connell et al., 2007; Overbeek, Nieuwenhuis, & 
Ridderinkhof, 2005). In tegenstelling tot de functionele significantie van de 
ERN/Ne, wordt verondersteld dat de Pe meer gecontroleerde of bewuste 
foutenverwerkingsprocessen weerspiegelt. De ERN/Ne, CRN en Pe zijn dus ERP 
componenten die gerelateerd zijn aan de interne detectie van fouten. Een 
component die echter gerelateerd is aan de externe detectie van fouten is de 
“feedback gerelateerde negativiteit” (FRN). Deze component is zeer gelijkaardig 
aan de ERN/Ne op elektrofysiologisch gebied en er wordt verondersteld dat deze 
component processen weerspiegelt die gelijkaardig zijn aan deze die 
gereflecteerd worden in de ERN/Ne component. De FRN is gewoonlijk groter 
voor negatieve vergeleken met positieve feedback en ook groter voor 
onverwachte vergeleken met verwachte feedback. 
NEDERLANDSTALIGE SAMENVATTING  215 
  
De foutengerelateerde processen in de hersenen blijken gevoelig te zijn 
voor veranderingen in negatief affect. Gedragsstudies hebben al aangetoond dat 
individuen die hoog scoren op negatief affect een verhoogde gevoeligheid 
vertonen voor fouten en negatieve feedback (Abela & D’Alessandro, 2002; Beats, 
Sahakian, & Levy, 1996; Conway, Howell, & Giannopoulos, 1991; Elliott, 
Sahakian, Herrod, Robbins, & Paykel, 1997; Elliott et al., 1996; Enns & Cox, 1999; 
Henriques & Leitenberg, 2002; Holmes & Pizzagalli, 2008; Pizzagalli et al., 2006; 
Shafran & Mansel, 2001). Dat negatief affect foutenverwerking beïnvloedt, werd 
ook bevestigd door ERP studies. In deze studies werd meer specifiek een 
verhoogde ERN/Ne en/of CRN amplitude geobserveerd (Olvet & Hajcak, 2008; 
Vaidyanathan et al., 2012) en sommige onderzoekers hebben daarom gesteld dat 
de ERN/Ne als een marker kan dienen voor de diagnose van stoornissen zoals 
angst en depressie, die beide gekarakteriseerd worden door een hoog niveau van 
negatief affect (Olvet&Hajcak, 2008). Angst wordt inderdaad systematisch gelinkt 
aan een vergrote ERN/Ne (Hajcak, McDonald, & Simons, 2003; Olvet & Hajcak, 
2008; Simons, 2010; Vaidyanathan et al., 2012; Vocat, Pourtois, & Vuilleumier, 
2008). Het plaatje voor depressie is echter minder duidelijk (Chiu & Deldin, 2007; 
Compton et al., 2008; Foti & Hajcak, 2009; Holmes & Pizzagalli, 2008; Pizzagalli, 
Peccoralo, Davidson, & Cohen, 2006; Santesso et al., 2008; Schrijvers et al., 2008; 
Schrijvers et al., 2009). Echter, wat deze modulaties door negatief affect in 
foutengerelateerde componenten zoals de ERN/Ne en CRN, alsook de Pe en FRN 
echter betekenen is niet geheel duidelijk. Is dit een gevolg van problemen in de 
executieve controle waarmee angstige en depressieve individuen gekenmerkt 
worden, of duidt dit op een deviante motivationele en/of emotionele reactie 
t.o.v. fouten in deze groepen vergeleken met gezonde controles? 
Deze vraag heb ik getracht te beantwoorden in dit proefschrift door 
gebruik te maken van standaard experimentele methoden en EEG/ERP’s. Het 
gebruik van deze methode en techniek maakte het mogelijk hersenprocessen 
gerelateerd aan de verwerking van fouten in hoog-angstige studenten en 
depressieve patiënten te onderzoeken en om de functionele betekenis van 
veranderingen in deze processen bloot te leggen. De experimentele taak die in al 
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de studies gebruikt werd in dit proefschrift, was de “Go/noGo” taak. Een 
belangrijk kenmerk van deze taak is dat de deelnemers zo snel mogelijk moeten 
reageren wanneer een bepaalde visuele stimulus, in dit geval een pijl (Go), op 
het scherm verschijnt, terwijl ze hun respons moeten onderdrukken wanneer er 
een andere specifieke stimulus (noGo) verschijnt. Fouten op deze taak worden 
gemaakt wanneer de deelnemer zijn/haar respons niet kan onderdrukken, dus 
als de inhibitie faalt (i.e. Vals Alarm) en de detectie van deze soort fout is 
gebaseerd op een interne voorstelling van de juiste actie. In deze taak was echter 
niet alleen de juistheid of accuraatheid, maar ook de snelheid van de actie 
belangrijk en daarom werd er ook feedback gegeven na elke actie. Zo werden 
deelnemers geïnformeerd of ze al dan niet juist en/of snel genoeg waren. In dit 
geval bevindt de voorstelling van de correcte actie zich dus buiten de persoon of 
in de omgeving. Zowel de “interne” verwerking van fouten (Hoofdstuk 2 en 3) als 
de “externe” (Hoofdstuk 3) werden onderzocht in dit proefschrift m.b.t. negatief 
affect (i.e. angst en depressie). Verder werd er ook een nieuw paradigma 
ontwikkeld om de affectieve waarde van acties af te leiden tijdens de Go/noGo 
taak (Hoofdstuk 5 en 6) om zo een beter inzicht te krijgen in de betekenis van 
veranderde foutengerelateerde hersenprocessen in angstige en depressieve 
mensen. Een gedetailleerd overzicht van deze bevindingen wordt hieronder 
gegeven. 
OVERZICHT VAN DE BEVINDINGEN 
In Hoofdstuk 2 werd de predictie getest dat een grotere ERN/Ne 
component niet enkel een overactief of hypersensitief foutenmonitoring 
systeem in angstige mensen weerspiegelt, maar dat dit ook kan gepaard gaan 
met een afwijkende manier van fouten verwerken. Daarom hebben we in deze 
studie niet enkel naar kwantitatieve veranderingen in de ERN/Ne component 
(i.e. amplitude) gekeken maar ook naar kwalitatieve veranderingen (i.e. 
topografie en onderliggende hersenstructuren die de ERN/Ne component 
genereren). Laag- en hoog-angstige studenten voerden de Go/noGo taak uit 
terwijl hun EEG werd gemeten.De gedragsresultaten lieten zien dat zowel laag- 
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als hoog-angstige studenten evenveel fouten maakten en dat ze even snel 
reageerden. De ERN/Ne component bleek echter groter te zijn in hoog- 
vergeleken met laag-angstige studenten en meer ventrale ACC gebieden waren 
betrokken tijdens deze vroege detectie van fouten bij hoog-angstige studenten. 
De Pe component daarentegen was niet verschillend tussen de twee groepen. 
Deze resultaten suggereren dat angst de emotionele of motivationele verwerking 
van een fout beïnvloedt. 
Omdat angst en depressie sterk overlappende en comorbide stoornissen 
zijn(Clark & Watson, 1991; Mineka, Watson, & Clark, 1998; Watson et al., 1995), 
werd een gelijkaardige methode gebruikt in Hoofdstuk 3 om vroege 
foutendetectie processen in depressieve patiënten te onderzoeken. Dezelfde 
Go/noGo taak als in Hoofdstuk 2 werd gebruikt in dit experiment en het EEG 
werd opnieuw gemeten. Depressieve patiënten maakten evenveel fouten als 
gezonde controles en zoals verwacht waren depressieve mensen in het 
algemeen trager. Echter, in tegenstelling tot de ERN/Ne resultaten bij hoog-
angstige studenten in de vorige studie, was de amplitude van de ERN/Ne niet 
verhoogd in depressieve patiënten.De bijkomende topografische en neurale 
bronlokalisatie analyses toonden echter wel aan dat er extra gebieden namelijk 
dorsolaterale prefrontale gebieden (naast de klassieke mediale frontale en 
dorsale ACC regio’s) werden gerekruteerd tijdens de vroege verwerking van een 
fout bij depressieve patiënten. Deze activering zou gerelateerd kunnen zijn aan 
ruminatie tijdens de vroege detectie van een fout bij depressieve patiënten. De 
Pe daarentegen was kleiner bij depressieve individuen en ging gepaard met een 
sterkere rekrutering van ventrale cingulate gebieden. Dit laatste effect bleek 
gerelateerd te zijn aan het niveau van ruminatie. De studies die beschreven zijn 
in Hoofdstuk 2 en 3 laten dus een dissociatief effect van angst en depressie zien 
op de foutengerelateerde componenten, ERN/Ne en Pe. 
In Hoofdstuk 4 werd er vervolgens gekeken of trekangst ook, naast 
“interne” fouten detectie processen (zie Hoofdstuk 2), “externe” fouten detectie 
processen in de hersenen beïnvloedt, aangezien de ERN/Ne en de FRN 
verondersteld worden eenzelfde neurale systeem te delen (Holroyd & Coles, 
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2002). Daarvoor werd de Go/noGo taak aangepast en werd er meer bepaald 
salliante feedback aangeboden na elke actie terwijl EEG werd gemeten bij laag- 
en hoog-angstige studenten. In tegenstelling tot de resultaten die beschreven 
zijn in Hoofdstuk 2, werd in dit experiment geen effect van angst gevonden op de 
ERN/Ne of Pe amplitude. De FRN was echter wel gemoduleerd door angst. De 
FRN in hoog-angstige deelnemers bleek veel kleiner te zijn dan de FRN in laag-
angstige deelnemers. Angst blijkt dus een effect te hebben op het monitoren van 
acties en meer specifiek op interne alsook op externe representaties van acties. 
In Hoofdstuk 5 stellen we een nieuw gedragsexperiment voor dat 
gebaseerd is op het evaluatieve priming paradigma en waarmee we gepoogd 
hebben om de affectieve waarde van zelf gegenereerde acties te meten. 
Hiermee wilden we meer specifiek te weten komen of de affectieve waarde van 
een actie automatische geactiveerd wordt en daarom werd in dit paradigma elke 
actie in de Go/noGo taak gevolgd (SOA = 300 in Experiment 1 en 2; SOA = 600 in 
Experiment 3 en SOA = 1000 ms in Experiment 4) door een positief of negatief 
woord dat zo snel mogelijk als positief of negatief moest worden geclassificeerd. 
Zoals voorspeld werd een evaluatief priming effect geobserveerd wanneer de 
SOA relatief kort was (i.e. SOA = 300 ms of 600 ms), maar niet wanneer deze 
langer was (i.e. 1000 ms). Negatieve woorden werden dus sneller 
gecategoriseerd na een fout dan na een correcte respons en positieve woorden 
sneller na een correcte respons. Als de valentie van het woord dus congruent 
was met de valentie van de actie, werd er sneller geantwoord. De affectieve 
waarde die gerelateerd is aan de juistheid van een actie blijkt dus snel en 
automatisch geëvalueerd te worden en fouten blijken als meer negatief te 
worden beoordeeld vergeleken met correcte reacties. Dit effect was echter 
kleiner wanneer het angstniveau van de deelnemer hoger was, wat zou kunnen 
wijzen op een verstoorde vroege automatische verwerking van de emotionele 
waarde van zelf gegenereerde acties. 
In Hoofdstuk 6 werden vervolgens de elektrofysiologische correlaten 
onderzocht van dit evaluatieve priming effect. De resultaten van deze studie 
toonden meer bepaald dat de grootte van het evaluatieve priming effect 
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gerelateerd was aan de sensitiviteit van de ERN/Ne/CRN aan de accuraatheid van 
acties; als het verschil tussen de ERN/Ne en de CRN groot was, werd er ook een 
groter verschil in de snelheid gevonden waarmee positieve en negatieve 
woorden werden gecategoriseerd. Dit suggereert dat de ERN/Ne/CRN 
component gerelateerd is aan de affectieve verwerking van acties. Verder 
vonden we ook dat fouten de vroege perceptuele componenten gerelateerd aan 
de emotionele verwerking van woorden beïnvloedde (i.e. “early posterior 
negativity” - EPN component; Herbert, Junghöfer, & Kissler, 2008; Schupp, 
Flaisch, Stockburger, &Junghöfer, 2006), terwijl correcte responsen latere 
processen beïnvloedde (i.e. “late positive potential” - LPP component; Hajcak, 
MacNamara, &Olvet, 2010; Olofsson, Nordin, Sequeira, &Polich, 2008; Schupp et 
al., 2000). Dit verschil in tijdsverloopgeeft aan dat fouten gerelateerd zijn aan 
een verhoogde motivatie of affect. 
CONCLUSIE 
Deze resultaten hebben belangrijke implicaties voor het verband tussen 
foutengerelateerde componenten zoals de ERN/Ne, Pe en FRN, en negatief 
affect. In wat volgt, zullen eerst de geobserveerde dissocieerbare effecten van 
angst en depressie op de ERN/Ne en Pe ERP componenten besproken worden. 
Vervolgens wordt het effect van angst op interne en externe 
foutenmonitoringsprocessen besproken (ERN/Ne vs. FRN). Tot slot wordt dieper 
ingegaan op het verband tussen affect en het monitoren van acties (correcte en 
incorrecte) in het algemeen en wordt er besproken of dit verband anders zou 
kunnen zijn in depressieve en angstige mensen. 
ERN/Ne-angst vs. Pe-depressie? 
In eerste instantie bestudeerden we het effect van twee stoornissen of 
trekken, die gerelateerd zijn aan negatief affect, op het verwerken van fouten. 
Olvet and Hajcak (2008) hebben gesteld dat negatief affect en internalizerende 
stoornissen zoals angst en depressie gepaard gaan met een grotere ERN/Ne. De 
resultaten die geobserveerd werden in de studies beschreven in Hoofdstuk 2 en 
3, laten inderdaad zien dat negatief affect of internalizerende stoornissen 
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foutengerelateerde componenten beïnvloeden. Trekangst bleek echter de 
ERN/Ne te beïnvloeden: hoog angstige mensen hadden een grotere ERN/Ne en 
rekruteerden meer ventrale ACC gebieden. Depressie bleek echter meer de Pe te 
beïnvloeden: depressieve patiënten hadden een kleinere Pe en rekruteerden 
minder ventrale ACC gebieden. Deze resultaten bevestigen dus dat de ERN/Ne 
en Pe verschillende processen tijdens het monitoren van fouten omvatten 
(Nieuwenhuis et al., 2001; Overbeek et al., 2005; Ridderinkhof et al., 2009). 
Terwijl de ERN/Ne een snelle en automatische detectie van een fout weergeeft, 
vertaalt de Pe component zich meer in gecontroleerde of bewuste 
foutendetectie processen (Dhar et al., 2011; Endrass, Franke, & Kathmann, 2005; 
Nieuwenhuis et al., 2001; O'Connell et al., 2007) die de verdere accumulatie van 
evidentie omtrent het maken van een fout weergeeft (Steinhauser & Yeung, 
2010). 
Veranderingen in de ERN/Ne werden geïnterpreteerd in het kader van de 
“attentional control theory” (Eysenck, Derakshan, Santos, &Calvo, 2007), die stelt 
dat angstige mensen zich meer inspannen tijdens een cognitieve taak om zo te 
compenseren voor het feit dat ze zich zorgen maken over fouten die ze 
eventueel in de toekomst kunnen maken en om fouten in de toekomst te 
vermijden. Een verhoogde ERN/Ne zou dus wijzen op een grotere inspanning. 
Een verhoogde ERN/Ne werd niet gevonden in depressieve patiënten, wat zou 
kunnen wijzen op het feit dat deze patiënten geen compensatiegedrag vertonen 
om met hun intrusieve gedachten om te gaan. Daarentegen, depressieve 
mensen die geneigd zijn om te focussen op negatieve gebeurtenissen in het 
verleden, zouden meer focussen op fouten die ze “in het verleden” hebben 
gemaakt (i.e. rumineren) waardoor ze minder aandacht hebben voor de verdere 
“bewuste” verwerking van een fout, wat gereflecteerd zou worden in een 
kleinere Pe component. 
Een verschillend effect van angst op interne en externe foutendetectie 
processen 
In tweede instantie hebben we de vraag trachten te beantwoorden of 
angst, naast interne foutendetectie processen, ook externe foutendetectie 
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processen in de hersenen beïnvloedt. Hieruit bleek eerst en vooral dat, in een 
taak waarin duidelijke externe feedback wordt aangeboden, angst geen effect 
meer heeft op interne foutendetectie processen. Deze bevinding bevestigt dus 
niet de hypothese van Olvet en Hajcak (2008) die de ERN/Ne als een 
endophenotype van angst zien. Angst bleek echter wel een effect te hebben op 
externe foutendetectie: De FRN in hoog-angstige individuen discrimineerde 
minder tussen negatieve en positieve feedback, dan de FRN in laag-angstige 
individuen. Alhoewel deze observatie contrasteert met de interne foutendetectie 
(ERN/Ne) bevindingen in hoofdstuk 2 waar een grotere ERN/Ne was 
geobserveerd voor hoog- vergeleken met laag-angstige studenten, lijken deze 
FRN resultaten wel te bevestigen dat angst actie-monitoring processen (interne 
en externe) lijken te verstoren.  
De kleinere FRN in hoog angstige individuen zou een gevolg kunnen zijn 
van een probleem in de monitoring van de actie die voorafging aan de feedback 
en zou meer specifiek de integratie tussen de waarde van deze actie en de 
valentie van de feedback beïnvloeden. Deze interpretatie werd indirect bevestigd 
door de correlatie tussen de FRN amplitude en de mate van het hebben van een 
interne locus of control (i.e. het niveau waarop mensen geloven dat 
veranderingen in de omgeving door hun acties worden veroorzaakt). Deze 
correlatie laat zien dat de FRN groter wordt naarmate mensen meer het gevoel 
hebben dat ze zelf (of hun acties) de controle hebben over of de oorzaak zijn van 
de veranderingen in hun omgeving. Echter, deze correlatie werd enkel in laag 
angstige individuen geobserveerd. 
Zelf gegenereerde acties verwerven automatisch een affectieve waarde 
Onderzoek heeft aangetoond dat fouten niet enkel het leren bevorderen 
(Frank et al., 2005; Holroyd& Coles, 2002), maar dat deze ook gepaard gaan met 
emotionele veranderingen. Zo werden er veranderingen in defensieve reacties 
(Hajcak & Foti, 2008) en in amygdala activiteit (Polli et al., 2009; Pourtois et al., 
2010) geobserveerd na een fout. Deze eerdere bevindingen uit de literatuur 
werden verder indirect ondersteund door de effecten van negatief affect, op de 
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detectie van fouten, die geobserveerd werden in de studies beschreven in 
Hoofdstuk 2 t.e.m. 4. 
De resultaten in de studies beschreven in Hoofdstuk 5 en 6 bevestigen 
verder het idee dat fouten gerelateerd zijn aan negatief affect. Door gebruik te 
maken van het evaluatieve priming paradigma observeerden we namelijk dat 
acties snel en automatisch geëvalueerd worden op een affectieve schaal (positief 
– negatief) en dat fouten vs. correcte acties vroege en late aandachtsprocessen 
tijdens emotionele woordverwerking op een verschillende manier beïnvloeden 
(fouten-EPN vs. correcte acties-LPP). Dit suggereert verder dat fouten vs. 
correcte acties anders verwerkt worden op affectief gebied.  
Meer nog, het evaluatieve priming effect bleek kleiner te zijn naarmate het 
niveau van angst hoger werd en het bleek ook gerelateerd te zijn aan de mate 
waarin de ERN/Ne discrimineerde tussen correcte en incorrecte acties. Naarmate 
de ERN/Ne meer discrimineerde tussen correcte en incorrecte acties, was ook 
het evaluatieve priming effect groter. Deze observaties suggereren dat een 
afwijkende monitoring van fouten bij angstige of depressieve individuen zou 
kunnen te wijten zijn aan het feit dat deze individuen problemen vertonen in het 
automatisch koppelen van een affectieve waarde aan hun acties (positief vs. 
negatief; goed of slecht; zie Cacioppo & Gardner, 1999). 
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